POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Victor D. Cha
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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

VICTOR D. CHA and DAVID C. KANG debate the strengths and weaknesses of an engagement policy to rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons program. From different perspectives, the two authors analyze common misconceptions about North Korean intentions and strategies as well as debate the merits of a harder-line approach taken by the United States toward the reclusive regime. Whether one views Pyongyang's intentions with greater skepticism (Cha) or greater flexibility (Kang), the authors argue that some form of engagement, not military preemption, is advisable.

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. analyzes recent developments in U.S. foreign policy in light of evidence that the essential soft power of the United States has eroded. He suggests that the challenges posed by transnational terrorism require more attention to soft power and cooperation with allies and institutions.

ATHAN G. THEOHARIS surveys FBI practices in the maintenance and destruction of records. He documents how this permitted FBI officials to abuse power and undermine accountability.

KURT WEYLAND discusses the political sustainability of Latin America's new market model. He argues that despite its disappointing socioeconomic performance thus far, the new development scheme has retained significant popular support. Furthermore, stringent economic constraints make significant deviations from market-oriented policies costly and unattractive, as case studies of contemporary Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela show.

EVELYN M. SIMIEN posits that black feminist consciousness arises from an understanding of intersecting patterns of discrimination. Using data from the 1993–1994 National Black Politics Study (NBPS), she develops and validates a measure of black feminist consciousness. Along the way, she considers whether the level of support for black feminist consciousness differs across gender.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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The Debate over North Korea

VICTOR D. CHA
DAVID C. KANG

Much as political scientists would like to believe otherwise, the strength of any new U.S. foreign policy doctrine historically stands not on its principles and logic, but on its material results. In this regard, there is no denying that U.S. military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, the capture of Saddam Hussein, the start of nuclear talks with Iran, and the agreement by Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi to submit to international nuclear inspections are impressive even to critics of the Bush administration. Although each of these developments is far from conclusive, they offer arguable evidence of the Bush doctrine's effectiveness. Yet, one member of the "axis of evil" remains recalcitrant—the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). In social science terms, the DPRK remains a "hard test" of the Bush doctrine's effectiveness at rolling back nuclear capabilities in rogue regimes. Unlike the suspected or potential nuclear weapons programs of Iraq or Libya, North Korea's program is real, developing, and already most likely churning out nuclear weapons. North Korean officials reportedly are fond of telling their American interlocutors that the United States should stop trying to roll back North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and should start thinking about how to live with a nuclear North Korea.

Indeed, the DPRK has emerged in the past decade as the subject of the most divisive foreign policy issues for the United States and its allies in Asia. Interested parties have disagreed vehemently over the regime's intentions and goals and over the appropriate strategy that the United States should employ in dealing with this country.

VICTOR D. CHA is associate professor of government and D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair in Asian Studies at Georgetown University. He is the award-winning author of *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* and coauthor, with David Kang, of *Nuclear North Korea.* Cha serves as an independent consultant of the U.S. government and financial private sector and has testified before Congress on Asian security issues. DAVID C. KANG is associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College. He is the author of *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* and coauthor of *Nuclear North Korea.*

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The debates over North Korea's bombshell admission in October 2002 of a second secret nuclear weapons program, over their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and over the ensuing crisis in 2003 are only the most proximate illustrations of the perennial division of views on the opaque regime. Many "hawks" or hardliners assert that Pyongyang's conduct not only amounted to a violation of a series of nonproliferation agreements (that is, the NPT, the 1994 U.S.–DPRK Agreed Framework, and the 1992 Korean Denuclearization Declaration) but also revealed the fundamentally unchanged and "evil" intentions of the Kim Jong Il regime. Hence, to hardliners, the only policy worth pursuing is isolation and containment, abandoning the "sunshine" policy of unconditional engagement made famous by former president Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea).[1] Others argue, by contrast, that North Korea's need for such a secret program, albeit in violation of standing agreements, derives from basic insecurity and fears of U.S. preemption. In this vein, Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju's admission of the secret nuclear program, this view purports, was a "cry for help" to draw a reluctant Bush administration into direct talks.[2] The former denigrate the latter as weak-kneed appeasers. The latter dismiss the former as irresponsible hawkish ideologues.

The North Korean problem, moreover, has become intricately tied to partisan politics: rivalries between the executive branch and Congress, controversies over intelligence assessments, the viability of the nonproliferation regime, the efficacy of homeland defense, and differing assessments of the utility of deterrence versus preemption in U.S. security doctrine. That is a pretty impressive record of troublemaking for the small, closed, and arguably most backward country in the post–Cold War world!

Obviously, the crux of the concern over North Korea stems from the threats it poses to its neighbors with its conventional military forces, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction capabilities. North Korea boasts a 1.1 million-man army in forward positions bearing down on the border separating the two Koreas (the Demilitarized Zone or DMZ). It is infamously known as an aggressive exporter of ballistic missile technology to regimes such as Iran and Pakistan. Its drive for nuclear weapons in earnest dates back to the 1980s, and its interest in them to even before then. Many experts believe the DPRK holds one of the largest stockpiles of biological and chemical agents in the world. And at the same time that the regime militarily empowers itself, it starves its citizens at home. This combination of policies elicits a plethora of colorful epithets and

[1] Victor Gilinsky, "North Korea as the Ninth Nuclear Power?" Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online, PFO 02-10A, accessed at http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0210A_Victor.html, 22 October 2002; "Answering North Korea," *Washington Post*, 18 October 2002; and "North Korea and the End of the Agreed Framework," *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder* No. 1605, 18 October 2002.

[2] Jimmy Carter, "Engaging North Korea," *New York Times*, 27 October 2002; Leon Sigal, "A Bombshell that's Actually an Olive Branch," *Los Angeles Times*, 18 October 2002; and Jekuk Chang, "Pyongyang's New Strategy of 'Frank Admission,'" Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online PFO02-11A, accessed at http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0211A_Chang.html, 24 October 2002.

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hyperbole concerning the regime and its leader, Kim Jong Il. A major U.S.-based news magazine covered the unexpected death of the first leader of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, in July 1994, with the cover story, "The Headless Beast."[3] A *Washington Post* (29 December 2002) op-ed contribution referred to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as a "radioactive lunatic."[4] The cover story of *Newsweek* (13 January 2003) carried a picture of the North Korean leader, clad in chic black, with the caption "Dr. Evil." Greta Van Susteren introduced a *Fox News* story on Kim Jong Il with the opening question, "Is he insane or simply diabolical?"[5]

Policy on North Korea has become a political football. In South Korea, the conservatives bash the liberal incumbent government over what they term an appeasement of North Korea. Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy has become so politicized that one can no longer distinguish between criticisms of the policy and character assassinations of the president. In the United States as well, engagement of North Korea and the "Agreed Framework" have become such a partisan issue that one cannot tell whether detractors object to the merits of the policy or the policy's association with the Clinton administration. Congressmen Benjamin Gilman and Christopher Cox claimed a U.S. policy of engagement with North Korea was the equivalent of entering "a cycle of extortion with North Korea" and nothing more than a "one-sided love affair."[6] While some saw engagement during the Clinton administration as one of the "unsung success stories" of American foreign policy,[7] it was elsewhere condemned as "the screwiest policy . . . ever seen."[8] While some saw incentives as a responsible way to try to transform the regime, outspoken figures such as Senator John McCain accused the Clinton administration of being "intimidated" by a puny country and charged that the American president had become a "co-conspirator" with DPRK leader Kim Jong Il.[9] Some even argued, moreover, that the United States was encouraging North Korean aggression with a policy of appeasement that rewarded bad behavior and "encouraged all these crazy people over in North Korea to believe we are weaklings because we are giving them everything they want."[10] Pat Buchanan criticized both the Clinton and Bush administrations for giving Kim Jong Il a "fruit basket" and "sweet reason," rather than a "tomahawk missile."[11]

[3] *Newsweek*, July 1994, cited in Bruce Cumings, "The Structural Basis of Anti-Americanism in the Republic of Korea," (unpublished paper presented at Georgetown University, 30 January 2003): 26.

[4] Mary McGrory, "Bush's Moonshine Policy," op-ed, *Washington Post*, 29 December 2002.

[5] *Fox News*, 15 January 2003, 10:08 PM, cited in Cumings, "The Structural Basis of Anti-Americanism," 25.

[6] Press release by Benjamin Gilman, 17 September 1999; and statement by Christopher Cox, Hearing of the House International Relations Committee, 13 October 1999.

[7] Lee Hamilton, "Our Stake in Asia's Nuclear Future," *Washington Times*, 13 May 1998.

[8] Statement by Dana Rohrbacher, Hearings of the House International Relations Committee, 24 March 1999.

[9] Statement by John McCain on the Senate floor, Congressional Record, 23 June 1994.

[10] Statement by Dana Rohrbacher, Hearings of the House International Relations Committee, 24 March 1999 and 13 October 1999.

[11] Patrick J. Buchanan, "The Great Equalizer," *The American Conservative* (10 February 2003): 7.

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A Debate, Not Hyperbole

These statements are a small sample of the degree to which discussion on North Korea has become emotionally charged and ideological. Rarely does good policy that serves American and allied interests emerge from such emotional and one-sided debates. Our purpose in this article is to step back from the histrionics and offer a reasoned, rational, and logical debate on the nature of the North Korean regime and the policy that should be followed by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Each of us has our own orientation toward the problem, ranging from more pessimistic to optimistic assessment. Nevertheless, the debate is a genuine one, apolitical and scholarly in nature, but with real implications for the basic foundations of different schools of thought on North Korea policy.

David Kang believes that the threat posed by North Korea has been unduly inflated and that despite the forward deployments on the DMZ, Pyongyang has been rationally deterred from aggression for fifty-plus years and there is no reason to believe that they would change their minds today. He believes that if one looks at the North's economic and political behavior in a broader, historical context, rather than fixating only on military deployments, there is a story of slow, plodding reform to be told. As a result, he argues that engagement works with the North. It sends the right signals to the insecure regime that the United States, South Korea, and Japan are interested in trading the North's proliferation threat for a path of economic reform and integration. Kang argues that this has already been validated by the record of DPRK responses thus far. Kang finds the October 2002 nuclear revelations a disappointing setback in DPRK efforts at reform and openness, but nevertheless sees a consistency in Pyongyang's behavior as well as an opportunity for the United States to negotiate an end to the proliferation threat on the peninsula.

Victor Cha believes that the threat posed by North Korea still remains and that although Pyongyang has been rationally deterred from attempting a second invasion, there still exists a coercive bargaining rationale for violence. In his view, the North undertakes limited but serious crisis-inducing acts of violence with the hope of leveraging crises more to its advantage, an extremely risky but also extremely rational policy for a country that has nothing to lose and nothing to negotiate with. Moreover, Cha is skeptical as to how much Pyongyang's intentions have really changed. Cha sees the October 2002 nuclear revelations as strong evidence validating hawkish skepticism of North Korean intentions. In light of these activities, his support of engagement is highly conditional (that is, only if the North Koreans return to the status quo ante); otherwise, the United States and its allies would be forced to pursue some form of isolation and containment of the regime.

The Makings of a Crisis

On 3 October 2002, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, accompanied by a delegation of administration officials, set

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off for two days of talks in Pyongyang with their North Korean counterparts.[12] The first of their kind in well over one-and-a-half years of nondialogue between the United States and the DPRK, the talks were preceded by protracted speculation about what policy the Bush administration would pursue with the regime. Following from the 2002 State of the Union Address in which President George W. Bush included North Korea in the "axis of evil" and later offered other choice negative personal opinions about Kim Jong Il (referring to Kim as a "pygmy" and to how he "loathed" him), many speculated a dark future for U.S.–DPRK relations.[13] Other pundits, however, cited various statements by administration officials and a June 2001 internal policy review that indicated that the administration would eventually pick up where the Clinton administration had left off, negotiating some form of engagement with the North Koreans.[14]

The meeting between Kelly and his counterpart, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Kye Gwan, took place against a backdrop of recently thawed relations between North Korea and U.S. regional allies. Following a deadly naval provocation by the DPRK against ROK vessels in June 2002, North–South relations appeared to cycle back to a more positive path, with high-level meetings throughout the summer that resulted in ministerial talks, family reunions, resumption of infrastructural projects (road and railway corridors), and North Korean participation in the Asian Games in Pusan.[15] On 31 July, Secretary of State Colin Powell met briefly with DPRK Foreign Minister Paik Nam Sun on the sidelines of Asian multilateral meetings in Brunei. One week later, Charles Pritchard, the U.S. State Department's chief representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) went to Kumho, North Korea, for the first ceremonial pouring of concrete for construction of the light-water reactor. Contemporaneous with these events, the North announced a series of new economic reforms and projects, including a special economic zone on the Sino-Korean border and, most significantly, the lifting of price controls.[16]

[12] Unless otherwise cited, the following description of events is based on several not-for-attribution interviews with U.S. government officials and press reports.

[13] State of the Union Address, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html, 1 June 2001. For Bush's March 2001 remarks, see "Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea," 7 March 2001, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010307-6.html, 1 June 2001. Also see Bob Woodward, *Bush At War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 339–340.

[14] For the June 2001 policy review, see "Statement by the President," 13 June 2001, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4.html and http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010307-6.html, 3 July 2001. For Secretary of State Powell's remarks about picking up the threads of the Clinton administration's engagement policy, see "Press Availability with Her Excellency Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden," 6 March 2001, accessed at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/1116.htm, 3 July 2001.

[15] Aidan Foster-Carter, "No Turning Back?" *Comparative Connections* (July 2002), accessed at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0203Qnk_sk.html, 1 August 2002.

[16] Marcus Noland, "West-Bound Train Leaving the Station: Pyongyang on the Reform Track," unpublished paper prepared for the Council on U.S.–Korea Security Studies, Seoul, Korea, 14–15 October 2002, accessed at http://www.iie.com/papers/noland1002.htm, 2 December 2002.

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North Korean–Japanese relations also appeared to take a major step forward with the breakthrough meeting between Kim Jong Il and Japanese Premier Koizumi in Pyongyang in September 2002.[17] The summit produced a North Korean admission of and apology for the past abduction of Japanese nationals for the purpose of espionage training and held out hope for diplomatic normalization. This course of positive events led many to conjecture that the stage had finally been set for a U.S. re-engagement with North Korea.

On the contrary, Assistant Secretary Kelly's mission produced North Korea's bombshell assertion that it was secretly pursuing a second nuclear arms program through uranium enrichment technology. Kelly's initial demarche acknowledged that the United States was interested in pursuing a new relationship with North Korea in the political, economic, and security arenas, but specified that before any such path could be taken, the North Koreans needed to come clean on their past and future proliferation activities. Kelly then informed the North Koreans that the United States was aware of the North's pursuit of a secret nuclear weapons program. This program was undertaken using a different method of production—highly enriched uranium (HEU) technology—and on a scale comparable to that of the plutonium-based bomb program that had been frozen in 1994.[18] Suspicions of such a program's existence dated back to 1997 or even earlier, but intelligence was spotty. Confirming evidence took the form of intelligence tracing of North Korean purchases of high-strength aluminum (a critical secondary material associated with an HEU program) and Pakistani sales of centrifuge technology to the North Koreans in exchange for DPRK missiles.[19]

The North Koreans initially denied this accusation, claiming that it was an American fabrication, and continued on with regularly scheduled meetings (a total of four over the two days). Kim reported Kelly's statements to his superiors during the first break, and this set off all-night consultations within the North Korean leadership (presumably including Kim Jong Il). The three-hour meeting on 3 October was followed by a dinner that evening and a two-and-a-half-hour meeting with Kim Kye Gwan the next morning. The North Koreans did not respond to Kelly's initial demarche at either of these meetings. A short ceremonial meeting (of about thirty-five minutes) with Supreme People's Assembly Chairman Kim Yong Nam at 3:00 PM on 4 October followed, again with no apparent North Korean response. It was at the fourth scheduled meeting of the trip, between 4:15 and 5:10 PM on 4 October, that the North Koreans re-

[17] Victor Cha, "Mr. Koizumi Goes to Pyongyang," *Comparative Connections* (October 2002), accessed at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0203Qjapan_skorea.html, 3 November 2002.

[18] Comments by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly at "Defining the Future of US–Korean Relations," roundtable hosted by the *Washington Post*, 6 February 2003, 3–5:30 PM.

[19] "US Followed the Aluminum," *Washington Post*, 18 October 2002; and Seymour Hersh, "The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program," *The New Yorker*, 27 January 2002, accessed at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030127fa_fact., 28 February 2002.

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turned with higher-level representation, Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju. In an extensive and scripted fashion that left little time for an exchange of views, Kang said that he spoke on behalf of the Party and the government of the DPRK in asserting that North Korea was justified in pursuing such capabilities and that it considered the Agreed Framework to be nullified. Kang blamed Bush for including North Korea in the "axis of evil" and declared that the DPRK had even "stronger weapons" to wield against the United States if threatened. (Kelly noted that the program in question had indeed begun before the "axis of evil" statement.)

A news blackout of sorts ensued as administration officials revealed very little of the deliberations over the following ten days (press conferences in Seoul and Tokyo during Kelly's return from Pyongyang were either shortened to official statements without time for questions or canceled; Bush did not mention North Korea publicly for five days after Kelly's return), raising speculation ranging from the very optimistic (a "grand bargain") to the pessimistic.[20] The news became public on 16 October 2002 when the administration, in order to preempt press leaks, released a statement.[21]

The United States demanded that North Korea return to the existing nonproliferation agreements before any further talks could take place and, in conjunction with the European Union, Japanese, and South Korean representatives of the KEDO board, suspended further shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea under the original terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework. By December 2002, the makings of a crisis (despite Bush administration assertions to the contrary) were evident as U.S. officials intercepted and boarded for inspection a North Korean ship in the Arabian Sea (carrying missiles to Yemen).

The North Koreans responded to these events in late December 2002 with a series of steps at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities that had been frozen under the 1994 agreement. Over a period of little more than one week, they removed the seals at all frozen facilities (the experimental reactor, the storage building, and the reprocessing laboratory), dismantled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring cameras, and expelled the three IAEA international inspectors. In defiance of IAEA resolutions demanding that the North Koreans come back into compliance, Pyongyang announced on 10 January 2003 their withdrawal from the NPT. Evidence of subsequent North Korean

[20] Ralph Cossa, "Trials, Tribulations, Threats and Tirades," *Comparative Connections* (January 2003), accessed at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qus_skorea.html, 28 February 2002.

[21] Inquiries by Chris Nelson of the *Nelson Report* and Barbara Slavin of *USA Today* prompted the administration to go public with the news. Some argue that the Bush administration deliberately withheld information about the program until after Congress authorized the use of military force against Iraq. Others argued that intelligence reports on the HEU program were delivered to the White House as early as November 2001, but that the September 11th attacks and war against terrorism took all high-level focus away from the assessment. See Walter Pincus, "N. Korea's Nuclear Plans Were No Secret," *Washington Post*, 1 February 2003; and Ryan Lizza, "Nuclear Test," *The New Republic*, 4 November 2002, 10–11.

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actions, including tampering with stored fuel rods (a source of weapons-grade plutonium), restarting the experimental reactor, resuming missile tests, and probable plutonium reprocessing, suggested deliberate and purposeful moves in the direction of producing nuclear weapons.[22]

After seven months of nondialogue, trilateral talks involving the United States, the DPRK, and China took place in Beijing in April 2003, but these meetings only served to heighten the crisis. On the eve of the talks, North Korea released statements about its intention to follow through on reprocessing if the United States did not yield in the upcoming meetings. Then, on the first day of three days of scheduled talks, the North stated its interest in pressing forward with a resolution to the nuclear crisis if the United States was so inclined. However, in virtually the same breath, the DPRK delegate, Ri Gun, pulled Assistant Secretary James Kelly aside at dinner on the first evening of talks (in an apparent attempt to have a "bilateral" discussion with the United States). Ri allegedly told Kelly that the North possessed nuclear weapons, that it had no intention of dismantling them, and that it would consider testing them or exporting them, depending on what the United States proposed in terms of tension-reducing measures. The North then did not show up for the remainder of the trilateral talks, except for a brief formal gathering to end the meetings. Another set of talks, this time involving six countries (the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, and North Korea), took place again in Beijing in August 2003. The United States refused to engage in bilateral negotiations with the North Koreans, preferring to include all countries in the talks. The North declared that they possessed nuclear weapons and threatened to test these weapons if the United States did not offer security assurances. A third set of six-party talks tentatively scheduled for December 2003 was postponed, with no visible sign of progress toward a resolution of the problem at the start of 2004.

Our (Differing) Assessments of the Crisis

Debates raged inside the U.S. government and among outside experts as to how to respond to the 2003 nuclear revelations. Yet again, the public policy debates became quickly shaped by needlessly inflammatory invectives levied against all parties concerned. Mary McGrory's column in the *Washington Post* (9 February 2003) named Kim "the little madman with the passion for plutonium."[23] Others blasted the Bush administration's North Korea policy as the source of the crisis, labeling it "amateur hour," and an example of what happens when "[i]t talks before it thinks."[24] Still others resorted to blaming the Clinton administration as the root cause of the crisis, referring to President Clinton's negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework as a "queer amalgamation of Clement

[22] Walter Pincus, "Hints of North Korean Plutonium Output," *Washington Post*, 31 January 2003; and Doug Struck, "Reactor Restarted, North Korea Says," *Washington Post*, 6 February 2003.

[23] Mary McGrory, "Fuzzy-Headed on North Korea," op-ed, *Washington Post*, 9 February 2003.

[24] Richard Cohen, "Amateur Hour at the White House," *Washington Post*, 16 January 2003.

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Atlee and Alfred E. Neuman."[25] As in the past, what was at issue substantively vis-a-vis North Korea got lost in partisan politics, bureaucratic rivalries, sensationalist arguments, and a hint of racism.[26]

David Kang: Getting Back to "Start"

In David Kang's view, the nuclear revelations of October 2002 and the ensuing crisis intensified an already acute dilemma for both the United States and North Korea. For the United States, the focus on Iraq was now potentially diverted by an unwanted crisis over an "axis of evil" country in Northeast Asia. For North Korea, the slowly intensifying economic and diplomatic moves of the past few years were also potentially thwarted. For both sides, their worst suspicions were confirmed in the worst of ways. North Korea concluded that the United States had never had any intention of normalizing ties or concluding a peace treaty. The United States concluded that North Korea had never had any intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons program.

The North Korean regime is a brutal and morally reprehensible regime. It has enriched itself while allowing hundreds of thousands of its own citizens to die of starvation. That this regime is odious is not in question. Rather, the issue is: what tactics will best ameliorate the problems on the peninsula?

Many Western policy makers and analysts viewed the nuclear revelations with alarm and surprise. However, much of the Western hand-wringing has elements of Kabuki theater to it, and the accusations ring hollow. "Outrage and shock! at North Korean nuclear programs" is not so convincing in view of the fact that the Bush administration has been openly derisive of Kim Jong Il, has been contemptuous of the Agreed Framework, and has known about North Korea's nuclear program since June 2001.[27] An American intelligence official who attended White House meetings in 2002 said that "Bush and Cheney want this guy's head on a platter. Don't be distracted by all this talk about negotiations. . . . They have a plan, and they are going to get this guy after Iraq."[28] A North Korea that feels threatened and perceives the U.S. administration to be actively attempting to increase pressure on it is unlikely to trust the United States.

Does North Korea have legitimate security concerns? If not, then their nuclear program is designed for blackmail or leverage. If the North does have legitimate security concerns, then it is not that surprising that such a program

[25] Ben Johnson, "Appeasing North Korea: the Clinton Legacy," *FrontPageMagazine.com*, 3 January 2003, accessed at http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID'5368. Also see Frank J. Gaffney, "North Korean Revisionism," *National Review Online*, 10 January 2003, accessed at http://www.nationalreview.com/gaffney/gaffney011003.asp.

[26] On the last point, see Cumings, "The Structural Basis of Anti-Americanism," 3, 4.

[27] Walter Pincus, "North Korea's Nuclear Plans Were No Secret: U.S. Stayed Quiet as It Built Support on Iraq," *Washington Post*, 1 February 2003.

[28] Hersh, "The Cold Test," 47.

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exists, given the open hostility toward the regime that the Bush administration has evidenced. However, despite the furor over the revelation, not much has changed on the peninsula. Deterrence is still robust. North Korea's basic strategy remains the same: simultaneously deter the United States and also find a way to fix the economy. The United States, for its part, faces the same choices it did a decade ago: negotiate, or hope that the North collapses without doing too much damage to the region.

Without movement toward resolving the security fears of the North, progress in resolving the nuclear weapons issue will be limited. It is unsurprising that the 1994 Agreed Framework fell apart, because it was a process by which both sides set out to slowly build a sense of trust and both sides began hedging their bets very early on in that process. Because neither the United States nor North Korea fulfilled many of the agreed-upon steps, even during the Clinton administration, the Framework was essentially dead long before the nuclear revelation of October 2002. Neither side acts in a vacuum; the United States and North Korea each react to the other's positions, and this interaction has led to a spiral of mistrust and misunderstanding. Threats and rhetoric from each side impact the other's perceptions and actions, and this interaction can be either a mutually reinforcing positive or a negative spiral.[29]

The accepted wisdom in the United States is that North Korea abrogated the Framework by restarting its nuclear weapons program. The reality is more complicated, however. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations violated the letter and the spirit of the agreement. Admitting that the United States is hostile toward North Korea does not make one an apologist—the United States *is* hostile, and it is unconvincing to pretend that we are not. The Bush administration made clear from the beginning that it had serious doubts about the Agreed Framework and engagement with the North. This began with the inception of the Bush administration—South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's visit to Washington DC in March 2001 was widely viewed as a rebuke to his sunshine policy that engaged the North, with Bush voicing "skepticism" in regard to the policy.[30] By the time of President Bush's now famous "axis of evil" speech, it had long been clear that the Bush administration did not trust the North. For the Framework to have had any hope of being even modestly successful, each side needed to have worked more genuinely toward building confidence in the other.

The 1994 Agreed Framework

The Agreed Framework of 1994 was not a formal treaty; rather, it was a set of guidelines designed to help two countries that were deeply mistrustful of each

[29] The most well known of these situations is the "security dilemma," where one side's attempts to make itself safer provoke fears in the other side. The other side thus adjusts to counter, and both sides end up worse off. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978): 105.

[30] See, for example, Rose Brady, "The Road to Détente gets Steeper," *Businessweek*, 9 April 2001.

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TABLE 1

Key Conditions of the Agreed Framework

Agreed Framework Condition	*Implemention and Discussion*
The United States agrees to provide two light-water reactor (LWR) power plants by the year 2003 (article 1.2).	Four years behind schedule. There has been no delay in South Korean or Japanese provision of funds. The delay has been U.S. implementation and construction.
The United States agrees to provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States (article 2.3.1).	No. The United States maintains that military force is an option on the peninsula. The United States continues to target North Korea with nuclear weapons via the "Nuclear Posture Review."
The DPRK agrees to freeze its nuclear reactors and to dismantle them when the LWR project is completed (article 1.3).	Until December 2002.
The DPRK agrees to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the freeze with full cooperation (article 1.3).	Until December 2002.
The United States and the DPRK agree to work toward full normalization of political and economic relations, reducing barriers of trade and investment, etc. (article 2.1).	Limited lowering of U.S. restrictions on trade, no other progress toward normalization or peace treaty. The United States continues to list North Korea as a terrorist state.
The United States and the DPRK will each open a liaison office in the each other's capital, aiming at upgrading bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level (articles 2.2, 2.3).	No.

Source: Compiled from KEDO, "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Geneva, Switzerland, 21 October 1994.

other find a way to cooperate. But both sides began backing out of the Agreed Framework well before the autumn of 2002. From its inception, the Bush administration made very clear how much it disdained the Framework, and the North had begun its nuclear program as far back as 1998. The core of the Framework was a series of steps that both sides would take that would ultimately lead to North Korea proving it had no nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons program and to the United States normalizing ties with the North and providing it with light-water nuclear reactors that could make energy but not weapons. Table 1 shows the key elements of the Framework.

Neither side fulfilled its obligations under the Framework.[31] The key elements on the U.S. side were a formal statement of nonaggression (article 2.3.1), provision of the light-water reactor (article 1.2), and progress toward normalization of ties (article 2.1). The reactor is now four years behind schedule.[32] The United States also has not opened a liaison office in Pyongyang and has

[31] For further discussion, see Moon J. Pak, "The Nuclear Security Crisis in the Korean Peninsula: Revisit the 1994 Agreed Framework," 28 December 2002, accessed at http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/Paknuclearcrisis.doc.

[32] See Jay Solomon, Alix Freedman, and Gordon Fairclough, "Troubled Power Project Plays Role in North Korea Showdown," *Wall Street Journal*, 30 January 2002.

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not provided formal written assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. "Nuclear Posture Review" still targets North Korea with nuclear weapons. The North did freeze its reactors and allow IAEA monitoring, but in December 2002, it backed out of the agreement and expelled inspectors from North Korea.

It is possible to argue that the uranium enrichment plant is a more serious breach of the Framework than not providing a formal nonaggression pact or not providing a reactor. But this argument will be compelling only to domestic constituencies. Given U.S. reluctance to fulfill its side of the Framework, it was unlikely that the North would continue to honor its side of the agreement in the hope that at some point the Bush administration would begin to fulfill its side. The implicit U.S. policy has demanded that the North abandon its military programs, and only after it does so would the U.S. decide whether to be benevolent. As Wade Huntley and Timothy Savage write:

> The implicit signal sent to Pyongyang was that the Agreed Framework . . . was at its heart an effort to script the abdication of the DPRK regime. Immediate reticence by the United States to implement certain specific steps toward normalization called for in the agreement, such as lifting economic sanctions, reinforced this perception. . . . [S]uch an underlying attitude could never be the basis for real improvement in relations.[33]

The United States and North Korea are still technically at war—the 1953 armistice was never replaced with a peace treaty. The United States has been unwilling to discuss even a nonaggression pact, much less a peace treaty or normalization of ties. While the United States calls North Korea a terrorist nation and Donald Rumsfeld discusses the possibility of war, it is not surprising that North Korea feels threatened. For the past two years, U.S. policy toward the North has been consistently derisive and confrontational. Table 2 shows a selection of statements by U.S. and North Korean officials.

The Bush administration began adding new conditions to the Agreed Framework early on in its tenure. On 6 June 2001, the White House included reduction of conventional forces in the requirements it wanted North Korea to fulfill, saying that "The U.S. seeks improved implementation [of the Agreed Framework], prompt inspections of past reprocessing . . . [and] a less threatening conventional military posture." On 11 June 2001, North Korea replied that "Washington should implement the provisions of the D.P.R.K.–U.S. Agreed Framework and the D.P.R.K.–U.S. Joint Communique as agreed upon." The Bush administration continued its stance. On 3 July 2001, a senior administration official said that "We need to see some progress in all areas . . . we don't feel any urgency to provide goodies to them."[34]

[33] Wade Huntley and Timothy Savage, "The Agreed Framework at the Crossroads," *Policy Forum Online* #99-05A, Natuilus Research Institute, 11 March 1999.

[34] All three citations are from Michael Gordon, "U.S. Toughens Terms for North Korea Talks," *New York Times*, 3 July 2001.

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In 2002, Secretary of State Powell added a reduction in the North's missile program to the list of conditions necessary for progress on the Framework. Missiles had originally been excluded from the Agreed Framework, and the Clinton administration had begun working out a separate agreement with the North about them. On 10 June 2002, Colin Powell said that "First, the North must get out of the proliferation business and eliminate long-range missiles that threaten other countries. . . . [T]he North needs to move toward a less threatening conventional military posture . . . and [toward] living up to its past pledges to implement basic confidence-building measures."[35]

The North consistently maintained that it wanted the United States to lower the pressure. On 20 October 2002, Kim Yong Nam, Chair of the Supreme People's Assembly, said that "If the United States is willing to drop its hostile policy towards us, we are prepared to deal with various security concerns through dialogue."[36] On 3 November 2002, Han Song Ryol, DPRK Ambassador to the UN, reiterated that "Everything will be negotiable, including inspections of the enrichment program. . . . [O]ur government will resolve all U.S. security concerns through the talks if your government has a will to end its hostile policy."[37] As the crisis intensified, Colin Powell refused to consider dialogue with the North, remarking that "We cannot suddenly say 'Gee, we're so scared. Let's have a negotiation because we want to appease your misbehavior.' This kind of action cannot be rewarded."[38]

As one North Korean diplomat noted: "The Agreed Framework made American generals confident that the DPRK had become defenseless; the only way to correct this misperception is to develop a credible deterrent against the United States."[39] As of winter 2003, the situation was one of standoff. North Korean statements made clear their fear that the Bush administration would focus on pressuring North Korea once the situation in Iraq was stabilized. The 28 January 2003 statement of the Korean Anti-Nuke Peace Committee in Pyongyang concluded by saying that

> If the U.S. legally commits itself to non-aggression including the non-use of nuclear weapons against the DPRK through the non-aggression pact, the DPRK will be able to rid the U.S. of its security concerns. . . . Although the DPRK has left the NPT, its nuclear activity at present is limited to the peaceful purpose of power generation. . . . If the U.S. gives up its hostile policy toward the DPRK and refrains from posing a nuclear threat to it, it may prove that it does not manufacture nuclear weapons through a special verification between the DPRK and the U.S. . . . . It is

[35] Colin Powell, remarks at the Asia Society annual dinner, 10 June 2002, quoted in Leon Sigal, "North Korea is No Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating Strategy," Nautilus Institute Special Report, accessed at http://nautilus.org/for a/security/0227A_Siga.html, 23 December 2002.

[36] Sigal, "North Korea is No Iraq."

[37] Philip Shenon, "North Korea Says Nuclear Program Can be Negotiated," *New York Times*, 3 November 2002.

[38] Jonathan Salant, "Secretary of State Powell says U.S. is willing to talk with North Korea," *Associated Press*, 29 December 2002.

[39] *DPRK Report* No. 19, Nautilus Institute, July–August 1999.

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TABLE 2

Selected U.S.–North Korean Rhetoric over the Agreed Framework

Date	*U.S. Statements*	*DPRK Statements*
9 October 2000	"Neither government will have hostile intent towards the other." (Joint Communique)	
6 June 2001	"The U.S. seeks improved implementation [of the Agreed Framework], prompt inspections of past reprocessing . . . [and] a less threatening conventional military posture." (White House press release)	
11 June 2001		"Washington should implement the provisions of the D.P.R.K.–U.S. Agreed Framework and the D.P.R.K.–U.S. Joint Communique as agreed upon." (DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman)
3 July 2001	"We need to see some progress in all areas . . . we don't feel any urgency to provide goodies to them . . ." (senior administration official, on the broadened demands to North Korea)	
29 January 2002	"States like these . . . constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world." (George W. Bush, State of the Union speech)	
2 February 2002		"His [Bush's] remarks clearly show that the U.S.-proposed 'resumption of dialogue' with the DPRK is intended not for the improvement of the bilateral relations but for the realization of the U.S. aggressive military strategy. It is the steadfast stand and transparent will of the DPRK to counter force with force and confrontation with confrontation." (Korean Central News Agency)
1 June 2002	"We must take the battle to the enemy . . . and confront the worst threats before they emerge." (George W. Bush)	
10 June 2002	"First, the North must get out of the proliferation business and eliminate long-range missiles that threaten other countries. . . . [T]he North needs to move toward a less threatening conventional military posture . . . and liv[e] up to its past pledges to implement basic confidence-building measures." (Secretary of State Colin Powell)	
29 August 2002	North Korea is "in stark violation of the Biological weapons convention. . . . [M]any doubt that North Korea ever intends to comply fully with its NPT obligations." (Undersecretary of State John Bolton)	
31 August 2002		"The D.P.R.K. clarified more than once that if the U.S. has a willingness to drop its hostile policy toward the D.P.R.K., it will have dialogue with the U.S. to clear the U.S. of its worries over its security." (North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman)
20 October 2002		"If the United States is willing to drop its hostile policy towards us, we are prepared to deal with various security concerns through dialogue." (Kim Young Nam, Chair of the Supreme People's Assembly)

(Continued)

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TABLE 2

Continued

Date	*U.S. Statements*	*DPRK Statements*
5 November 2002		"Everything will be negotiable, including inspections of the enrichment program. . . . [O]ur government will resolve all U.S. security concerns through the talks if your government has a will to end its hostile policy." (Han Song Ryol, DPRK ambassador to the UN)
29 December 2002	"We cannot suddenly say 'Gee, we're so scared. Let's have a negotiation because we want to appease your misbehavior.' This kind of action cannot be rewarded." (Secretary of State Colin Powell)	
5 January 2003	"We have no intention of sitting down and bargaining again." (State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher)	
9 January 2003	"We think that they [Russia] could be putting the screws to the North Koreans a little more firmly and at least beginning to raise the specter of economic sanctions." (senior U.S. official)	"[W]e have no intention to produce nuclear weapons. . . . After the appearance of the Bush Administration, the United States listed the DPRK as part of an 'axis of evil,' adopting it as a national policy to oppose its system, and singled it out as a target of pre-emptive nuclear attack. . . . [I]t also answered the DPRK's sincere proposal for conclusion of the DPRK–US non-aggression treaty with such threats as 'blockade' and 'military punishment' . . . ." (DPRK official announcement of withdrawal from the NPT)
23 January 2003	"First is regime change. It need not necessarily be military, but it could lead to that." (senior U.S. official)	

Sources: Jay Solomon, Peter Wonacott, and Chris Cooper, "North Asian Leaders Criticize Bush on North Korea," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 January 2003; Jay Solomon, Peter Wonacott, and Chris Cooper, "South Korea is Optimistic About End to Nuclear Crisis," *Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2003; Michael Gordon, "Powell Says U.S. is Willing to Talk with North Korea," *New York Times*, 29 December 2002; "N. Korea pulls out of nuclear pact," MSNBC News Services, 10 January 2003; Leon Sigal, "North Korea is No Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating Strategy," Special Report, Nautilus Organization, 23 December 2002; Susan V. Lawrence, Murray Hiebert, Jay Solomon, and Kim Jung Min, "Time to Talk," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 January 2003: 12–16.

> the consistent stand of the DPRK government to settle the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula peacefully through fair negotiations for removing the concerns of both sides on an equal footing between the DPRK and the U.S.[40]

Causes and Consequences of the October Revelation

Thus, the Agreed Framework of 1994 is dead. Both North Korea and the United States are now in essentially the same position they were in in 1994—threatening war, moving toward confrontation. Given the levels of mistrust on both sides, this comes as no surprise. If North Korea feels threatened, threaten-

[40] Ri Kang Jin, "Statement of the Korean Anti-Nuke Peace Committee," 28 January 2003, accessed at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200305/news05/13.htm, 12 June 2003.

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ing them is unlikely to make them feel less threatened. Gregory Clark pointed out that "Washington's excuse for ignoring the nonaggression treaty proposal has to be the ultimate in irrationality. It said it would not negotiate under duress. So duress consists of being asked to be nonaggressive?"[41]

An intense security dilemma on the Korean peninsula is exacerbated by an almost complete lack of direct interaction between the two sides. Levels of mistrust are so high that both sides hedge their bets. The United States refused to provide formal written assurances of nonaggression to the North. The North thus retains its military and nuclear forces in order to deter the United States from acting too precipitously.

The consequences are fairly clear: the United States can continue a policy of pressure in the hope that the North will buckle and give in to U.S. pressure or collapse from internal weakness, or it can negotiate a bargain of normalization for nuclear weapons. Without resolving North Korea's security fears, the opportunity for any quick resolution of the confrontation on the peninsula will be limited. This is disappointing because North Korea, unlike Iraq, is actively seeking accommodation with the international community. Even while the Bush administration was increasing its pressure on the North, the North continued its voluntary moratorium on missile testing until 2003. The North's tentative moves toward economic openness have also been stymied for the time being. In July 2002, North Korea introduced a free-market system, allowing prices to determine supply and demand for goods and services. In September 2002, it announced a special economic zone in Shinuiju. In the last six months of 2002, work was begun to clear a section of the demilitarized zone to allow the reconnection of the railway between North and South Korea. To cap all of these developments, Kim Jong Il finally admitted in September 2002, after three decades of denials, that the North kidnapped Japanese citizens in the 1970s.

If North Korea really wanted to develop nuclear weapons, it would have done so long ago. Even today, North Korea has still not tested a nuclear device, tested an intercontinental ballistic missile, or deployed a nuclear missile force.[42] Even if North Korea develops and deploys nuclear weapons, it will not use them, because the U.S. deterrent is clear and overwhelming. The North wants a guarantee of security from the United States, and a policy of isolating it will not work. Isolation is better than pressure because pressure would only make it even more insecure. But even isolation is at best a holding measure. And the imposition of economic sanctions or economic engagement is equally unlikely to get North Korea to abandon its weapons program.

Above all, the North Korean regime wants better ties with the United States. The policy that follows from this is clear: the United States should begin negotiating a nonaggression pact with the North. It should let other countries, such as South Korea and Japan, pursue economic diplomacy if they wish. If the

[41] Gregory Clark, "Pyongyang is the Real Victim," *Japan Times*, 10 January 2003.

[42] Indeed, as of this writing, North Korea has still maintained the voluntary moratorium on ICBM missile testing that it began in 1999.

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North allows UN nuclear inspectors back and dismantles its reactors, the United States could then move forward to actual engagement. But to dismiss the country's security fears is to miss the cause of its actions.

The Bush administration's reluctance to consider dialogue with the North is counterproductive. Even at the height of the Cold War, Ronald Reagan, despite calling the Soviet Union "the Evil Empire," met with Soviet leaders and held dialogue with them. The United States had ambassadorial relations with the Soviets, engaged in trade with the Soviets, and interacted regularly—precisely in order to moderate the situation and keep information moving between the two adversaries and to keep the situation from inadvertently escalating out of control. The United States was in far greater contact with the Soviet Union during the Cold War than it is with North Korea in 2004. By refusing to talk, the United States allows the situation to spiral out of control and harms its own ability to deal with the reality of the situation.

Does the October nuclear revelation provide any insight as to North Korea's foreign policy strategy? Essentially, no: North Korea has always sought to deter the United States and has viewed the United States as belligerent. Thus, the nuclear program is consistent with North Korea's attempts to provide for its own security. It is also important to remember that a nuclear weapons program does not mean that North Korea is any more likely to engage in unprovoked military acts now than it was before. North Korea was deterred before the revelations, and it remains deterred after the revelations. The way to resolve the crisis is by addressing the security concerns of North Korea. If the United States genuinely has no intention of attacking North Korea or pressuring it for regime change, the administration should conclude a nonaggression pact. It is not that surprising that North Korea does not believe the Bush administration's occasional assurances about having no intention of using force when the administration refuses to formalize those assurances.

In terms of U.S. policy toward the North, the revelations are actually an opening. It is impossible to negotiate with a country over an issue whose existence they deny. In the case of the nuclear program, the United States has the opportunity to actually reach a conclusion to this problem. If the Bush administration were to handle negotiations adroitly, it could possibly finally resolve an issue that has plagued Northeast Asia for far too long.

Victor Cha: Past the Point of No Return?

Many moderates argued, as David Kang has done, that this new nuclear confession reveals Pyongyang's true intentions. Although of concern, they argue, these actions represent North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's perverse but typical way of creating a crisis to pull a reluctant Bush administration into serious dialogue. By "confessing" to the crime, in other words, Pyongyang is putting its chips on the table, ready to bargain away this clandestine program in exchange for aid and a U.S. pledge of nonaggression.[43] Moderates would, therefore, advocate continued negotiations by the United States and its allies, providing incen-

[43] Sigal, "North Korea is No Iraq."

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tives for the North to come clean on its uranium enrichment activities as well as to extend a more comprehensive nonproliferation arrangement to replace the Agreed Framework. In exchange for this, the allies would put forward a package of incentives including economic aid and normalization of political relations.

Before the world accepts this "cry for help" thesis, however, the North's confession must be seen for what it is—admission of a serious violation of a standing agreement that could, in effect, be North Korea's last gambit for peaceful engagement with the United States and its allies. North Korea's actions constitute a blatant breakout from the 1994 U.S.–DPRK Agreed Framework designed to ensure denuclearization of the North. Those who try to make a technical, legalistic argument to the contrary are patently wrong. Although the Agreed Framework dealt specifically with the plutonium-reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon, this document was cross-referenced with the 1991–1992 North–South Korea denuclearization declaration, which banned both North and South Korea from the uranium enrichment facilities now found to be covertly held in the North. Moreover, any legal gymnastics over this issue were rendered moot by North Korea's subsequent withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty, the first in the NPT's history.

Moreover, the implications of this act extend beyond a mere violation of legal conventions. Arguably, all of the improvements in North–South relations, including the June 2000 summit, breakthroughs in Japan–North Korea relations in 2001, and the wave of engagement with the reclusive regime that spread across Europe, Australia, and Canada in 2000–2001, were made possible by what was perceived to be the North's good-faith intentions to comply with a major nonproliferation commitment with the United States in 1994. The subtext of this commitment was that the North was willing to trade in its rogue proliferation threat for a path of reform and peaceful integration into the world community. The subsequent diplomatic achievements by Pyongyang, therefore, would not have been possible without the Agreed Framework. And now the North has shown it all to be a lie.

Alternative Explanations for North Korean Misbehavior

Many of the justifications offered by either Pyongyang or mediating parties in Seoul (an irony in itself) for the HEU program and the restarting of the plutonium program at Yongbyon are, at best, suspect. North Korea claimed its actions were warranted as responses to American failure to keep to the timetable of the Agreed Framework as well as to Washington's reneging on promises to normalize relations with the North. Moreover, they argued, the aggressive language of the United States and President Bush's "axis of evil" statements made these actions necessary. North Korean pursuit of the HEU program, however, as assistant secretary Kelly noted in the October 2002 meeting with Kang Sok Ju, predated the Bush administration's accession to office in 2001, and indeed,

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was well under way as Pyongyang was enjoying the benefits of Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy from 1999 to 2002. There is no denying that the United States and the KEDO fell behind in the implementation of the Agreed Framework, in large part because the signing of the accord in October 1994 was followed by congressional elections that put in control Republicans with strong antipathy to Clinton (and by definition then, the Agreed Framework). The North Koreans were aware of this possibility and, therefore, sought during the negotiations a personal guarantee from President Clinton that the United States would do what it could to keep implementation on schedule. In other words, as far back as October 1994, Pyongyang was cognizant of such potential problems in implementation. To argue otherwise as justification for their illicit nuclear activities is a stretch. Moreover, although the Agreed Framework was not a legally binding document, arguably there is a distinction between negligence in implementing a contract and completely breaking out of one. Washington could certainly be guilty of the former, but that does not warrant the other party's actions to do the latter.

Kim Jong Il's justification that he needs to wield the nuclear threat as a backstop for regime survival and deterrence against U.S. preemption also does not hold water. This is not because anyone should expect Kim to believe Bush's public assurances that he has no intention of attacking North Korea but because any logical reasoning shows that the North already possesses these deterrent capabilities. Its 11,000 artillery tubes along the DMZ hold Seoul hostage, and its Nodong ballistic missile deployments effectively hold Japan hostage. The warning time for a North Korean artillery shell landing in Seoul is measured in seconds (fifty-seven) and for a ballistic missile fired on the Japanese archipelago in minutes (ten). There is no conceivable defense against these threats, which would result in hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of casualties. As long as the United States values the welfare of these two key allies in Northeast Asia (as well as the 100,000-plus American service personnel and expatriate community), the North holds a credible deterrent against any hypothetical contemplation of American preemption.

Finally, the argument that with the latest crisis, North Korea is seeking direct negotiations with the United States rather than a bonafide nuclear weapons capability is both disturbing and logically inconsistent. North Korea seeks a nonaggression pact, these advocates argue, and a new relationship, by using the only leverage it can muster—its military threat. There are three glaring problems with this argument. First, the notion that North Korean proliferation is solely for bargaining purposes runs contrary to the history of why states proliferate. Crossing the nuclear threshold is a national decision of immense consequence and, as numerous studies have shown, is a step rarely taken deliberately for the purpose of negotiating away these capabilities.[44] Second, even if one

[44] Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); and Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" *International Security* 21.3 (Winter 1996–1997): 54–86.

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were to accept these as the true North Korean intentions, the moral hazard issues become obvious. Rather than moving Pyongyang in the direction of more-compliant behavior, indulging the North's brinkmanship is likely only to validate their perceived success of the strategy. Such coercive bargaining strategies in the past by the North might have been met with engagement by the United States, but in the aftermath of the October 2002 nuclear revelations, such behavior is more difficult to countenance. The difference, as I will explain below, largely stems from the gravity of North Korean misbehavior in 2002 and violation of the Agreed Framework.

Third, the "negotiation" thesis for North Korean proliferation, upon closer analysis, actually leads one to the *opposite* logical conclusion—in other words, a North Korean "breakout" strategy of amassing a midsized nuclear weapons arsenal. South Korean advocates of the negotiation thesis maintain that Pyongyang is aware of the antipathy felt by the Bush administration toward the Clinton-era agreements made with it. Therefore, Pyongyang seeks to leverage the proliferation threat to draw the Bush administration into bilateral negotiations, ostensibly to obtain a nonaggression pact, but in practice to obtain *any* agreement with this government. Ideally, this agreement would offer more benefits than the 1994 agreement, but even if this were not the case, the key point, according to these officials, is that the agreement would have the Bush administration's imprimateur rather than that of Clinton and therefore would be more credible in North Korean eyes.[45]

Though plausible, such an argument, however, leads to a compelling counterintuitive conclusion. If North Korea wants a new and improved agreement and knows that this current administration is more "hard-line" than the previous one, then the logical plan of action would not be to negotiate away its potential nuclear capabilities (the modus operandi in 1994) but to *acquire* nuclear weapons and *then* confront the United States from a stronger position than they had in 1994. Indeed, North Korean actions in December 2002 appear to have been more than a bargaining ploy. If coercive bargaining had been the primary objective, then the North Koreans arguably would have needed to undertake only one of several steps to denude the 1994 agreement. On the contrary, their unsealing of buildings, disabling of monitoring cameras, expelling international inspectors, withdrawal from the NPT, restarting the reactor, and reprocessing represented a purposeful drive to develop weapons. As one U.S. government official observed, "[W]e made a list of all the things the North Koreans might do to ratchet up a crisis for the purpose of negotiation. They went through that list pretty quickly."[46]

What Follows Hawk Engagement?

There is no denying that Bush's "axis of evil" statements exacerbated a downward trend in U.S.–DPRK relations. But actions matter more than semantics.

[45] South Korean government officials, phone interviews by Victor Cha, 9 January 2003.

[46] U.S. government official, conversation with Victor Cha, 14 January 2003.

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The problem is not what the United States, South Korea, or Japan may have done to irk the North. The problem is North Korea. What is most revealing about the North's actions is that hawkish skepticism vis-a-vis a real change in Kim Jong Il's underlying intentions, despite behavior and rhetoric to the contrary, remains justified.

This skepticism, as I have argued in *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2002), is what informs the "hawk engagement" approach toward North Korea. Unlike South Korea's "sunshine policy" of unconditional engagement, this version of the strategy is laced with a great deal more pessimism, less trust, and a pragmatic calculation of the steps to follow in case the policy fails. In short, hawks might pursue engagement with North Korea for very different tactical reasons than might doves. Engagement is useful with rogues like North Korea because: first, "carrots" today can serve as "sticks" tomorrow (particularly with a target state that has very few); second, economic and food aid can start a slow process of separating the people of North Korea from its despotic regime; and third, engagement is the best practical way to build a coalition for punishment, demonstrating good-faith efforts at negotiating and thereby putting the ball in the North's court to maintain cooperation.

The 2002–2003 nuclear revelations confirm much of the skepticism that informs the hawk engagement approach. The premise of hawk engagement is that engagement should be pursued for the purpose of testing the North's intentions and genuine capacity to cooperate. If this diplomacy succeeds, then the sunshine policy advocates are correct about North Korea, and honest hawks (as opposed to ideological ones) would be compelled to continue on this path. But if engagement fails, then one has uncovered the North's true intentions and built the consensus for an alternate course of action. The nuclear violations, in this context, have created more transparency about the extent to which the North's reform efforts represent mere tactical changes or a true shift in strategy and preferences. As hawk engagement believers had always expected, Kim Jong Il has now dropped the cooperation ball. What comes next? The first step is to rally a multilateral coalition for diplomatic pressure among the allies. The fall 2002 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Mexico and the U.S.–Japan–Korea trilateral statement at these meetings were important first steps in this direction. Both Seoul and Tokyo decreed that any hopes Pyongyang might have for inter-Korean economic cooperation or a large normalization package of Japanese aid hinge on satisfactory resolution of the North's current violation. (People also have wrongfully discounted the significance of a similar statement made by APEC as a whole—the first of its kind from the multilateral institution to explicitly address a security problem.) A second important step was taken in November 2002, when the three allies, through KEDO, agreed to suspend further shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea that had been promised under the 1994 agreement until Pyongyang came back into compliance. A third step effectively "multilateralizing" the problem occurred in August 2003, when China hosted talks involving the

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United States, the DPRK, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Although unsuccessful in resolving the crisis, these talks were critical to enlisting China and the region in a more proactive role in helping to solve the problem.

Pundits and critics have blasted the United States for its "no-talk, no-negotiation" position until North Korea rolls back its HEU program. Hawk engagement, in contrast, would posit that the Bush administration's relatively low-key response to North Korea's violation (especially when compared with its response to Iraq's), coupled with its withholding negotiations with Pyongyang until it first makes gestures to come back into compliance, is effectively an offer to the North of one last chance to get out of its own mess. In this sense, as Harry Rowen at Stanford University has observed, this *is* the negotiating position. Kim Jong Il needs to unilaterally and verifiably address international concerns by dismantling the HEU program and returning to the status quo ante. If he were to do this, then the possibility of new U.S.–DPRK negotiations involving quid pro quos of economic aid for nonproliferation would lie ahead.

Why Not Hawk Engagement Again?

Prominent figures in the United States, such as former President Carter, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, and others have argued for turning back the engagement clock and entering into new negotiations to gain access to the HEU program and to roll back the 1994 Agreement violations.[47] In a related vein, other commentators and journalists have argued implicitly that the United States should pursue some form of hawk engagement in the aftermath of the HEU revelations to at least "test" whether North Korea is interested in giving up the program.[48] Others have explicitly invoked the hawk engagement argument to criticize the Bush administration's nonengagement with North Korea.[49]

I do not find engagement a feasible option after the HEU revelations for one very critical reason: the initial rationale for hawk engagement was based on some degree of uncertainty with regard to the target regime's intentions. As long as such uncertainty existed, as it did in 1994, and Pyongyang remained somewhat compliant thereafter with the standing agreements that were the fruits of engagement, it would have been difficult for hawks to advocate otherwise. Hence, even when the North Koreans test-fired a ballistic missile over

[47] Anthony Lake and Robert Gallucci, "Negotiating with Nuclear North Korea," *Washington Post*, 6 November 2002; Carter, "Engaging North Korea"; Sigal, "A Bombshell that's Actually an Olive Branch."

[48] Comments by Joel Wit, "N. Korea Nuclear Threat," transcript of *Lehrer NewsHour* (Ray Suarez, Joel Wit, Henry Sokolski), 10 January 2003, accessed on the website of PBS Online NewsHour at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june03/korea_1-10.html; and comments by Wendy Sherman, "Defining the Future of US–Korean Relations," *JoongAng Ilbo–Washington Post* seminar, Washington DC, 6 February 2003.

[49] Jonathan Power, "A Hawk on North Korea Wants Bush to be a Dove," 5 February 2003, accessed at http://www.transnational.org/forum/power/2003/02.03_NorthKorea.html, 1 March 2003.

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Japan in 1998, conducted submarine incursions into the South, attacked South Korean naval vessels, and undertook other acts of malfeasance, I still believed that engagement, even for hawks, was the appropriate path. However, the current violations by the North are on a scale that removes any uncertainty in regard to its intentions. Its behavior does not represent minor deviations from the landmark agreement, but rather a wholesale and secretive breakout from it. Negotiating under these conditions, for hawks, would be tantamount to appeasement.

If the current impasse is resolved diplomatically, however, and the DPRK takes unilateral steps toward dismantlement of the facilities, then regional diplomatic pressures, allied entreaties, and public opinion would again compel hawks to pursue some form of engagement. Such engagement would not be informed by any newfound trust in North Korea or its intentions. Indeed, hawk engagement in such a scenario would be informed by infinitely more palpable skepticism and distrust than existed prior to the HEU revelations and would perhaps be characterized by an even shorter tolerance for additional misbehavior by the North before switching to an alternate, more coercive path.

Isolation and Containment

If the North Koreans do not take a cooperative path out of the current crisis, then from a hawk engagement perspective, there is no choice but isolation and containment. The strategy's general contours would be to rally interested regional powers to isolate and neglect the regime until it gave up its proliferation threat. Although this would be akin to a policy of benign neglect, it would not be benign. The United States and its allies would maintain vigilant containment of the regime's military threat and would intercept any vessels suspected of carrying nuclear- or missile-related materials in and out of the North. Secondary sanctions would also be levied against firms in Japan and other Asian countries involved in illicit North Korean drug trafficking in an effort to restrict the flow of remittances to the DPRK leadership. The United States and the ROK might also undertake a reorientation of their military posture on the peninsula, focusing more on long-range, deep-strike capabilities, and betting that the DPRK will respond by scaling back forward deployments in defense of Pyongyang.[50]

This strategy of "malign neglect" would also entail more proactive humanitarian measures, including the continuation of food aid, designed to help and engage the North Korean people. The United States would urge China and other countries to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to establish North Korean refugee processing camps in neighboring countries around the Peninsula, enabling a regularized procedure for dealing with popu-

[50] This is risky because the DPRK's response might also be to forward deploy even more aggressively in a "best-defense is strong-offense" strategy. For further discussion, see Henry Sokolski, ed., *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 3–4.

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lation outflows from the decaying country. Potentially a more significant watershed in this regard would be passage of a bill clearing the way for the United States to accept any North Korean who meets the definition of "refugee" and desires safe haven in the United States. In this regard, the United States would lead by example in preparing to facilitate passage out of the darkness that is North Korea to those people who have the courage to vote with their feet.

Two critical actors in pursuing such an unattractive course of action will be China and South Korea. China's stake in propping up its old ally on the peninsula is geostrategic and keyed to a competitive U.S.–China relationship. It has no desire to see a collapse of the regime and the specter of a U.S. military presence remaining on the peninsula. Chinese equities are undeniably shifting, however, as the North Koreans pursue a nuclear weapons capability. It is official Chinese policy to oppose nuclear weapons on the peninsula, in large part because of the ripple effects that such weapons might have on Japanese and Taiwanese plans for such capabilities. Combining this worst-case contingency with frustration at continuing to pour food, fuel, and aid in large amounts (estimated around 70–90 percent of all North Korean external reliance) into a country that has shown virtually no progress toward reform might cause Chinese leaders to think differently. A more pragmatic, less-ideological Chinese leadership—in conjunction with the United States capitalizing on its more-constructive post-September 11th relationship with Beijing and helping China defray the negative externalities that might come from an isolation strategy toward North Korea—might be the key variables in the strategy's feasibility and success.[51] If Beijing were to cooperate in diplomatically pressuring the North, moreover, this decision would not be seen as kowtowing to the United States but rather as China stepping up to a leadership role in the region. China's aspirations to great power status in the region will be dependent not only on its economic capabilities but also on the type of political leadership it will be seen as providing. A proactive role in reducing the North Korean nuclear threat would provide a security good to the region that would be appreciated by all.

Where South Korea stands in a U.S. isolation policy undeniably will be a test of the alliance. Reduced perceptions of a North Korean threat since the June 2000 summit, particularly among the younger generation of South Koreans (despite little material change in the security situation on the ground), coupled with the upsurge of anti-Americanism during the December 2002 presidential elections (following the accidental USFK vehicular death of two South Korean teenage girls), resulted in an incredible phenomenon in 2003: in the face of increasing DPRK nuclear threats, South Koreans demonstrated against the alliance with the United States, blaming the United States for provoking the crisis with North Korea. If these two trends continue (that is, anti-Americanism and no fear of North Korea), then an American isolation and containment policy toward North Korea would be unacceptable to South Koreans. If

[51] Thanks to Tom Christensen for raising the point about the Party Congress.

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South Koreans, moreover, oppose such a U.S. policy, at the price of allowing a nuclear North Korea, then the alliance might be damaged beyond repair. Two critical variables in this mix will be the leadership of the Roh Moo Hyun government and the South Korean "silent majority." In spite of Roh's past political activities and his left-leaning ideology, many argue that pragmatism and some badly needed foreign policy experience will cause him to moderate his views to be more supportive of the alliance (as was the case with Kim Dae Jung).[52] Even more important, if North Korean malfeasance grows more pronounced, the future of the alliance and a coordinated isolation strategy toward North Korea may rest in the hands of the South Korean electorate. Despite the media hype of a younger Korean generation that purportedly fears George Bush more than a nuclear-armed Kim Jong Il, polls show that a significant percentage (almost 50 percent) of the electorate hold a more somber view of North Korea's nuclear weapons obsession, and this silent majority presumably would grow as the North moves closer to such capabilities unchecked.[53] What deters many South Koreans are the costs that would come from a precipitous collapse of the DPRK regime resulting from an isolation strategy. This is understandable. South Koreans must also realize, however, that the costs of letting North Korea grow unfettered into a nuclear power would also be high. These costs might be measured in terms of not only lost alliance support from the United States but also huge potential losses in investor confidence. Already, Moody Investors downgraded South Korea's sovereign credit outlook in 2003, U.S. foreign direct investment in Korea plummeted 72 percent (in the first quarter of 2003), and the stock market dropped nearly 20 percent because of the DPRK threat.[54] A nuclear North Korea places undeniable costs on South Korea that not even the younger generation should underestimate.

No doubt there are dangers associated with an isolation strategy, not least of which is North Korean retaliation. Pyongyang states clearly that they would consider isolation and sanctions by the United States an act of war. To support isolation, however, is not to crave war on the peninsula. Indeed after engagement has been proven to fail (as it has for hawk engagers after the HEU revelations), then isolation is the *least* likely strategy to provoke war, inasmuch as the remaining options (including preemptive military strikes) are all much more coercive.[55]

There is no denying the gravity of the crisis in 2003–2004. For hawk engagement, the offer to Kim Jong Il to resolve concerns about his dangerous uranium enrichment and plutonium nuclear weapons programs if he wants to get back on the engagement path is, in effect, the last round of diplomacy. Not taking up this offer would mean a path of isolation and containment of the regime and

[52] Victor Cha, "Stay Calm on Korea," *Washington Post*, 20 December 2002.

[53] *Choson Ilbo–Gallup Korea* polls, 1 January 2003, accessed at http://www.gallup.co.kr/news/2003/release004.html.

[54] Hyun-Chul Kim, "Reality Check Takes Seoul Stocks Lower," *JoongAng Ilbo*, 17 March 2003.

[55] Victor Cha, "Tighten the Noose," *The Financial Times*, 29 July 2003.

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an end to many positive gains Pyongyang has accumulated since the June 2000 inter-Korean summit. Given the high stakes involved, one hopes that Kim Jong Il makes the correct calculation.

The Last Word on the Crisis

David Kang embraces the argument that the North's blatant HEU confession is a cleverly disguised attempt to "retail" its new threat and thus draw a reluctant Bush administration into negotiations. He advocates negotiation by the United States and its allies to bring *both* the United States and the North Koreans back into compliance in exchange for a package of incentives including economic aid and normalization of political relations. As long as the United States threatens the North, Kang sees little hope that pressure will make the North disarm. But Kang sees great potential for reduced tensions and increased economic opening in North Korea if the United States makes a credible commitment to nonaggression.

The overall contours of such a package are not the point of disagreement for Cha. There are still good reasons for engaging such a dangerous regime. The primary point of departure for Cha would be the withholding of such a negotiation until the North Koreans first resolve international concerns about the HEU program and restore the status quo ante at Yongbyon. To engage with Pyongyang in the face of such a blatant breakout from the Agreed Framework would be tantamount to appeasement. However, maintaining a coalition of allies to impress upon Kim Jong Il in the strongest terms the need to first come clean in order to return to a path of engagement with the outside world appears to be the most prudent course of action. From a hawk engagement perspective, such a strategy also puts the cooperation ball clearly in the North's court, and in this sense, also contributes to a coalition for isolation and containment should Kim Jong Il drop this ball.

Despite the authors' disagreements, they agree on a number of important issues. Most significantly, both authors agree on the goals of U.S. policy and the nature of the North Korean regime. Both authors wish to see a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and a North Korean regime that either modifies its behavior or disappears. Their disagreement is not over these goals but over the tactics toward that end. Both authors also agree that the North Korean regime is a brutal and reprehensible regime that has perpetrated massive crimes against its own citizens. Finally, both authors agree that one major element of a successful policy toward North Korea is a consistently engaged United States that develops a coherent strategy toward the region.

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Soft Power and American Foreign Policy

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.

Anti-Americanism has increased in the past few years. Thomas Pickering, a seasoned diplomat, considered 2003 "as high a zenith of anti-Americanism as we've seen for a long time."[1] Polls show that our soft power losses can be traced largely to our foreign policy. "A widespread and fashionable view is that the United States is a classically imperialist power. . . . That mood has been expressed in different ways by different people, from the hockey fans in Montreal who boo the American national anthem to the high school students in Switzerland who do not want to go to the United States as exchange students."[2] An Australian observer concluded that "the lesson of Iraq is that the US's soft power is in decline. Bush went to war having failed to win a broader military coalition or UN authorization. This had two direct consequences: a rise in anti-American sentiment, lifting terrorist recruitment; and a higher cost to the US for the war and reconstruction effort."[3] A Gallup International poll showed that pluralities in fifteen out of twenty-four countries around the world said that American foreign policies had a negative effect on their attitudes toward the United States.

A Eurobarometer poll found that a majority of Europeans believe that the United States tends to play a negative role in fighting global poverty, protecting the environment, and maintaining peace in the world.[4] When asked in a Pew

[1] Interview, NPR, *Weekend Edition*, 13 July 2003.

[2] Richard Bernstein, "Foreign Views of U.S. Darken After Sept 11," *New York Times*, 11 September 2003.

[3] Paul Kelly, "Power Pact," *The Australian*, 26 July 2003.

[4] Eurobarometer #59, Spring 2003.

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, is Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Nye has been on the faculty at Harvard since 1964, during which time he also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. He is the author of numerous books and articles on national security policy.

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poll to what extent they thought the United States "takes your interests into account," a majority in twenty out of forty-two countries surveyed said "not too much" or "not at all."[5] In many countries, unfavorable ratings were highest among younger people. American pop culture may be widely admired among young people, but the unpopularity of our foreign policies is causing the next generation to question American power.[6]

American music and films are more popular in Britain, France, and Germany than they were twenty years ago, another period when American policies were unpopular in Europe, but the attraction of our policies is even lower than it was then.[7] There are also hints that unpopular foreign policies might be spilling over and undercutting the attractiveness of some aspects of American popular culture. A 2003 Roper study showed that "for the first time since 1998, consumers in 30 countries signaled their disenchantment with America by being less likely to buy Nike products or eat at McDonalds. . . . At the same time, nine of the top 12 Asian and European firms, including Sony, BMW and Panasonic, saw their scores rise."[8]

The Costs of Ignoring Soft Power

Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. When you can get others to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country's military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.

Skeptics about soft power say not to worry. Popularity is ephemeral and should not be a guide for foreign policy in any case. The United States can act without the world's applause. We are so strong we can do as we wish. We are the world's only superpower, and that fact is bound to engender envy and resentment. Fouad Ajami has stated recently, "The United States need not worry about hearts and minds in foreign lands."[9] Columnist Cal Thomas refers to "the fiction that our enemies can be made less threatening by what America says and does."[10] Moreover, the United States has been unpopular in the past, yet managed to recover. We do not need permanent allies and institutions. We can

[5] Pew Global Attitude Project, *What the World Thinks in 2002* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2002), T-49.

[6] Gallup International, "Post War Iraq 2003 Poll," accessed at http://www.gallup-international.com; Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Views of a Changing World June 2003* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2003), T-132. Age demographics are available from Pew on request.

[7] Newsweek poll of 1983 compared to Pew Global Attitudes Project.

[8] Wendy Melillo, "Ad Industry Doing Its Own Public Diplomacy," *Adweek*, 21 July 2003.

[9] Fouad Ajami, "The Falseness of Anti-Americanism," *Foreign Policy* (September/October 2003): 61.

[10] Cal Thomas, "Muzzling the Wrong Dog," *Washington Times*, 23 October 2003. Thomas was defending the anti-Islamic statements of General William Boykin.

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always pick up a coalition of the willing when we need to. Donald Rumsfeld is wont to say that the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice-versa.

But it would be a mistake to dismiss the recent decline in our attractiveness so lightly. It is true that the United States has recovered from unpopular policies in the past, but that was against the backdrop of the Cold War, in which other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. Moreover, while America's size and association with disruptive modernity are real and unavoidable, wise policies can soften the sharp edges of that reality and reduce the resentments that they engender. That is what the United States did after World War II. We used our soft power resources and co-opted others into a set of alliances and institutions that lasted for sixty years. We won the Cold War against the Soviet Union with a strategy of containment that used our soft power as well as our hard power.

It is true that the new threat of transnational terrorism increased American vulnerability, and some of our unilateralism after September 11 was driven by fear. But the United States cannot meet the new threat identified in the national security strategy without the cooperation of other countries. They will cooperate, up to a point, out of mere self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the attractiveness of the United States. Take Pakistan for example. President Pervez Musharraf faces a complex game of cooperating with the United States on terrorism while managing a large anti-American constituency at home. He winds up balancing concessions and retractions. If the United States were more attractive to the Pakistani populace, we would see more concessions in the mix.

It is not smart to discount soft power as just a question of image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity. As I argued earlier, it is a form of power—a means of obtaining desired outcomes. When we discount the importance of our attractiveness to other countries, we pay a price. Most important, if the United States is so unpopular in a country that being pro-American is a kiss of death in their domestic politics, political leaders are unlikely to make concessions to help us. Turkey, Mexico, and Chile were prime examples in the run-up to the Iraq war in March 2003. When American policies lose their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce our leverage. For example, after September 11, there was an outpouring of sympathy from Germans for the United States, and Germany joined a military campaign against the al Qaeda network. But as the United States geared up for the unpopular Iraq war, Germans expressed widespread disbelief about the reasons the United States gave for going to war, such as the alleged connection of Iraq to al Qaeda and the imminence of the threat of weapons of mass destruction. German suspicions were reinforced by what they saw as biased American media coverage during the war and by the failure to find weapons or prove the connection to al Qaeda right after the war. The combination fostered a climate in which conspiracy theories flourished. By July 2003, one-third of Germans under the age of thirty said that they thought the American government might even have staged the original September 11 attacks.[11]

[11] "Poll: One-third of Germans believe US may have staged Sept 11 attacks," Reuters, 23 July 2003.

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Absurd views feed upon each other, and paranoia can be contagious. American attitudes toward foreigners harden, and we begin to believe that the rest of the world really does hate us. Some Americans begin to hold grudges, to mistrust all Muslims, to boycott French wines and rename french fries, to spread and believe false rumors.[12] In turn, foreigners see Americans as uninformed and insensitive to anyone's interests but their own. They see our media wrapped in the American flag. Some Americans, in turn, succumb to residual strands of isolationism, saying that if others choose to see us that way, "to hell with 'em." If foreigners are going to be like that, who cares whether we are popular or not. But to the extent that we allow ourselves to become isolated, we embolden enemies such as al Qaeda. Such reactions undercut our soft power and are self-defeating in terms of the outcomes we want.

Some hard-line skeptics might say that whatever the merits of soft power, it has little role to play in the current war on terrorism. Osama bin Laden and his followers are repelled, not attracted by American culture, values, and policies. Military power was essential in defeating the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and soft power will never convert fanatics. Charles Krauthammer, for example, argued soon after the war in Afghanistan that our swift military victory proved that "the new unilateralism" worked. That is true up to a point, but the skeptics mistake half the answer for the whole solution.

Look again at Afghanistan. Precision bombing and Special Forces defeated the Taliban government, but U.S. forces in Afghanistan wrapped up less than a quarter of al Qaeda, a transnational network with cells in sixty countries. The United States cannot bomb al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lumpur, or Detroit. Success against them depends on close civilian cooperation, whether sharing intelligence, coordinating police work across borders, or tracing global financial flows. America's partners cooperate partly out of self-interest, but the inherent attractiveness of U.S. policies can and does influence the degree of cooperation.

Equally important, the current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations but a contest whose outcome is closely tied to a civil war between moderates and extremists within Islamic civilization. The United States and other advanced democracies will win only if moderate Muslims win, and the ability to attract the moderates is critical to victory. We need to adopt policies that appeal to moderates and to use public diplomacy more effectively to explain our common interests. We need a better strategy for wielding our soft power. We will have to learn better how to combine hard and soft power if we wish to meet the new challenges.

Beneath the surface structure, the world changed in profound ways during the last decades of the twentieth century. September 11 was like a flash of light-

[12] French Ambassador Levitte complained about a series of false rumors circulating about French positions in 2003. See Kim Housego, "France calls for fuller U.S. response to allegations of disinformation campaign," Associated Press, 16 May 2003.

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ning on a summer evening that displayed an altered landscape, and we are still left groping in the dark wondering how to find our way through it. George W. Bush entered office committed to a traditional realist foreign policy that would focus on great powers like China and Russia and eschew nation building in failed states of the less-developed world. But in September 2002, his administration proclaimed a new national security strategy that declared "we are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies falling into the hands of the embittered few." Instead of strategic rivalry, "today, the world's great powers find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos." The United States increased its development assistance and its efforts to combat AIDS because "weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states."[13] The historian John Lewis Gaddis compared the new strategy to the seminal days that redefined American foreign policy in the 1940s.[14]

The new strategy attracted criticism at home and abroad for its excessive rhetoric about preemptive military strikes and the promotion of American primacy. Critics pointed out that the practice of preemption is not new, but that turning it into a doctrine weakens international norms and encourages other countries to engage in risky actions. Similarly, American primacy is a fact, but there was no need for rhetoric that rubbed other people's noses in it. Notwithstanding such flaws, the new strategy responded to the deep trends in world politics that were illuminated by the events of September 11, 2001. The "privatization of war" is a major historical change in world politics that must be addressed. This is what the new Bush strategy gets right. What the United States has not yet sorted out is how to go about implementing the new approach. We have done far better on identifying the ends than the means. On that dimension, both the administration and Congress were deeply divided.

According to the National Security Strategy, the greatest threats the American people face are transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and particularly their combination. Yet, meeting the challenge posed by transnational military organizations that could acquire weapons of mass destruction requires the cooperation of other countries—and cooperation is strengthened by soft power. Similarly, efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and elsewhere will require the help of others. Reconstruction in Iraq and peacekeeping in failed states are far more likely to succeed and to be less costly if shared with others rather than appearing as American imperial occupation. The fact that the United States squandered its soft power in the way that it went to war meant that the aftermath turned out to be much more costly than it need have been.

Even after the war, in the hubris and glow of victory in May 2003, the United States resisted a significant international role for the UN and others in Iraq. But as casualties and costs mounted over the summer, the United States

[13] *National Security Strategy of the United States*, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

[14] John Lewis Gaddis, "Bush's Security Strategy," *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2002): 50–57.

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found many other countries reluctant to share the burden without a UN blessing. As the top American commander for Iraq, General John Abizaid, reported, "You can't underestimate the public perception both within Iraq and within the Arab world about the percentage of the force being so heavily American." But, Abizaid continued, other countries "need to have their internal political constituents satisfied that they're playing a role as an instrument of the international community and not as a pawn of the United States."[15] Before the Madrid conference of potential donors to Iraq in October 2003, the *New York Times* reported that L. Paul Bremer, the chief occupation administrator in Baghdad, said, "I need the money so bad we have to move off our principled opposition to the international community being in charge."[16] Neoconservatives like Max Boot were urging conservatives not to treat marginalizing the UN as a core principle, and Charles Krauthammer, proud author of "the new unilateralism," called for a new UN resolution because Russia, India, and others "say they would contribute only under such a resolution." In his words, "the U.S. is not overstretched. But psychologically we are up against our limits. The American people are simply not prepared to undertake worldwide nation building."[17]

In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weakening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow these nations to train together and quickly become interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. Initially, for example, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not very popular in Japan, but polls show that over the decades, it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction so that other countries are not obliged continually to re-examine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the United States by the Japanese public "contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony" and "served as politi-

[15] Eric Schmitt quoting General John Abizaid, "General in Iraq Says More G.I.s Are Not the Answer," *New York Times*, 9 August 2003.

[16] Steven Weisman, " U.S Set to Cede Part of Control over Aid for Iraq," *New York Times*, 20 October 2003.

[17] Max Boot, "America and the UN, Together Again?" *New York Times*, 3 August 2003; Charles Krauthammer, "Help Wanted," *TIME*, 1 September 2003, 72.

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cal constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States."[18] Popularity can contribute to stability.

Finally, as the RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt argue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.[19] As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

American Empire?

Not everyone agrees with this picture of the changing nature of world politics, and, thus, they recommend a different approach to American foreign policy. Many argue that our new vulnerability requires a much higher degree of forceful control. Moreover, our unprecedented power now makes it possible. As Robert Kaplan has argued, "it is a cliché these days to observe that the United States now possesses a global empire; the question now is how the American empire should operate on a tactical level to manage an unruly world."[20] William Kristol, editor of the neoconservative magazine *The Weekly Standard*, says, "We need to err on the side of being strong. And if people want to say we're an imperialist power, fine."[21] Writing in the same journal in 2001, Max Boot agreed, in the explicitly titled article "The Case for an American Empire."[22]

Three decades ago, the radical left used the term "American empire" as an epithet. Now the phrase has come out of the closet and is used by a number of analysts, on the left and the right alike, to explain and guide American foreign policy. Andrew Bacevich, for example, argues that the notion of an American empire is approaching mainstream respectability, and we should not worry about the semantic details.[23] But words matter. In *Alice in Wonderland*, the Red Queen tells Alice that she can make words mean whatever she wants. But when

[18] Qingxin Ken Wang, "Hegemony and Socialisation of the Mass Public: the Case of Postwar Japan's Cooperation with the United States on China policy," *Review of International Studies* 29 (2003): 119.

[19] John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1999), 52.

[20] Robert Kaplan, interview in "Islam vs. the West," *Rolling Stone*, 7 August 2003, 38.

[21] Quoted in "A Classicist's Legacy: Empire Builders," *New York Times*, *Week in Review*, 4 May 2003.

[22] Max Boot, "The Case for an American Empire," *The Weekly Standard*, 15 October 2001.

[23] Andrew Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

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we want to communicate clearly with others, we have to take care in what we use our words to do. If America is like no other empire in history, as Bacevich claims, then in what sense is it an empire? And while the use of the term may point up some useful analogies, it may also mislead us by obscuring important differences.

In many ways, the metaphor of empire is seductive. The American military has a global reach, with bases around the world, and its regional commanders sometimes act like proconsuls. English is a lingua franca, like Latin. The American economy is the largest in the world, and American culture serves as a magnet. But it is a mistake to confuse the politics of primacy with the politics of empire. Although unequal relationships certainly exist between the United States and weaker powers and can be conducive to exploitation, absent formal political control, the term "imperial" can be misleading. Its acceptance would be a disastrous guide for American foreign policy because it fails to take into account how the world has changed. The United States is certainly not an empire in the way we think of the European overseas empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because the core feature of such imperialism was direct political control.[24] The United States has more power resources, compared to other countries, than Britain had at its imperial peak. On the other hand, the United States has less power, in the sense of control over the behavior that occurs inside other countries, than Britain did when it ruled a quarter of the globe. For example, Kenya's schools, taxes, laws, and elections—not to mention external relations—were controlled by British officials. Even where Britain used indirect rule through local potentates, as in Uganda, it exercised far more control than the United States does today. Others try to rescue the metaphor by referring to "informal empire" or the "imperialism of free trade," but this simply obscures important differences in degrees of control suggested by comparisons with real historical empires. Yes, the Americans have widespread influence, but in 2003, the United States could not even get Mexico and Chile to vote for a second resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council. The British empire did not have that kind of problem with Kenya or India.

Devotees of the new imperialism say not to be so literal. "Empire" is merely a metaphor. But the problem with the metaphor is that it implies a control from Washington that is unrealistic and reinforces the prevailing strong temptations towards unilateralism that are present in Congress and parts of the administration. The costs of occupation of other countries has become prohibitive in a world of multiple nationalisms, and the legitimacy of empire is broadly challenged.

Power depends on context, and the distribution of power differs greatly in different domains. In the global information age, power is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard of political-military issues, military power is largely uni-

[24] David Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires 1415–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 19.

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polar, but on the economic board, the United States is not a hegemon or an empire, and it must bargain as an equal when Europe acts in a unified way. And on the bottom chessboard of transnational relations, power is chaotically dispersed, and it makes no sense to use traditional terms such as unipolarity, hegemony, or American empire. Those who recommend an imperial American foreign policy based on traditional military descriptions of American power are relying on woefully inadequate analysis. If you are in a three-dimensional game, you will lose if you focus only on one board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them—witness the connections in the war on terrorism between military actions on the top board, where we removed a dangerous tyrant in Iraq, but simultaneously increased the ability of the al Qaeda network to gain new recruits on the bottom, transnational board.[25]

Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in military power, the United States will likely remain the world's single most powerful country well into the twenty-first century. French dreams of a multipolar military world are unlikely to be realized anytime soon, and the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has explicitly eschewed such a goal.[26] But not all the important types of power come out of the barrel of a gun. Hard power is relevant to getting the outcomes we want on all three chessboards, but many of the transnational issues, such as climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, international crime, and terrorism, cannot be resolved by military force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues are inherently multilateral and require cooperation for their solution. Soft power is particularly important in dealing with the issues that arise from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations. To describe such a world as an American empire fails to capture the real nature of the foreign policy tasks that we face.

Another problem for those who urge that we accept the idea of an American empire is that they misunderstand the underlying nature of American public opinion and institutions. Even if it were true that unilateral occupation and transformation of undemocratic regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere would reduce some of the sources of transnational terrorism, the question is whether the American public would tolerate an imperial role for its government. Neoconservative writers like Max Boot argue that the United States should provide troubled countries with the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodphurs and pith helmets, but as the British historian Niall Ferguson points out, modern America differs from nineteenth century Britain in our "chronically short time frame."[27] Although an advocate of empire, Ferguson worries that the American political system is not up to the task, and for better or worse, he is right.

[25] "U.S. Officials See Signs of a Revived Al Qaeda in Several Nations," *New York Times*, 17 May 2003.

[26] Joschka Fischer quoted in John Vinocur, "German Official Says Europe Must Be U.S. Friend, Not Rival," *New York Times*, 19 July 2003.

[27] Niall Ferguson, "The Empire Slinks Back," *New York Times Magazine*, 27 April 2003, 52.

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The United States has intervened in and governed countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and the Philippines, and America was briefly tempted into real imperialism when it emerged as a world power a century ago, but the interlude of formal empire did not last.[28] Imperialism has never been a comfortable experience for Americans, and only a small portion of the cases of military occupation in our history have led directly to the establishment of democracies. The establishment of democracy in Germany and Japan after World War II remains the exception rather than the rule, and in these countries it took nearly a decade. American empire is not limited by "imperial overstretch," in the sense of costing an impossible portion of our gross domestic product. We devoted a much higher percentage of the gross domestic product to the military budget during the Cold War than we do today. The overstretch will come from having to police more peripheral countries with nationally resistant publics than foreign or American public opinion will accept. Polls show little taste for empire among Americans. Instead, the American public continues to say that it favors multilateralism and using the UN. Perhaps that is why Michael Ignatieff, a Canadian advocate of accepting the empire metaphor, qualifies it by referring to the American role in the world as "Empire Lite."[29]

In fact, the problem of creating an American empire might better be termed "imperial understretch." Neither the public nor Congress has proven willing to invest seriously in the instruments of nation building and governance as opposed to military force. The entire budget for international affairs (including the Agency for International Development) is only 1 percent of the federal budget. The United States spends nearly nineteen times that amount on its military, and there is little indication that this is about to change in an era of tax cuts and budget deficits. Moreover, our military is designed for fighting, rather than for police work, and the Rumsfeld Pentagon has cut back on training for peacekeeping operations. The United States has designed a military that is better suited to kick down the door, beat up a dictator, and then go home rather than stay for the harder imperial work of building a democratic polity. For a variety of reasons, in regard to both the world and the United States, Americans should avoid the misleading metaphor of empire as a guide for our foreign policy. Empire is not the narrative we need to help us understand and cope with the global information age of the twenty-first century.

American Foreign Policy Traditions

The United States has a variety of foreign policy traditions to draw upon that overlap, reinforce, and sometimes conflict with each other. The writer Walter Mead has used the device of identifying these traditions with the names of past

[28] Ernest May, *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay* (Chicago, IL: Imprint Publications, 1991).

[29] Michael Ignatieff, "American Empire: The Burden," *New York Times Magazine*, 5 January 2003, 22.

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leaders as a helpful way to distinguish them.[30] The realists who prudently pursue national interest and commerce are named after Alexander Hamilton. Populists, who emphasize self-reliance and frequent use of coercion, he names for Andrew Jackson. He calls "Jeffersonians" those who pursue democracy by being a shining beacon to others rather than (in John Quincy Adams's words) "going forth in search of monsters to destroy." Finally, "Wilsonians" are the idealists who follow Woodrow Wilson in seeking to make the world safe for democracy.

Each approach has its virtues and faults. The Hamiltonians are prudent, but their realism lacks a moral appeal to many at home and abroad. The Jacksonians are robust and tough, but lack staying power and allies. Both the Hamiltonians and Jacksonians are deficient in soft power. The Jeffersonians, on the other hand, have plenty of soft power, but not enough hard power. Being a shining city on a hill is attractive but often not sufficient to achieve all foreign policy goals. The Wilsonians are also long on soft power, but sometimes their idealism leads them into unrealistic ambitions. Their danger is that their foreign policy vehicles often have strong accelerators but weak brakes and are thus prone to go off the road.

Whereas Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians tend toward prudent and conservative foreign policies that do not rock the boat, Wilsonians seek to transform the international situation. In the case of the Middle East, for years, the United States followed a Hamiltonian policy that sought stability through the support of autocrats but that, in the end, did not prevent the rise of radical Islamist ideology and terrorism. The Wilsonians urge a transformational rather than a conservative or status quo foreign policy. In their view, without democratization, the Middle East (and other regions) will continue to be a breeding ground for rogue states and terrorist threats. Much of the debate inside the Bush administration over the Iraq war was between traditional Hamiltonian realists (such as Secretary of State Colin Powell) and a coalition of Jacksonians (such as Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) plus neoconservative Wilsonians (such as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz). Part of the confusion over American objectives in going to war was that the administration used different arguments to appeal to different camps. The suggestion of a connection to al Qaeda and September 11 was important to Jacksonians, who sought revenge and deterrence; the argument that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN resolutions appealed to Hamiltonians and traditional Wilsonians in Congress; and the need to remove a bloody dictator and transform Middle Eastern politics was important to the new Wilsonians.

In recent years, the Wilsonians have divided into two camps. President Wilson, of course, was a Democrat, and traditional Wilsonians continue to stress both the promotion of democracy and the role of international institutions. The

[30] Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001).

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neoconservatives, many of whom split off from the Democratic party, stress the importance of democracy, but have dropped Wilson's emphasis on international institutions. They do not want to be held back by institutional constraints, and they see our legitimacy coming from our focus on democracy. In that sense, the neoconservatives are advocates of soft power, but they focus too simply on substance and not enough on process. By downgrading the legitimacy that comes from institutional processes in which others are consulted, they squander soft power.

Ironically, however, the only way to achieve the type of transformation that the neoconservatives seek is by working with others and avoiding the backlash that arises when the United States appears on the world stage as an imperial power acting unilaterally. What is more, because democracy cannot be imposed by force and requires a considerable time to take root, the most likely way to obtain staying power from the American public is through developing international legitimacy and burden sharing with allies and institutions. For Jacksonians like Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, this may not matter. They would prefer to punish the dictator and come home rather than engage in tedious nation building. For example, in September 2003, Rumsfeld said of Iraq, "I don't believe it's our job to reconstruct the country."[31] But for serious neoconservatives, like Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, their impatience with institutions and allies may undercut their own objectives. They understand the importance of soft power but fail to appreciate all its dimensions and dynamics.

Soft Power and Policy

Soft power grows out of our culture, out of our domestic values and policies, and out of our foreign policy. Many of the effects of our culture, for better or worse, are outside the control of government. But there is still a great deal that the government can do. Much more can be done to improve our public diplomacy in all dimensions. We can greatly improve our broadcast capabilities as well as our narrowcasting on the Internet. But both should be based on better listening as well. Newt Gingrich has written that "the impact and success of a new U.S. communication strategy should be measured continually on a country-by-country basis. An independent public affairs firm should report weekly on how U.S. messages are received in at least the world's 50 largest countries."[32] Such an approach would help us to select relevant themes as well as to fine-tune our short-term responses. And we should greatly increase our investment in soft power. We could easily afford to double the budget for public diplomacy as well as raise its profile and direction from the White House.

Equally important will be increasing the exchanges across societies that allow our rich and diverse nongovernmental sectors to interact with other coun-

[31] Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says More G.I.s Would Not Help U.S. in Iraq," *New York Times*, 11 September 2003.

[32] Newt Gingrich, "Rogue State Department," *Foreign Policy* (July 2003): 42.

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tries. It was a great mistake for the Clinton administration and Congress to cut the budget and staff for cultural diplomacy and exchanges by nearly 30 percent after 1993.[33] And it is a mistake now to let visa policies curtail such contacts. The most effective communication often occurs not by distant broadcasts but in face-to-face contacts—what Edward R. Murrow called "the last three feet." Such programs were critical to winning the Cold War. The best communicators are often not governments but civilian surrogates, both from the United States and from other countries.

We will need to be more inventive in this area, whether it be through finding ways to improve the visa process for educational exchanges, encouraging more American students to study abroad, rethinking the role of the Peace Corps, inventing a major program for foreigners to teach their languages in American schools, starting a corporation for public diplomacy that will help tap into the resources of the private and nonprofit sectors, or a myriad of other ways. As Michael Holtzman has observed about the Middle East, our public diplomacy must acknowledge a world that is far more skeptical of government messages than we have assumed. "To be credible to the so-called Arab street, public diplomacy should be directed mainly at spheres of everyday life. Washington should put its money into helping American doctors, teachers, businesses, religious leaders, athletic teams, and entertainers to go abroad and provide the sorts of services the people of the Middle East are eager for."[34]

While the United States has a number of social and political problems at home, many of these are shared with other postmodern societies, and thus invidious comparisons do not seriously undercut our soft power. Moreover, we maintain strengths of openness, civil liberties, and democracy that appeal to others. Problems arise for our soft power when we do not live up to our own standards. As we try to find the right balance between freedom and security in the struggle against terrorism, it is important to remember that others are watching as well. The Bush administration deserves credit for responding to human rights groups' accusations that it was torturing suspects by unequivocally rejecting the use of any techniques to interrogate suspects that would constitute 'cruel' treatment prohibited by the Constitution.[35]

Some domestic policies, such as capital punishment and the absence of gun controls, reduce the attractiveness of the United States to other countries but are the results of differences in values that may persist for some time. Other policies, such as the refusal to limit gas-guzzling vehicles, damage the American reputation because they appear self-indulgent and demonstrate an unwillingness to consider the effects we are having on global climate change and other countries. Similarly, domestic agricultural subsidies that are structured in a way

[33] Juliette Antunes Sablosky, "Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Diplomacy: 1993–2002," accessed at the website of the Center for Arts and Culture at http://www.culturalpolicy.org.

[34] Michael Holtzman, "Washington's Sour Sales Pitch," *New York Times*, 4 October 2003.

[35] Peter Slevin, "U.S. Pledges Not to Torture Terror Suspects," *Washington Post*, 27 June 2003.

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that protects wealthy farmers while we preach the virtue of free markets to poor countries appear hypocritical in the eyes of others. In a democracy, the "dog" of domestic politics is often too large to be wagged by the tail of foreign policy, but when we ignore the connections, our apparent hypocrisy is costly to our soft power.

The government can do most to recover the recent American loss of soft power in the near term by adjusting the style and substance of its foreign policy. Obviously there are times when foreign policies serve fundamental American interests and cannot and should not be changed. But tactics can often be adjusted without giving up basic interests. Style may be the easiest part. For one thing, the administration could go back to the wisdom about humility and warnings about arrogance that George W. Bush expressed in his 2000 campaign. There is no need to take pleasure in embarrassing allies or to have a secretary of defense insulting them while a secretary of state is trying to woo them. As a British columnist wrote in the *Financial Times*, "I have a soft spot for Donald Rumsfeld. But as an ambassador for the American values so admired around the world, I can think of no one worse."[36] Prime Minister Tony Blair put it well in his 2003 address to the American Congress, when he said that the real challenge for the United States now "is to show that this is a partnership built on persuasion, not command."[37]

On the substance of policy, the Bush administration deserves credit for its efforts to align the United States with the long-term aspirations of poor people in Africa and elsewhere through its Millenium Challenge initiative, which promises to increase aid to countries willing to make reforms, as well as for its efforts to increase resources to combat AIDS and other infectious diseases. Success in implementing those programs will represent a significant investment in American soft power. So also will be the serious promotion of the peace process in the Middle East. As National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said, "America is a country that really does have to be committed to values and to making life better for people around the world. . . . It's not just the sword, it's the olive branch that speaks to those intentions."[38]

As for the sword, the United States will continue to need it from time to time in the struggle against terrorism and in our efforts to create stability. Maintaining our hard power is essential to security. But we will not succeed by the sword alone. Our doctrine of containment led to success in the Cold War not just because of military deterrence but because, as George Kennan designed the policy, our soft power would help to transform the Soviet Bloc from within. Containment was not a static military doctrine but a transformational strategy,

[36] Philip Stephens, "The World Needs a Confident America, Not a Fearful One," *Financial Times*, 12 December 2002, 21.

[37] Cathy Newman, "Blair Tells Congress 'Don't Give Up on Europe—Work With It,'" *Financial Times*, 18 July 2003, 1.

[38] Richard Stevenson, "New Threats and Opportunities Redefine U.S. Interests in Africa," *New York Times*, 7 July 2003.

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albeit one that took decades to accomplish. Indeed, Kennan frequently warned against what he regarded as the over-militarization of containment and was a strong supporter of contacts and exchanges. Those lessons about patience and the mixture of hard and soft power still stand us in good stead today.

When we do use our hard power, we will need to be more attentive to ways to make it less costly to our soft power by creating broad coalitions. Here, the model should be the patient and painstaking work of George H. W. Bush in building the coalition for the first Gulf war. Those who write off "old Europe" as so enthralled by Venus that it is hopelessly opposed to the use of force should remember that 75 percent of the French and 63 percent of the German publics supported the use of military force to free Kuwait before the Gulf war.[39] Similarly, both countries were active participants in NATO's use of military force against Serbia in the 1999 Kosovo war, despite the absence of a formal UN security council resolution. The difference was that American policy appeared legitimate in the eyes of their publics in those two cases. We had soft power and were able to attract allies.

The UN is not the only source of legitimacy, but many people concluded that the Kosovo campaign was legitimate (although not formally legal) because it had the de facto support of a large majority of Security Council members. The UN is often an unwieldy institution. The veto power in the Security Council has meant that it has been able to authorize the use of force for a true collective security operation only twice in half a century: in Korea and Kuwait. But it was designed to be a concert of large powers that would not work when they disagree. The veto is like a fuse box in the electrical system of a house. Better that the fuse blows and the lights go out than that the house burns down. Moreover, as Kofi Annan pointed out after the Kosovo war, the UN is torn between the traditional strict interpretation of state sovereignty and the rise of international humanitarian and human rights law that sets limits on what leaders can do to their citizens. Moreover, the politics of consensus have made the United Nations Charter virtually impossible to amend. Nonetheless, for all its flaws, the UN has proven useful in its humanitarian and peacekeeping roles where states agree, and it remains an important source of legitimization in world politics.

The latter point is particularly galling to the new unilateralists, who correctly point to the undemocratic nature of many of the regimes that vote and chair committees. But their proposed solution of replacing the UN with a new organization of democracies ignores the fact that the major divisions over Iraq were among the democracies. Rather than engage in futile efforts at ignoring the UN or changing its architecture, we should improve our underlying bilateral diplomacy with the other major powers and use the UN in the practical ways in which it can help with the new strategy. In addition to the UN's development and humanitarian agenda, the Security Council may wind up playing a background role related to North Korea; the Committee on Terrorism can help to

[39] Gallup Poll, Ltd., "European Attitudes Toward the Gulf Crisis," October 1990.

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prod states to improve their procedures; and UN peacekeepers can save us from having to be the world's lone policeman. Not only can the UN be useful to us in a variety of practical ways if we work at it, but unilateralist attacks on it will backfire in a way that undercuts our soft power.

* * *

Americans are still working their way through the aftermath of September 11. We are groping for a path through the strange new landscape created by technology and globalization whose dark aspects were vividly illuminated on that traumatic occasion. The Bush administration has correctly identified the nature of the new challenges that the nation faces and has reoriented American strategy accordingly. But the administration, like Congress and the public, has been torn between different approaches to the implementation of the new strategy. The result has been a mixture of both successes and failures. We have been more successful in the domain of hard power, where we have invested more, trained more, and have a clearer idea of what we are doing. We have been less successful in the areas of soft power, where our public diplomacy has been woefully inadequate and our neglect of allies and institutions has created a sense of illegitimacy that has squandered our attractiveness.

Yet this is ironic because the United States is the country that is at the forefront of the information revolution as well as the country that built some of the longest-lasting alliances and institutions that the modern world has seen. We should know how to adapt and work with such institutions, since they have been central to our power for more than half a century. And the United States is a country with a vibrant social and cultural life that provides an almost infinite number of points of contact with other societies. What's more, during the Cold War, we demonstrated that we know how to use the soft power resources that our society produces.

It is time now for us to draw upon and combine our traditions in a different way. We need more Jefferson and less Jackson. Our Wilsonians are correct about the importance of the democratic transformation of world politics over the long term, but they need to remember the role of institutions and allies. They also need to temper their impatience with a good mixture of Hamiltonian realism. In short, America's success will depend upon our developing a deeper understanding the role of soft power and developing a better balance of hard and soft power in our foreign policy. That will be smart power. We have done it before; we can do it again.

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Secrecy and Power: Unanticipated Problems in Researching FBI Files

ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

The history of the United States in the twentieth century has been marked by an explosive growth in bureaucracies, a growth that has undermined a political system based on accountability and the "public's right to know." As these public and private bureaucracies evolved over time, they not only became more powerful, but their power stemmed from an ability to shroud their operations in secrecy. This problem of secrecy is best exemplified by FBI records destruction practices, practices inadvertently discovered through tantalizing hints in released FBI records.

Until the late 1970s, the FBI had not been a subject of historical research, primarily because of the inaccessibility of even closed FBI records,[1] none of which had been deposited by FBI officials at the National Archives. In the 1950s and 1960s, when FBI officials discovered that copies of FBI reports and memoranda were accessible in the deposited records of other federal officials and departments—whether the diaries of former Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau or the files of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice—they pressured National Archives officials to withdraw these records from public access.[2]

[1] That is, records of those cases that either had been prosecuted or prosecution had been rejected as unfeasible.

[2] Thus, while William Preston was able in the early 1960s to research FBI records for the World War I period included in Department of Justice files at the National Archives, by the late 1960s, these records (and those FBI files formerly accessible in the American Protective League records) were no longer accessible to Joan Jensen. See William Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933* (New York: Harper, 1963), 228, 280; and Joan Jensen, *The Price of Vigilance* (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1968), 314. See also Athan Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988), 68n, 267–268; and Athan Theoharis, "The FBI and the Morgenthau Diaries," *OAH Newsletter* (November 1993): 3.

ATHAN G. THEOHARIS is a professor of history at Marquette University whose research focuses on the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His most recent books are *Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence But Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War Years* and the forthcoming *The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History.*

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This roadblock was first breached in 1974, when Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1966. Under these amendments, FBI officials were required to release all records responsive to specified requests. Certain information was nonetheless exempted from release—if it was properly classified as "national security," if it would reveal the agency's "sources and methods," or if it would violate the "privacy rights" of the subject of the record. Then, when processing FOIA requests, FBI officials interpreted the Act's exemptive provisions so broadly that the released records were often so heavily redacted as to have limited research value.[3]

Nonetheless, the major problem compromising research into the FBI's past history stems from the inadvertent discovery that not all relevant FBI records created about a specific subject (person, organization, or program) have been or will become accessible. Released FBI records indirectly document how FBI officials created and maintained records, in the process revealing much about the priorities and political objectives of senior FBI officials. Two distinct problems are highlighted: first, that not all extant FBI records on specific subjects have been released or made identifiable during the processing of FOIA requests, and second, that sensitive FBI records have been destroyed for the explicit purpose of protecting the decisions of senior FBI officials against public knowledge and accountability.

The FBI and the House Committee on Un-American Activities

The first problem is underscored by the FBI's file on the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). This file documents that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover agreed to a May 1947 request for assistance from HUAC Chair J. Parnell Thomas and HUAC Counsel Robert Stripling and specifically authorized the release to them of information on the personal and political background (including Communist party membership) of nine Hollywood personalities and a report, "Re: Communist Activities in Hollywood." This report named individuals who either "probably [would] be cooperative and friendly witnesses" or who would be "hostile witnesses and uncooperative" because of their association "with the communist movement together with positions or activities." When honoring Thomas's and Stripling's request for FBI assistance, Hoover understood that the success of their preliminary inquiry that May would ensure that at a meeting the following month, the full membership of the Committee would approve a full-scale investigation into Communist influ-

[3] For a discussion of these research limitations, see the essays by Athan Theoharis, "The Freedom of Information Act Versus the FBI"; Jon Wiener, "'National Security' and Freedom of Information: The John Lennon FBI Files"; and Alexander Charns, "Playing the Information Game: How It Took Thirteen Years and Two Lawsuits to Get J. Edgar Hoover's Secret Supreme Court Sex Files" in Athan Theoharis, ed., *A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus the People's Right to Know* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 4–31, 83–93, 97–109. See also Daniel Moynihan, *Secrecy: The American Experience* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

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ence in Hollywood. The FBI's HUAC file also contains three memoranda confirming that between August and October 1947, HUAC investigator H. Allen Smith "fully" briefed the FBI's Los Angeles office regarding "his activities" and provided the names of individuals HUAC planned to subpoena and the order of their scheduled testimony.[4]

The FBI's HUAC file appears to confirm that FBI assistance to HUAC was limited to ensuring the success of Thomas's preliminary inquiry. In fact, FBI assistance to HUAC continued until HUAC's public hearings of October 1947. Indeed, following the full Committee's vote to authorize an investigation of Communist influence in Hollywood, Hoover met personally with Thomas. At this June 1947 meeting, the FBI Director agreed to Thomas's request for continuing FBI assistance and promised to be "as helpful to the Committee as we could." The FBI Director had concluded that "it is long overdue for the Communist infiltration in Hollywood to be exposed, and as there is no medium at the present time through which this Bureau can bring this about on its own motion, I think it is entirely proper and desirable that we assist the Committee in Congress that is intent upon bringing to light the true facts in the situation." In the succeeding months, FBI officials, for example, leaked to the HUAC photostats of the Communist party membership cards and the Communist Front affiliations of forty other Hollywood personalities—in this case responding to specific HUAC requests. This assistance proved crucial to the success of the highly publicized HUAC hearings of October 1947 that led to the indictment and conviction of ten Hollywood producers, directors, and writers for contempt of Congress. An appreciative HUAC Chair conveyed his "heartfelt appreciation" to Hoover following the conclusion of the October hearings "because the Director more than any other person is responsible for his [Thomas's] Committee not being put out of business." The records documenting these activities, however, were included in the FBI's Communist Infiltration in the Motion Picture Industry (COMPIC) file but not in the FBI's HUAC file.[5] Created in 1942, the COMPIC file records the FBI's sixteen-year investigation into the sus-

[4] FBI officials' assistance to Thomas is recorded in Memo, Tolson to Hoover, 12 May 1947, FBI 61-7582-1462; Letters, Hood to FBI Director, 12 May 1947, FBI 61-7582-1465 and 14 May 1947 and copy of Memo Re: Communist Activities in Hollywood, FBI 61-7582-1468; Three teletypes, Hood to FBI Director, all 13 May 1947, FBI 61-7582-1463, FBI 61-7582-1466, and FBI 61-7582-1467; Memo, Nichols to Tolson, 13 May 1947, FBI 61-7582-1465. Smith's briefing of the Los Angeles office is from Letters, Hood to FBI Director, 13 September 1947, FBI 61-7582-1476 and 13 October 1947, FBI 61-7582-1478.

[5] Hoover's willingness to assist Thomas is recorded in Memo, Hoover to Tolson, Tamm, Ladd, and Nichols, 24 June 1947, FBI 100-138754-165. FBI assistance to Thomas thereafter is recorded in Memos, Nichols to Tolson, 21 August 1947, FBI 100-138754-219; 27 August 1947, FBI 100-138754-219; 29 August 1947, FBI 100-138754-221; 7 September 1947, FBI 100-138754–unclear; and 10 September 1947, FBI 100-138754-224. Memo, Coyne to Ladd, undated and unserialized, captioned "Request of House Committee on Un-American Activities for a Check of Bureau Files on 40 Individuals Identified with Motion Picture Industry," filed in FBI 100-138754. Letters, Hood to FBI Director, 13 September 1947, FBI 100-138754-230 and 17 September 1947, FBI 100-138754-unclear. Thomas's appreciation is recorded in Memo, Nichols to Tolson, 28 October 1947, FBI 100-138754-286.

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pected infiltration of Communists into the motion picture industry wherein, for example, by breaking into the office of the Los Angeles section of the Communist party, FBI agents were able to document the Communist party membership of Hollywood directors, producers, actors, actresses, stage hands, and other laborers.

The FBI and Congressman Nixon

The incompleteness of the FBI's HUAC file is further underscored by the absence of *any* record that FBI officials assisted HUAC members and staff—and, more specifically, Congressman Richard Nixon—prior to and during the August–December 1948 HUAC hearings involving the Hiss-Chambers case. Congressman Nixon played a prominent role in ensuring the public impact of these hearings, first when seeking to establish in August that Hiss had been a member of a Communist cell during the New Deal years and then in December that Hiss had given classified State Department documents to Whittaker Chambers in 1938. As in the case of HUAC's Hollywood investigation, the FBI's covert assistance to HUAC (and Nixon) was, in fact, both extensive and crucial.

Richard Nixon hints at such an FBI-HUAC relationship in his memoirs. The former HUAC member claimed that because of President Truman's March 1948 executive order barring FBI (as well as other federal) officials from honoring congressional subpoenas for agency records, "we [HUAC] were not able to get any direct help from J. Edgar Hoover or the FBI. However, we had some informal contacts with a low-level agent that proved helpful in our investigations."[6] In May 1949 grand jury testimony, former HUAC member Karl Mundt disclosed that HUAC had a "fairly good liaison with the F.B.I." FBI officials, Mundt elaborated, "would never come to us originally with tips," but "sometimes" helped by keeping "us from getting off on a wrong track." Mundt continued that "Most of our work with the F.B.I. had to be on a personal basis, rather than an official basis."[7]

While admitting to having worked with FBI officials surreptitiously, both Nixon and Mundt minimized the extent and significance of FBI assistance. In contrast, John Cronin, a Catholic priest who had forged a close, if covert relationship first with FBI officials dating from 1943 and then with Nixon dating from 1947, contradicts this relatively benign account. During interviews with Garry Wills and Allen Weinstein, Cronin admitted that in 1948 he had acted as an intermediary between FBI officials and Congressman Nixon. Cronin described how Nixon acquired "the results of the Bureau's investigation into Hiss—the car, the typewriter, etc." After learning from FBI agent Ed Hummer what the FBI "had turned up," Cronin telephoned Nixon on his private line "frequently between August and December 1948" to provide "the F.B.I. tidbits" and thereby ensured that Nixon "knew just where to look for things and what he could find."[8]

[6] Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 58.

[7] Grand jury transcripts, *U.S. v. John Doe*, Karl E. Mundt, 17 May 1949, 7390.

[8] Garry Wills, *Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man* (New York: New American Library, 1971), 36–37; Allen Weinstein, "Nixon vs. Hiss: The Story Nixon Tells and the Other Story," *Esquire*, November 1975, 77.

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Cronin's more expansive account of the Nixon-FBI relationship is confirmed not by records in his FBI file (there are none) but by two FBI memoranda of December 1948 included in the FBI's Alger Hiss files. One of these memoranda records that Nixon "voluntarily stated" to former FBI agents Patrick Coyne and Bob King during an 8 December 1948 meeting that "he had worked very close with the Bureau and with [FBI Assistant Director Louis] Nichols during the past year on the [Hiss-Chambers] matter." The second memorandum, dated 2 December 1948, documents the closeness of this relationship. Returning to his Washington, DC office after meeting with Chambers at his farm in Westminster, Maryland on 1 December, this freshman Congressman telephoned FBI Assistant Director Nichols (the third-ranking FBI official) at his home in the middle of the night to brief him "on a strictly personal and highly confidential basis" about this meeting. Nixon reported that Chambers admitted that he had not told the FBI "everything he knew" and "still had other documents and material" beyond the handwritten notes and typed documents that Chambers had turned over to Hiss's attorneys on 17 November, which had then been given to the Justice Department. Nixon specifically requested that Nichols (and his FBI superiors) "not tell the Attorney General that we [FBI] were told of this information as the Attorney General would try to make it impossible for the Committee [HUAC] to get the documents. He also asked that the Bureau not look for the documents themselves." As justification for this audacious request, Nixon emphasized that HUAC intended to subpoena the documents and material "for hearings scheduled for 18 December." Briefed on this development and about Nixon's request, FBI Director Hoover agreed to defer to Nixon and the Committee and ordered his aides to inquire of Assistant Attorney General Alexander Campbell (the Justice Department official supervising the case then being presented to a federal grand jury) only about the "documentary evidence" (a reference to the typed and handwritten documents turned over on 17 November).[9]

No released FBI record (whether in the FBI files on HUAC, Hiss, or Cronin) documents the nature of the FBI-HUAC, FBI-Cronin-Nixon, or Nixon-Nichols relationships and specifically the "close" relationship that "past year" between FBI officials and Nixon, including whatever information had been surreptitiously provided to HUAC and to Nixon between August and December 1948. Six years ago, I filed an FOIA request for the FBI's Nixon files. This FOIA request has to date not been processed. Should the (eventually released) FBI files on Nixon contain no records of this assistance and "close" relationship, this would confirm that such sensitive records have been destroyed.

The FBI and Senator McCarthy

That not all FBI records created pertaining to named individuals or organizations are accessible through requests for these individuals'/organizations' files is again inadvertently confirmed in released FBI files on Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy.

[9] Memo, Nichols to Tolson, 2 December 1948, FBI file on Alger Hiss #101; Memo, Ladd to FBI Director, 9 December 1948, FBI file on Alger Hiss #157.

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In his memoirs, former FBI Assistant Director William Sullivan claims that following McCarthy's Senate speech of 20 February 1950 (when he had claimed to have a list of 81 "known Communists in the State Department"), the Wisconsin Senator solicited FBI assistance to corroborate these allegations. In response, the FBI Director had ordered a search of FBI files for any information that would help McCarthy. Elaborating, Sullivan wrote that Hoover "had us [FBI agents and officials] prepare material for [McCarthy] regularly, kept furnishing it to him while [Hoover] publicly denied that we were helping him." Sullivan continued that "During the Eisenhower years the FBI kept Joe McCarthy in business. Senator McCarthy stated publicly that there were Communists working for the State Department. We gave McCarthy all we had, but all we had were fragments, nothing could prove his allegations. For a while, though, the allegations were enough to keep McCarthy in the headlines."[10]

Former FBI agent Don Surine, who joined McCarthy's staff in 1950, also claims that he and Senator McCarthy met frequently with Hoover and FBI Associate Director Clyde Tolson to exchange information.[11]

No record in the released FBI McCarthy files documents Sullivan's and Surine's accounts. In part, this is because these files inadvertently document how FBI officials purposefully ensured that their covert assistance to McCarthy could not be uncovered. FBI memoranda of September and October 1950 record that on receipt of FBI information provided in blind-memorandum form (a special FBI records procedure wherein information was typed on nonletterhead stationary without identifying the writer or recipient), McCarthy's aides "would insert the information appearing in the Bureau report in the form of a summary of information appearing in the CSC [Civil Service Commission] file, thus making it appear that his [McCarthy's] office had secured a CSC file rather than a Bureau file."[12]

No copies of such blind memoranda for 1950–1952 are extant in the FBI's McCarthy files. These files, nonetheless, document a fundamental change in the FBI-McCarthy relationship following McCarthy's re-election to the Senate and Republican victories in the 1952 congressional and presidential elections. In late November 1952, a confident McCarthy told Guy Hottel, the head of the FBI's Washington, DC field office, that he "anticipated close cooperation and more extended use of the FBI and its facilities following the beginning of the new Congress." "In the past," McCarthy observed, as recorded in an FBI memo on this meeting, "it was not always to one's advantage to be seen talking to or associating with" himself but that "all this would be changed now with his [McCarthy's] re-election and the new Congress." McCarthy planned to confer

[10] William Sullivan, *The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI* (New York: Norton, 1979), 45, 46, 267.

[11] Thomas Reeves, *The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy* (New York: Stein and Day, 1982), 126, 127, 245, 246, 312–314, 548; David Oshinsky, *A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy* (New York: Free Press, 1983), 117, 257, 258, 324.

[12] Memo, Hottel to FBI Director, 19 September 1950, FBI 121-41668-28; Memo, Ladd to FBI Director, 5 October 1950, FBI 121-41668–Not Recorded.

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with FBI Director Hoover "in the not too distant future relative to his obtaining suggestions for prospective investigative personnel" whom he could hire when assuming the chairmanship of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee in January 1953.[13]

The FBI's McCarthy files confirm that in the ensuing months, the Wisconsin Senator solicited Hoover's assistance on a number of matters. These included the FBI Director's recommendations of competent investigators for appointment to the staff of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee and Hoover's counsel regarding whether the Subcommittee should pursue hearings into the loyalty of J. Robert Oppenheimer and whether the Senator should sue *Las Vegas Sun* editor and publisher Hank Greenspan for a column alleging that he (McCarthy) was homosexual.[14]

The above examples constitute the totality of FBI assistance to McCarthy recorded in the FBI's McCarthy files, seemingly confirming that such assistance was limited. As in the case of the HUAC file, other extant FBI records, in this case included in the FBI's Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) file, document a close FBI-McCarthy relationship. The SISS file was created in 1951 when Attorney General J. Howard McGrath authorized a covert FBI-SISS liaison program.

Following Dwight Eisenhower's election to the presidency in 1952, FBI officials briefed his Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, and Deputy Attorney General, William Rogers, about this secret FBI-SISS liason program. Brownell immediately reauthorized its continuance. FBI officials concurrently solicited Brownell's and Rogers's guidance whether to accede to requests for assistance from other congressional committees, and specifically from Senator McCarthy and the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee. Brownell and Rogers authorized Hoover to honor all of McCarthy's requests for name checks on proposed staff appointments and any other of McCarthy's requests for assistance by deciding "each case . . . on its merits." There "might be legitimate instances wherein the Bureau should cooperate but . . . this should be decided in individual cases." The Deputy Attorney General specifically urged the FBI Director to assist the Senator's proposed investigation of the Voice of America. He and Brownell, Rogers continued, "wanted to do whatever the Bureau wanted to do" and would back Hoover whether or not he decided to cooperate with McCarthy. In the ensuing weeks, when McCarthy flooded the FBI with a flurry of requests, Rogers reaffirmed this policy of cooperation. "For the time being, when we [FBI] receive requests" from McCarthy and the McCarthy Committee, Rogers counselled FBI Assistant Director Louis Nichols, "we should decide each on its merits and do all we can to slow them down."[15]

[13] Memo, Hottel to FBI Director, 28 November 1952, FBI 94-37708-76x.

[14] Memo, Hoover to Tolson, 13 January 1953, FBI 94-37708-79x; Memo, Hoover to Tolson, Ladd, Belmont, and Nichols, 19 May 1953, FBI 62-96332–Not Recorded; Memo, Ladd to Belmont, 28 July 1953, FBI 94-37708–Not Recorded; Memo, Hoover to Brownell, 31 July 1953, FBI 94-37708-Not Recorded; Memo, Pennington to Ladd, 25 June 1953, FBI 62-96332-50; Memo, Nichols to Tolson, 24 June 1953, FBI 94-37708–Not Recorded.

[15] Brownell's approval of FBI assistance is from Memo, Nichols to Tolson, 4 February 1953, FBI 62-88217–Not Recorded; Roger's reaffirmation is from Memo, Nichols to Tolson, 9 March 1953, FBI 62-88217–Not Recorded.

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In 1950, Hoover had sought to ensure that Democratic Attorney General J. Howard McGrath could not learn of his assistance to McCarthy. In 1953, in contrast, the FBI Director commanded the full backing of Eisenhower's attorney general. Accordingly, he ordered Nichols to maintain a "close liaison" relationship with McCarthy and the Senator's principal aides, Roy Cohn and Don Surine. During the four-week period between 16 March and 16 April 1953, as a result, FBI officials serviced a total of seventy-four name check requests from the McCarthy Committee.[16]

There is no record in the FBI's McCarthy files documenting this liaison relationship, indirectly confirming that the McCarthy files do not record all FBI assistance to the Senator. Furthermore, the relatively more comprehensive SISS file contains no documentation of the McCarthy Committee's specific requests (which triggered the seventy-four name checks) or copies of the seventy-four reports the FBI sent to the McCarthy Committee. Furthermore, the specific memoranda included in the SISS file documenting the above-cited examples of FBI assistance to McCarthy are carbon copies (and all were serialized Not Recorded), thereby inadvertently confirming that the originals as well as the originals of the McCarthy Committee name check requests and copies of the seventy-four FBI reports have been destroyed.

FBI Officials' Secret Office Files

Three other FBI memoranda further confirm the incompleteness of the FBI's McCarthy files. These memoranda were included either in FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's Official and Confidential File or in FBI Assistant Director Louis Nichols's Official and Confidential File and record McCarthy's solicitation of Hoover's assistance first to submarine President Eisenhower's nomination of Charles Bohlen as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and then to reconsider his (Hoover's) opposition to McCarthy's proposed appointment of a current FBI agent, Frank Carr, as Committee Staff Director. In the latter case, Hoover rebuffed McCarthy aide Jean Kerr's request that he sanction the Carr appointment. Such an appointment, Hoover advised, "would no doubt be seized upon by critics of the Senator and of the FBI as a deliberate effort to effect a direct 'pipe line' into the FBI and that it would make it necessary for the Bureau to be more circumspect in all of its dealings with the McCarthy Committee should Mr. Carr be appointed." McCarthy nonetheless appointed Carr. As a result, FBI officials decided, as recorded in the minutes of an October 1953 FBI Executives Conference meeting (and again not in the FBI's McCarthy files), "We

[16] Memos, Keay to Belmont, 20, 27 March, 5, 13, 20 April 1953, all FBI 62-88217-Not Recorded; Memo, FBI Executives Conference to FBI Director, 2 June 1953, FBI 62-88217-Not Recorded. When processing name check requests, FBI officials searched all FBI files for any derogatory personal or political information about the named subject.

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[FBI] have furnished information to the Senate Permanent Investigative [sic] Committee (McCarthy) up until the late summer [1953] when the Committee appointed former Special Agent Carr as Staff Director. Since then no information has been furnished to this Committee."[17]

Hoover had purposefully created the above-cited secret office files to maintain records that were not to be serialized and indexed in the FBI's central records system—thereby allowing the FBI Director and other senior FBI officials to deny that any such records existed in Bureau files. Hoover maintained in his office two secret files, an Official and Confidential File and a Personal and Confidential File, and in 1940 authorized Nichols to maintain a similar secret office file. The FBI Director had also devised special procedures (such as Do Not File and blue/pink/informal memoranda) to ensure that sensitive records would not be serialized and indexed in the FBI's central records system but would instead be routed either to his, Nichols's, or other FBI assistant directors' office files. Of these various secret office files, only Hoover's Official and Confidential File, Nichols's Official and Confidential File, and portions of FBI Associate Director Clyde Tolson's Personal File (the latter covering the 1965–1972 period) currently remain extant. The other office files were destroyed either pursuant to Hoover's March 1953 order that all FBI assistant directors destroy the contents of their office files on a regular six-month basis or by Hoover's administrative assistant, Helen Gandy, who destroyed Hoover's Personal and Confidential File within the month following his death in May 1972.[18]

The FBI and Adlai Stevenson

Hoover's extant Official and Confidential File contains over 17,000 pages of sensitive records. Yet, this secret office file does not contain all the sensitive communications written or received by the FBI Director, even in those instances when memoranda were sent directly to him. For example, the Adlai Stevenson folder in Hoover's Official and Confidential File contains a memorandum from FBI Assistant Director Nichols addressed directly to Hoover reporting on Nichols's recent meeting with Milt Hill. Hill had been commissioned

[17] Hoover's assistance to McCarthy re Bohlen is from Memo, Hoover to Tolson, Ladd, and Nichols, 18 March 1953, McCarthy, Joseph folder, Folder #105, Official and Confidential File of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. The Carr pipeline quote is from Memo, Hoover to Tolson, Ladd, and Nichols, 14 July 1953, McCarthy, Joseph folder, Folder #105, Official and Confidential File of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Memo, Nichols to Tolson, 23 July 1953, Miscellaneous A-Z folder, Official and Confidential File of FBI Assistant Director Louis Nichols. The October 1953 Executives' Conference minutes are in Memo, FBI Executives Conference to FBI Director, 14 October 1953, FBI 62-93875–Not Recorded. The reference to "late summer" confirms that FBI officials continued to honor McCarthy Committee name check requests after 16 April.

[18] On the Hoover, Nichols, and other office files and Hoover's special records procedures, see Athan Theoharis, "In-House Cover-up: Researching FBI Files" in Athan Theoharis, ed., *Beyond the Hiss Case: The FBI, Congress, and the Cold War* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1982), 21–24, 27–30.

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to "do the official Republican biography on [the 1952 Democratic presidential nominee] Governor Stevenson," Nichols informed Hoover, and during this meeting he had briefed him on the derogatory personal and political information about Stevenson that Hill had recently learned from a former FBI agent, including "scuttlebutt" that Stevenson had been arrested "on a morals charge" in New York City. When briefing Hoover about Hill's initiative, Nichols assured the FBI Director that Hill was "intensely anti-Communist, loyal to the Director" and that he and Hill had been friends for a period of years. After describing Hill's purpose, Nichols added that "The attached memorandum from Hill is self-explanatory." Hill had given it to him in strict confidence to "read and destroy," Nichols continued, and he would return it to Hill "after, of course, making a photostatic copy which would not go to [the FBI's main] files."[19]

The Stevenson folder does not contain this "photostatic copy." More significantly, the Stevenson folder contains the carbon copy, but not the original of Nichols's memorandum to Hoover—confirming both that the original has been destroyed and that not all of the former FBI Director's politically sensitive memoranda are currently contained in Hoover's Official and Confidential File.[20]

The FBI's Record Destruction File

This does not mean that only those FBI records that were not serialized and indexed in the FBI's central records system were destroyed. The contents of the FBI's Records Destruction File, a file ostensibly recording all cases wherein serialized and indexed records were approved for destruction, inadvertently confirms this.

During the early 1960s, an intensive FBI investigation of Fred Black, a Washington, DC-based lobbyist and influence peddler was launched. This investigation eventually resulted in Black's indictment and conviction for income tax evasion. Black appealed his conviction to the U.S. Supreme Court, at which time the Solicitor General (at the direction of senior Justice Department officials) disclosed that FBI agents had bugged Black's Washington residence and office during the course of this investigation. The Justices responded by demanding that the Solicitor General submit a brief to the Court outlining the authority for this microphone installation. When drafting this brief, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach became enmeshed in a bitter conflict with Hoo-

[19] Personal and Confidential Memo, Nichols to FBI Director, 29 August 1952, Stevenson, Adlai folder, Folder #143, Official and Confidential File of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

[20] Whenever receiving memoranda requiring his personal attention, Hoover hand-wrote his specific orders in the margins or at the bottom of the page of these communications. Such orders would have been on the original of Nichols's memorandum to Hoover, in this case confirming Hoover's authorization that Nichols corroborate these allegations about Stevenson.

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ver over Katzenbach's refusal to stipulate explicitly that Justice Department officials had authorized this and other FBI microphone installations. A frustrated FBI Director, troubled by the Attorney General's unwillingness to back the FBI, immediately ordered a cutback in FBI microphone and wiretap installations. At the same time, lower-level FBI officials began to review the records of past FBI wiretapping and bugging activities to determine whether any of these records should be destroyed.[21]

As part of this records review process, in August 1966, the head Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the FBI's Washington, DC field office requested Hoover's authorization to destroy "the tesurs [technical surveillances, i.e., wiretaps] logs more than 20 years old in certain designated cases."[22] Among the records he proposed to destroy were the logs of twenty wiretaps installed during an FBI investigation of alleged Soviet espionage activities. This investigation had been triggered by Elizabeth Bentley's defection in November 1945, when she approached the FBI and, in this and succeeding interviews, admitted to having served as a courier for two Soviet espionage rings during World War II. She named as her sources 150 employees in various wartime federal agencies and departments who she claimed were either Communist party members or sympathizers. Thus, we learn from the Washington SAC's record destruction request that during this FBI investigation to verify Bentley's allegations, at least twenty of those she named had been wiretapped.

Hoover rejected this 1966 request to destroy these wiretap logs "due to the unsettled positions the courts were taking on information emanating from, or connected with, technical surveillances." The FBI Director, however, advised the Washington SAC, "If, at a later date, you feel the original information in the logs . . . will not be the subject of court inquiry in the future, you should resubmit your recommendation for destruction of such records." Resubmitting this request in March 1970, the Washington SAC argued in justification of the recommended record destruction that despite having intensively investigated Bentley's allegations "over and over again" since 1945, the FBI had been unable to "substantiate and corroborate" them and that as a result, this "case has now disintegrated to such an extent that there appears to be no possibility of any prosecution or court inquiry at any time."

Hoover commended the SAC's record destruction request as "well researched," but nonetheless observed that because one of the twenty, Alger Hiss, had a pending court case challenging a statute denying him a federal pension, it was not "an opportune time to destroy the technical surveillance logs of Hiss and others listed in relet" and that should the matter be finally resolved,

[21] The Black case is discussed in Theoharis and Cox, *The Boss*, 368–393. Relevant documents are reprinted in Athan Theoharis, ed., *From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover* (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1991) 153–176, 267–275.

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the SAC could "resubmit [its] request." Hoover's rejection ensured that these records of past FBI wiretapping practices were preserved. Yet, had the FBI Director approved the 1970 proposal, not only would the wiretap logs have been destroyed but also the SAC's memorandum requesting his approval to destroy these logs. This action inadvertently confirms that not all past approved record destruction practices are recorded in the extant Record Destruction File.[22]

That the Record Destruction File does not record all decisions authorizing the destruction of specific records is further confirmed by a court suit initiated by Stephen Salant in 1978. In his suit, Salant argued that the FBI had not complied with his FOIA request for all records pertaining to the Alger Hiss case. Salant based this challenge on depositions of FBI agent Martin Wood and a Justice Department attorney, who were responding to his discovery of the destruction of a letter from Whittaker Chambers and of an accompanying check to Henry Julian Wadleigh.[23] A December 1950 memorandum from the Baltimore SAC to the FBI Director and an inventory of documents maintained in the Baltimore field office "Bulky Matter File" on the Whittaker Chambers investigation record that the Chambers letter and check were destroyed. According to the inventory, on 4 June 1958, FBI agent Bernard Norton destroyed "two photostatic copies of a letter dated 12-5-50 to Julian Wadleigh from Whitaker [sic] Chambers, 2 photostatic copies of check payable to Henry Julian Wadleigh signed by Whitaker [sic] Chambers and film."[24] The FBI's Record Destruction File, however, contains no record of this 1958 request to destroy the Chambers letter and check or of Hoover's approval. We have also inadvertently learned of two other cases of destruction of serialized FBI records.

The FBI's Sex Deviate Program Files

Although FBI officials had turned over no FBI records to the National Archives prior to 1974 (even for dated records of the 1908–1920 period), they reassessed FBI records retention practices in response to the enactment in 1974 of

[22] Memo, SAC Washington to FBI Director, 6 March 1970, FBI 66-3286-53 and Memo, FBI Director to Washington SAC, 11 March 1970, FBI 66-3286-53. When processing my FOIA request for the Record Destruction file, FBI personnel withheld in entirety other records relating to this specific request of the Washington SAC: see Not Recorded records dated 9, 17, 24 March 1970 and 4 May 1970.

[23] Wadleigh admitted during grand jury and court testimony of 1948–1949 to having given classified State Department documents to Chambers in 1936–1938. He also claimed that in 1939, Chambers had telephoned him seeking a private meeting at which he (Chambers) pressured him for monetary assistance—which Wadleigh interpreted as an attempt at blackmail. Meyer Zeligs, *Friendship & Fratricide: An Analysis of Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss* (New York: Viking, 1967), 243–247.

[24] Deposition, FBI agent Martin Wood in *Salant v. U.S. Department of Justice*, CA 77-893, 8 March 1978, 22–28. Affidavit, FBI agent Martin Wood in *Salant v. U.S. Department of Justice*, CA 77-893, 30 March 1978. Answers to Interrogatories, E. Ross Buckley, in *Salant v. U.S. Department of Justice*, CA 77-893, 2 March 1978, 7–10. Memo, Baltimore SAC to FBI Director, 18 December 1950, FBI 74-6-4707. Bulky Matter File re Whittaker Chambers, Baltimore, Maryland, 13 September 1949, FBI 65-1642-1-B.

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a series of amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, amendments that ensured that closed FBI records would be subject to public release. Accordingly, in 1975, FBI officials submitted a records disposition plan seeking National Archives approval to destroy all closed FBI field office files.[25]

In justification of this records disposition plan, FBI officials claimed that the contents of FBI field office files were duplicated in FBI headquarters files. This proposal, however, was temporarily held in abeyance. The creation that year of the so-called Church and Pike committees, mandated to investigate the federal intelligence agencies, led congressional leaders to request that these agencies suspend all records destruction for the duration of these inquiries. With the completion of the Senate and House investigations in 1976, FBI officials renewed their proposed field office records destruction request. Archives officials concurred, without, however, independently reviewing FBI field office and headquarters files to ascertain that the contents of field office files were, in fact, duplicated in headquarters files. The inadvertent discovery in 1978 by historian John Rosenberg that FBI field office files on Clifford Durr had recently been destroyed precipitated a federal court suit, *American Friends Services Committee, et al. v. William Webster et al.*, challenging the FBI's and Archives's actions. Federal Judge Harold Greene ruled on this suit in 1980, ordering FBI and Archives officials to suspend further records destruction and to develop a plan, for his review and approval, that would ensure the preservation of FBI files of historical value. Judge Greene approved the revised records disposition plan in 1985. By that time, FBI field office files had been massively purged, the records destruction having taken place during the period between 1976 and Judge Greene's 1980 order.[26]

[25] Under the Federal Records Act of 1950, all federal agencies and departments were required to obtain Archives approval for any records destruction, a requirement intended to ensure that all federal records of historical value would be preserved. As the previous examples confirm, prior to 1975, FBI officials had not advised Archives officials of their special records destruction procedures governing sensitive records or sought Archives approval when destroying specific documents (as opposed to case files).

[26] Concurrently, in 1977, FBI officials sought Archives approval to purge FBI headquarters files, based on the thickness of specific files. This proposal was also subject to this court order. Susan Steinwall, "The FBI Files Case: Implications for Archivists" (seminar paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison Library Science 976, copy in author's possession). John Rosenberg, "The FBI Shreds Its Files: Catch in the Information Act," *The Nation* 228 (4 February 1978): 108–111; John Rosenberg, "The FBI's Field Files," *The Nation* 229 (3 March 1979): 231, 232. Athan Theoharis, "Bureaucrats above the Law: Double-Entry Intelligence Files," *The Nation* 227 (22 October 1977): 394; Athan Theoharis, "The FBI and the FOIA: Problems of Access and Destruction," *The Midwestern Archivist*, V, No. 2 (1981), 69, 70; Athan Theoharis, "FBI Files, the National Archives, and the Issue of Access," *Government Publications Review* 9 (1982), 31–33. National Archives and Records Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Appraisal of the Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: A Report to the Honorable Harold H. Greene, United States District Court for the District of Columbia* (Washington, DC, 9 November 1981). Gerald Haines and David Langbart, *Unlocking the Files of the FBI: A Guide to Its Records and Classification System* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1993).

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FBI officials had also solicited Archives approval in 1977 of another records disposition plan for three FBI headquarters files: 105-34074 (Sex Offenders Foreign Intelligence), 105-12198 (Sex Perverts in Government Service), and 94-4-980 (Sex Degenerates and Sex Offenders). This FBI request, and Archives's approval, was not known at this time and was inadvertently discovered in 1991.

In 1990, I received a telephone call from Seth Rosenfeld, a reporter for the *San Francisco Examiner*, seeking my assistance with an article he was researching on FBI surveillance of homosexuals. I alerted Rosenfeld to a formal FBI code-named Sex Deviate program, the existence of which I had learned from a brief reference in the minutes of an October 1953 FBI Executives Conference (regular meetings wherein senior FBI officials discussed policy matters requiring the FBI Director's attention). This memorandum summarized various FBI programs wherein information was disseminated outside the executive branch. One paragraph in this memorandum briefly described a code-named Sex Deviate program that Hoover had authorized in June 1951 under which "information concerning allegations" of homosexuality on the part of "present and past [federal] employees" was "furnish[ed]" to executive, legislative, and judicial officials. I also alerted Rosenfeld to an index card I had uncovered in the Adlai Stevenson folder in Hoover's Official and Confidential File. Captioned "Sex Deviate," this index card cited Stevenson by name and the specific FBI document upon which this listing was based.

Forewarned through these extant records, Rosenfeld requested the FBI's Sex Deviate files and was informed by FBI officials that in 1978, all such records (the files identified two paragraphs above) had been destroyed with National Archives approval. Rosenfeld then contacted National Archives officials who provided him with copies of the memoranda they had created when reviewing and approving the FBI's record destruction proposal. These memoranda document that the destroyed files had totalled 99 cubic feet (approximately 330,000 pages) and had contained index cards, abstracts, and related FBI documents that had been created during the period from 1937 through 1977. One of the memoranda describes why Archives personnel approved the proposed record destruction, in the process confirming that the files contained "massive amounts of information that relates to matters of individual sexual conduct," "infringe[d] on personal privacy," and that most of the reported information "involved unsubstantiated accusations and allegations." The reviewing Archives official conceded that these files had "some evidential value for documenting the FBI's interest and activities," but nonetheless recommended destruction since the sensitivity of this information could not be "made available for research purposes without threatening damage to the reputations of numerous private citizens" while the volume lessened the "value" of these records "in terms of systematic use for research purposes."[27]

[27] Seth Rosenfeld, "FBI's 'Sex Deviate' Files Come to Light," *San Francisco Examiner*, 13 January 1991, 1. The National Archives review and approval of this record destruction is recorded in Memo, Wolfinger re Disposition Job No. NO1-65-78-5, 27 December 1977 and Request for Record Disposition Authority, James Awe, 15 January 1978. The Executives' Conference reference to the Sex Devi-

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FBI Record Destruction Policies

Do these examples of FBI record destruction preclude an assessment of the FBI's historical role? Are these examples of record destruction unique to the FBI, and more specifically, the Hoover FBI?

Any assessment of the FBI's history is dependent on the assurance that extant records document FBI officials' decisions—and particularly secret decisions that might contradict a public image of professionalism and rationality. FBI records, in contrast to those of other public and private bureaucracies, should be, in theory, both more accessible and more comprehensive in recording the authorized actions of low-level FBI agents. FBI records, in contrast to those of private corporations and social service agencies, are subject to the mandatory release requirements of the FOIA—thereby ensuring, in theory, that all relevant records can be accessioned, and the centralized, highly disciplined nature of the Hoover FBI would seem to ensure that the FBI's most sensitive practices would have been recorded in writing (and not simply communicated orally).

The latter is confirmed by the special Do Not File procedure that Hoover devised in 1942 to govern FBI break-ins. Conceding that this practice was "clearly illegal," the FBI Director sought to foreclose the possible discovery of FBI break-ins whether through agent carelessness, excessive use, or in the event that FBI case files had to be released in response to a congressional subpoena or court-ordered discovery motion. Heads of FBI field offices (SACs) were required to seek Hoover's (or a designated FBI assistant director's) advance approval before conducting a break-in. When seeking approval, the SAC had to recount both the justified risks (the value of the information to be obtained through the break-in) and the planned safeguards (employed to preclude discovery). These requirements necessitated the creation of written records of these requests and Hoover's approval. Field office communications would normally have been serialized and indexed in the FBI's central records system, thereby rendering them vulnerable to court-ordered discovery motions or congressional subpoenas or otherwise confirming that a record had been withheld or destroyed. To foreclose this eventuality, accordingly, Hoover ordered that all break-in request memoranda were to be captioned "Do Not File," alerting recipients of these field office communications at FBI headquarters not to serialize and index these memoranda in the FBI's central records system and instead route them to Hoover's office (permitting their undiscoverable destruction). SACs were also to maintain copies of these "informal"

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ates program is recorded in Memo, FBI Executives Conference to FBI Director, 14 October 1953, FBI 62-93875-Not Recorded. The Sex Deviate index card on Stevenson is Sex Deviate Index Card Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, Stevenson, Adlai folder, Folder #143, Official and Confidential File of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

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(that is, nonofficial) memoranda in their office safes and to destroy them after the next semiannual inspection.[28]

The Politics of FBI Record Destruction

As the examples cited in this article confirm, the Do Not File procedure was not a unique FBI practice for sanitizing the record. The inadvertent discovery of these examples of destroyed, incomplete, or separately maintained records confirm that FBI officials: first, welcomed and assisted HUAC's 1947 investigation of Hollywood because of a desire to shape public opinion; second, collaborated with Republican congressmen (Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy) who sought to undermine the credibility of the incumbent Democratic Truman Administration; and third, corroborated for a Republican campaign operative derogatory personal information about the 1952 Democratic presidential nominee. These were not the actions of a professional law enforcement agency but of an autonomous agency whose leadership relied on secrecy to advance a conservative political agenda.

Destruction of the Sex Deviate program files, moreover, effectively foreclosed an assessment of FBI officials' covert role in sustaining a homophobic climate during the Cold War era. As recorded in brief references in two memoranda in the FBI's Responsibilities program file, by 1954, FBI officials—in addition to disseminating information about alleged homosexuals to executive, legislative, and judicial officials—had leaked such information to other "proper" officials "in appropriate instances where the best interests of the Bureau are served." These other recipients included "institutions of higher learning or law enforcement agencies."[29]

The 1970 proposal to destroy both the twenty wiretap logs and the memorandum justifying this request further confirms the FBI's autonomy and, in this case, that FBI officials sought to foreclose critical scrutiny of a Bureau counterintelligence failure.

The recommended proposal to destroy the wiretap logs indirectly documents the intensity of the FBI investigation to corroborate Elizabeth Bentley's charges. Yet, a federal grand jury, convened in 1947–1948 to consider indicting the federal employees named by Bentley, returned no indictments. Unaware of the scope and nature of this FBI investigation, conservative Republicans

[28] For inexplicable reasons, the New York SAC did not destroy the contents of his office file, and thus some of the New York field office's break-in records, for the period 1954–1972, remain extant. The Do Not File procedure is described in Memo, Sullivan to DeLoach, 19 July 1966, "Black Bag" Jobs folder, Folder #36, Official and Confidential File of J. Edgar Hoover. FBI agents' conduct of break-ins is recorded in JUNE Memo, name withheld FBI agent to SAC New York, 26 April 1954, FBI 62-117166-131. See also, Athan Theoharis, *Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence but Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold Ward Years* (Chicago, IL: Ivan Dee, 2002), 246–247.

[29] Memo, Boardman to FBI Director, 28 October 1954, FBI 62-93875-2503; Memo, name redacted agent to Rosen, 22 October 1954, FBI 62-93875-Not Recorded.

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learned of her allegations and the end of the grand jury in the summer of 1948. At this time and in ensuing years, they denounced the Truman administration's indifference to the Communist threat, focusing on this failure to indict any of those named by Bentley and by the continued federal employment of some of those she had named. Indeed, in a November 1953 speech before a Chicago business group, Eisenhower's Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, accused former President Harry Truman of ignoring FBI reports questioning the loyalty of one of those named by Bentley, Harry Dexter White, when submitting White's name in 1946 for confirmation as Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund. More recently, historians John Haynes and Harvey Klehr have echoed these criticisms of President Truman, describing his response as marked by "a mixture of indifference and skepticism of FBI reports indicating significant Soviet espionage activity in the United States."[30]

As the extant 1970 memorandum confirms, at least twenty of those whom Bentley named (including White) were wiretapped—a practice requiring the advance approval of Truman's attorney general. That Truman did not withdraw White's nomination in 1946—and that none of those named by Bentley were indicted in 1948—did not mean that the Truman administration had been indifferent to Soviet espionage activities. Rather, FBI investigations had failed to develop the evidence needed to indict or dismiss current employees. FBI reports of 1945–1946 to the Truman White House had been based solely on Bentley's uncorroborated allegations. Subsequent FBI investigations, moreover, failed to corroborate her claims—documented by an October 1946 FBI report to the Truman White House. This report lamely sought to rationalize why FBI agents were unable to confirm Bentley's allegations, attributing this to the "time element"—specifically that because the alleged espionage dated "back several years," the reader of this FBI report "must consider the difficulty of actually proving these activities by investigation at this later date." The writer of this report then conceded that the "facts are strong in many instances and circumstantial in others primarily because of the disparity in time between the date of these activities and the actual report of these activities to the authorities."[31] Evaluating the results of this investigation in January 1947, FBI agent E. P. Morgan counselled against indicting any of those named by Bentley. "We have no evidence from which 'intent or reason to believe' can be proved or reasonably inferred," Morgan admitted, adding that "the evidence very definitely is insufficient to sustain a successful prosecution under the espionage statutes."[32] Finally, the Washington SAC's 1970 memorandum recommending destruction of the twenty wiretap logs unqualifiedly reported that despite hav-

[30] John Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 13.

[31] FBI Report, Underground Soviet Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government, 21 October 1946, Truman presidential library.

[32] Gary May, *Un-American Activities: The Trials of William Remington* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 88, 89.

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ing analyzed the Bentley case "over and over again" since 1945, FBI agents were never able to "obtain information to substantiate and corroborate the allegations of BENTLEY."[33]

Post-Hoover FBI Records Destruction

Separate record and record destruction practices—and what they reveal about the autonomy of bureaucracies and their senior officials' commitment to secrecy—were also not unique to the Hoover FBI. During his 1973 confirmation hearings as FBI director, L. Patrick Gray III admitted to having destroyed (at the time he was serving as Acting FBI Director) sensitive records given to him in 1972 by the Nixon White House with the admonition that these records were "political dynamite" and should not "see the light of day."[34] In August 1995, moreover, Justice Department officials initiated a criminal investigation that, as one result, led FBI supervisor E. Michael Kahoe to plead guilty to obstruction of justice for destroying copies of the FBI's internal "after-action" report critiquing the performance of FBI agents in the seige of Randall Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho.[35] Then, in May 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft disclosed that over 4,000 pages of FBI records had not been given to the attorneys of Timothy McVeigh (contradicting earlier Justice Department assurances that all FBI reports had been turned over). This withholding was not sinister and did not compromise McVeigh's right to a fair trial but does offer insights into the Justice Department–FBI relationship. More importantly, Ashcroft indirectly documented the FBI's continued autonomy—namely, that while FBI officials had discovered this withholding in January 2001, they did not report their discovery to Justice Department officials until May, approximately two weeks before McVeigh's scheduled execution.[36]

CIA, NSC, and President Nixon's Records Policies

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials also devised separate record and record destruction procedures. For example, CIA Director Richard Helms (shortly before leaving office) ordered his secretary to destroy his office files, including transcripts of his telephone and room conversations. Other CIA officials destroyed records pertaining to the Agency's drug programs, working pa-

[33] Memo, SAC Washington to FBI Director, 6 March 1970, FBI 66-3286-53.

[34] These records included doctored State Department cables and files on Daniel Ellsberg and Senator Edward Kennedy. Sanford Ungar, *FBI* (Boston, MA: Atlantic Monthly/Little Brown, 1975), 529–539; David Wise, *The American Police State: The Government Against the People* (New York: Random House, 1976), 76, 142.

[35] Tony Poveda, "Controversies and Issues" in Athan Theoharis, ed., *The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide* (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1999), 138–139.

[36] *New York Times*, 11 May 2001, A1; 12 May 2001, A1; 13 May 2001, 13; 16 May 2001, A12; 17 May 2001, A18; 25 May 2001, A14. *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, 18 May 2001, 8A.

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pers and interviews that the Agency's Inspector General had relied on when preparing a 1967 report on the Agency's assassination-planning activities, the file on Chilean Police Chief Manuel Contreras, and records pertaining to the Agency's covert operation to overthrow the Mossadegh government. Acting CIA Director John Blake, moreover, admitted to a Senate committee that CIA officials purposefully created "soft files," which he described as "not official records and they are not indexed as such," while the independent counsel investigating the Iran-Contra affair discovered that Duane Claridge (the chief of the Agency's European Division) retained sensitive records separate from the Agency's official files in his secretary's "shadow file" and when the Iran-Contra affair was publicly compromised in November 1986, ordered his secretary to destroy them.[37]

The National Security Council (NSC) also devised special records and records destruction procedures. Testifying in September 1975 before the Church Committee, former NSC Executive Secretary James Lay disclosed that NSC minutes did not record the NSC's most "highly sensitive" decisions and discussions. "If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting," Lay stated, "it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject of the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference would be made in the NSC minutes." The congressional investigation of the Iran-Contra affair, moreover, uncovered a special "do not log" procedure employed by NSC aide Oliver North when communicating sensitive information to his superior, John Poindexter. These communications were not to be logged in the NSC's central records system, permitting their undiscoverable destruction, which North attempted when the Iran-Contra affair was first uncovered in November 1986. In this case, North's ignorance of the NSC computer system's backup

[37] The Contreras and Mossadegh record destruction is reported in *New York Times*, 29 May 1997, A11; *New York Times*, 14 November 2008, A8; The Claridge "shadow file" is recorded in *Report of the Independent Counsel for the Iran/Contra Matter, Vol. I, Investigations and Prosecutions* (Washington, DC: Reports of the Independent Counsel, 1993), 255–259. Helms's record destruction is from Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, *Report to the President* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 203–204 and Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Knopf, 1979), 157, 158. CIA drug testing programs and record destruction is recorded in U.S. Senate, Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Hearings on Intelligence Activities, Vol. 1, Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents* (94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975), 6, 11, 21–23, 245; U.S. Senate, Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I* (94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976), 390, 394, 402–406, 404n76, 408, 408n90; U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and Committee on Human Resources, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, *Joint Hearings on Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavorial Modification* (95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977), 2–5, 8–10, 14, 15, 21–23, 25, 38, 45–55, 65n2, 65, 66, 70, 71, 74, 82–88, 84n75, 84n76, 84n77, 88n90, 103–107, 134, 137. Blake's testimony is from U.S. Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, *Hearings on Oversight of the Freedom of Information Act* (95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977), 68, 73–85, 93, 525–532.

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memory (as a safeguard against accidental deletions) led to the reconstruction of many of the messages he had destroyed.[38]

Shortly before leaving office in disgrace in 1974, President Richard Nixon concluded an agreement with Arthur Sampson, the head of the General Services Administration, that would have permitted Nixon to destroy the Oval Office tapes. Publicity of the Nixon-Sampson agreement led Congress to enact first the Presidential Recording and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 rescinding this agreement and then the Presidential Records Act of 1978 defining presidential records as public property and mandating their release twelve years after the end of a president's term and subjecting them to FOIA requests.[39]

The recent, highly publicized scandals of corporate accounting and insider trading practices confirm that record destruction practices were not confined to public bureaucracies. Officials in the Arthur Andersen accounting firm admitted to having destroyed records relating to their role in the so-called Enron scandal.[40] This disclosure kindled an intense media interest in corporate records practices and led to the further discovery that employees of the Montreal, Toronto, Rochester, and Minneapolis offices of the telecommunication giant Global Crossing had destroyed records after investigators of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) began looking into the company's accounting practices. Furthermore, six prominent Wall Street firms (Salomon Smith Barney, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank, and U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray) were unable to honor a request from the National Association for Security Dealers for copies of all their stock analysts' e-mail, a request pursuant to a conflict-of-interest investigation. This record destruction violated an SEC rule requiring analysts to retain all their e-mail for three years.[41]

The discovery of these record destruction practices, particularly because this discovery was inadvertent, is both frustrating and illuminating. On the one hand, these practices raise questions about the comprehensiveness and reliability of extant and accessible records. On the other hand, these practices confirm that public and private bureaucrats were not simply professionals committed to rationalizing decision making but employed secrecy to further a specific policy agenda (whether conservative or criminal) and to subvert an informed public understanding of their abuses of power.

[38] U.S. Senate, *Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* (94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975), 56n2; 55–60. *New York Times*, 28 November 1986, 9; 23 February 1987, 6; 24 February 1986, 4; 9 June 1987, 1, 8, 9; 10 June 1987, 9; 10 July 1987, 1, 5, 7. One of North's reconstructed "Not Log" messages is reprinted in *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987), Appendix A, Vol. 2, 1321, 1322.

[39] Joan Hoff, "The Endless Saga of the Nixon Tapes" in Theoharis, ed., *A Culture of Secrecy*, 116–118.

[40] *New York Times*, 6 May 2002, C1; 7 May 2002, C1, C6; 8 May 2002, C1; 10 May 2002, C2; 14 May 2002, C4; 15 May 2002, C10; 17 May 2002, C7; 18 May 2002, B1; 21 May 2002, C6; 22 May 2002, 10; 29 May 2002, C13; 30 May 2002, C4; 31 May 2002, C4; 1 June 2002, B1; 4 June 2002, C4; 5 June 2002, C8; 6 June 2002, C1; 13 June 2002, A1; 14 June 2002, C1; 16 June 2002, 1.

[41] On Global Crossing, see *New York Times*, 24 June 2002, C1 and 25 June 2002, C11. On the Wall Street firms, see *New York Times*, 7 May 2002, C1 and 2 August 2002, C1.

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Threats to Latin America's Market Model?

KURT WEYLAND

What are the prospects for the survival of Latin America's new market model? Are most countries in the region likely to preserve the basic outlines of the neoliberal development scheme, or will there be a reversal, that is, a region-wide trend away from free-market economics? This question is particularly acute, given the recent economic and political difficulties facing the new market system in major Latin American countries. Three cases stand out: In Venezuela, President Hugo Chávez has spouted strident antineoliberal rhetoric and has enacted a number of measures that depart from free-market recipes, such as stringent currency controls. In Argentina, one of the big neoliberal success stories of the early and mid-1990s, the economy collapsed in 2001–2002 and a center-left president who criticizes the free-market system was recently elected. And in Brazil, the socialist Workers' Party, which was traditionally very critical of neoliberalism, won the presidential election in a landslide in late 2002. Thus, important potential challenges to the continuing predominance of the market model have emerged over the last few years. Observers have, therefore, become worried. Eduardo Lora and Ugo Panizza, for instance, report that "the future of structural reforms seems cloudy"; and a panic-stricken columnist for the *Financial Times* even saw Latin America moving "back to revolution."[1]

What, then, are the future prospects of Latin American neoliberalism? Is the new economic model there to stay, or was the wave of free-market reforms only a passing fad? Will the economic vulnerabilities and social limitations of neoliberalism and the dashed hopes that market reform would finally put Latin America back on a path toward sustained growth cause a backlash?

[1] Eduardo Lora and Ugo Panizza, "The Future of Structural Reform," *Journal of Democracy* 14 (April 2003): 123; Richard Lapper, "Back to Revolution," *Financial Times*, 21 February 2002.

KURT WEYLAND is an associate professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela* and of numerous articles on democratization, market reform, social policy, and populist politics in Latin America.

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This article argues that in most countries in which the free-market program was enacted to a large extent—especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru—its basic outline is likely to persist; only in those nations where market reform was never consistently implemented in the first place—such as Venezuela—does the risk of a significant backlash exist.[2] Yet, even in those cases, governments that try to depart from neoliberalism will face strong domestic and external opposition and will therefore fail to achieve economic success; in particular, they will not manage to install a promising alternative to a market economy. These experiences, exemplified by the troubles and travails facing the Chávez government in Venezuela, will, in turn, discourage other Latin American nations from challenging market economics. Overall, thus, fundamental continuity is much more likely than are drastic change and experimentation with alternative development models.

One initial clarification is in order: In predicting the persistence of the new market model, this article has in mind the basic outlines of the economic policy approach instituted in most Latin American countries during the past two decades. This approach entails a strong insistence on maintaining macroeconomic stability by keeping inflation low, limiting fiscal deficits, and preventing large imbalances in a country's external accounts. In structural terms, the market has become the main mechanism of economic coordination as the state has opened the domestic economy to foreign trade and investment, has withdrawn from many—but not all—productive activities, and has reduced—although by no means eliminated—its regulation of the economy. No Latin American country, however, has instituted a complete free-market system, and few governments will maintain radical free-market policies. In fact, there is room for significant variation inside the confines of the new development model. For instance, the Brazilian state continues to protect strategic sectors of the economy, and Chile's new democracy substantially increased social spending compared to the lean years of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship. Thus, while the market model precludes heavy-handed state interventionism and gives market forces much freer rein, it does not commit governments to a radically neoliberal approach, but it leaves them considerable room for addressing market failures through active economic and social policies.

Sources of Challenges to Latin American Market Systems

As mentioned above, sectors on the right and the left of the political and academic spectrum expect that the new market model may soon face serious challenges due to the deficient economic and social performance of neoliberalism. According to this diagnosis, people respond directly and immediately to mate-

[2] For a good recent overview of the market reform process, see Javier Corrales, "Market Reforms" in Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 74–99.

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rial developments, and because the new market model has delivered only modest economic and social benefits, popular support for it will soon diminish.

The most straightforward version of this expectation is an economic-voting argument. According to this line of reasoning, people base their political judgments and choices on absolute cost-benefit calculations. If they receive gains, they endorse the established economic policy, the underlying development model, and the government administering it; by contrast, losses prompt rejection.[3] From this perspective, the new market model has clear weaknesses. First of all, the process of neoliberal reform imposed losses on large numbers of people and important sectors. Continued fiscal austerity has often made it difficult to compensate these groups for the initial costs they had to bear. Furthermore, people who initially received compensation often saw it devalued by the competition exacerbated by market reform. For instance, laid-off workers in Argentina used their severance pay to buy small stores or taxi cabs, but many of these businesses soon faced ruinous competition or even went bankrupt.[4] Moreover, the new market model has produced only meager economic growth and little employment. Thus, initial losers have had difficulty finding a profitable niche in the new market system, and the ranks of new winners have remained limited. As a result of these economic and social deficiencies, neoliberalism is expected to face political threats.[5]

More complex predictions of challenges to the new market system claim that discontent is more widespread than the simple economic-voting argument claims. Whereas that line of reasoning assumes that people respond primarily to objective gains and losses, high subjective levels of aspiration can make even an economic model that produces absolute benefits appear unsatisfactory. Absolute winners may suffer from "relative deprivation" if they had expected to receive even greater gains than they in fact did. And people who suffer modest losses may experience disproportionate discontent if they had anticipated significant gains. The new market model may trigger such politically dangerous perceptions of relative deprivation because it was instituted with exorbitant promises. To make the severe transitional costs of structural adjustment politically acceptable, neoliberal experts promised to put their country back on a sustained growth trajectory. "Short-term pain for long-term gain" was the battle cry of neoliberalism. One last round of painful belt tightening was expected

[3] For a recent explication and discussion of this line of reasoning, see Susan Stokes, "Public Opinion of Market Reforms: A Framework" in Susan Stokes, ed., *Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2–13. Focusing on the enactment of market reform, not the most recent time period, Karen Remmer has forcefully advocated this view. See Karen Remmer, "Elections and Economics in Contemporary Latin America" in Carol Wise and Riordan Roett, eds., *Post-Stabilization Politics in Latin America* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), 31–55.

[4] Nancy Powers, *Grassroots Expectations of Democracy and Economy* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 123–124, 128.

[5] See, for example, Martin Feldstein, "Argentina's Fall," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (March–April 2002): 8.

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to usher in mass prosperity. These high hopes for the future were the crucial reason why many people accepted the sacrifices inherent in orthodox shock programs.[6] Initially, these exalted expectations seemed to come true. For instance, Argentina grew at an average rate of 7 percent for three years after the Convertibility Plan of early 1991. In Peru, recovery was slower in coming but produced an unprecedented 12.8 percent growth in 1994.[7] And in Brazil, the economy was overheating after the enactment of the Real Plan in mid-1994. Thus, neoliberalism initially seemed to live up to its promise.

But after this short-lived boom, the new market system has failed to deliver on these high hopes. It has certainly not guaranteed mass prosperity. Since the mid-1990s, economic growth in Latin America has remained erratic; the widespread employment problems have not diminished; and new rounds of painful adjustment have been required with disturbing frequency.[8] Thus, the economic performance of the neoliberal model has proven mediocre, dashing initial hopes.[9] According to relative-deprivation arguments, the resulting sentiment of frustration fuels ever more large-scale rejection of the new development scheme.

While economic-voting arguments and relative-deprivation theories see people as motivated primarily by individual gains and losses, social-distributional arguments claim that citizens also engage in comparative assessments across different social groups. They care, not only about their own gains and losses, but also about the relative benefits they receive by comparison to reference groups. In other words, social inequality matters. Therefore, even people who attain material benefits and who see their subjective expectations of gains fulfilled may be discontent if they realize that other people receive disproportionately larger benefits. In particular, the conspicuous consumption of the *nouveaux riches*, who flaunt their fabulous wealth, violates the sense of fairness of the hard-working masses. The resulting feelings of injustice and envy can spark discontent even among sectors which are doing objectively and subjectively well under the new development scheme. Thus, social-distributional judgments may turn even more people into critics of the new market model.[10]

[6] See Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 136–187.

[7] Felipe de la Balze, *Remaking the Argentine Economy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), 80; Alberto Pascó-Font and Jaime Saavedra, *Reformas Estructurales y Bienestar* (Lima: GRADE, 2001), 116–119.

[8] Overviews in Barbara Stallings and Wilson Peres, *Growth, Employment, and Equity* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2000), 88–102, 116–129; and Jürgen Weller, *Economic Reforms, Growth and Employment* (Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2001), 45–72.

[9] For interesting evidence on people's subjective perceptions of gains and losses, which reflect their aspiration levels, see Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, *Hardship and Happiness: Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2002), 1–153.

[10] Susan Stokes, "Public Opinion of Market Reforms," 16, 17.

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Neoliberalism has had a mixed performance in social-distributional terms.[11] The initial stabilization measures often reduced social inequality by eliminating the inflation tax that particularly burdened the poor. But structural reforms such as deregulation and privatization often provided special benefits to better-off sectors while imposing high burdens on the organized working class and on middle sectors. In particular, the layoffs resulting from privatization and state-shrinking have further swelled the abundant pool of labor in Latin America, thus depressing wage levels. Thus, in recent years, social inequality has been on the rise again in much of Latin America. Moreover, neoliberalism has made this inequality more visible because spreading norms of consumerism have induced newly affluent sectors to flaunt their wealth and the media have reported some of the resulting excesses. New wealth often is less discreet than old money. In Chile, for instance, there is a clear sense that market reform has eroded traditional norms of personal austerity and has led young millionaires to tear through Santiago's fashionable suburbs in their fancy BMWs. The large numbers of common people who struggle daily to make ends meet may not be pleased to witness this conspicuous consumption. Thus, social-distributional arguments—advanced by "radical" critics of the new development scheme—predict especially widespread discontent.[12]

On the basis of these arguments, the right-wing defenders of market reform fear—and the left-wing critics of neoliberalism celebrate—instances of popular protest as the beginning of the end of the neoliberal model. Whether it is the indigenous uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, in early 1994 or the roadblocks in Neuquén, Argentina, in early 2002, localized outbursts of popular discontent have sent shivers down the spines of *Financial Times* columnists while stimulating excitement among the left.[13] Interestingly, both of these ideologically opposed groups of observers seem to accept a "sprouting bulb" assumption about such protests. In this view, which is common in the literature on Latin American social movements, popular discontent is widespread and on the verge of erupting into the open. Just as the first tulip that opens its blossom in the spring announces the coming brilliance of flowers, so the first instance of popular protest foreshadows a wave of uprisings; in the conservative view, the short-sighted masses will undermine the delicate operation of the market system, whereas in the "radical" view, the popular sectors will finally act on their true interests and throw off the yoke of neoliberalism.

[11] Stallings and Peres, *Growth, Employment*, 129–142; Samuel Morley, *The Income Distribution Problem in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2001), 23–25, 46–50, 84–91.

[12] See, for example, Richard Harris, "Resistance and Alternatives to Globalization in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Perspectives* 29 (November 2002): 136–151.

[13] For the latter, see, for example, James Petras, "Latin America: The Resurgence of the Left," *New Left Review* 223 (May–June 1997): 17–47; and the discussion in Ricardo Salvatore, "The Un-Making of the Argentine Working Class (ca. 1990–2002)" (paper for workshop on "Latin American Workers in Dictatorship and Democracy," University of Texas at Austin, 3–4 October 2002).

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How Much Discontent with the New Market System?

Interestingly, neither the conservative defenders of the market system nor its "radical" critics have offered much empirical evidence to support this "sprouting bulb" assumption, which they surprisingly seem to share. Data from opinion surveys provide some evidence on people's views of the new market system. Certainly, these figures need to be interpreted with caution. It is difficult to unearth valid and reliable evidence on abstract attitudes such as people's views on the proper role of market versus state in the promotion of economic development. Surveys are blunt instruments that give people few options for expressing their potentially complex views on fundamental questions. Also, many people seem to lack well-formed opinions on such abstract issues and therefore face particular difficulty in compressing their nebulous views into one of the response categories provided by a questionnaire.[14] While surveys succeed in ascertaining people's opinions on issues that are on their minds—for example, whether they approve of the incumbent president or not—they are not nearly as successful at tapping citizens' true attitudes concerning abstract questions of system preference. Therefore, the data presented below allow for a tentative assessment of popular support for neoliberalism in contemporary Latin America but not for definitive conclusions.

Overall, while popular endorsement of market principles has declined in Latin America over the last few years, this decline has remained strikingly limited, considering the deficient performance of the new development scheme. Most importantly, the basic outlines of neoliberalism continue to receive majority support in public opinion. These data cast doubt on the arguments about economic-voting, relative-deprivation, and social-distributional assessments. While these arguments do predict recent trends, they overestimate the causal force of the factors they stress and neglect counteracting mechanisms that give popular support for the market system considerable persistence and "stickiness."

Above all, throughout Latin America, an average of 57 percent of respondents in the 2002 Latinobarómetro poll regarded the market economy, in principle, as the best development scheme for their country.[15] While this figure reflects a decline from the 66 percent who held this view in 1998, it shows that a clear majority of citizens remained committed to the new development model, despite the severe economic and social problems battering the region during the intervening four years. In fact, majority backing for market principles prevailed in thirteen out of seventeen countries covered by Latinobarómetro, including Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Of the four remaining nations, endorsement of the market was substantially lower than 50 percent only in Argentina and especially in Uruguay (see Table 1). Thus, approval of market principles has continued to be strong throughout most of Latin America.

[14] John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response," *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (August 1992): 579–616.

[15] Latinobarómetro, "Informe de Prensa Latinobarómetro 2002" (Santiago de Chile: Latinobarómetro, 2002), 4, 12, accessed on the website of Latinobarómetro at http://www.latinobarometro.org, 16 May 2003.

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TABLE 1

Support for the Principles of the New Market System in Latin America (Percentage of Survey Respondents Agreeing that the Market Economy is Best for the Country)

Argentina	*Bolivia*	*Brazil*	*Chile*	*Colombia*	*Mexico*	*Peru*	*Uruguay*
43	56	56	48	56	66	49	35

Source: Latinobarómetro, *Gráficos Informe de Prensa 2002* (Santiago de Chile: Latinobarómetro, 2002), 35, accessed on the website of Latinobarómetro at http://www.latinobarometro.org, 16 May 2003.

As these data suggest, Latin American neoliberalism has bases of sustenance that are not directly affected by its short-term economic and social performance. Indeed, only 24 percent of respondents are satisfied with the actual performance of the new development model so far. Thus, there is a substantial gulf between general commitment and specific cost-benefit assessments. Many Latin Americans support the market system in principle, although they are not receiving significant absolute gains, are not seeing their subjective expectations of gains met, or are not obtaining what they regard as their fair share of benefits. Interestingly, many people place the blame for economic problems on the incumbent government,[16] not the new market system as such. In fact, distrust of the established "political class" has reached exceedingly high levels. In 2001, 68 percent of Latin Americans disagreed with the statement that "in general, one can trust that the people who are running the country are doing things correctly"; only 26 percent expressed confidence in their politicians.[17] Thus, discontent triggered by the deficient performance of the new market scheme seems to find a lightning rod in the government.

Data from specific countries confirm this general picture. In Peru, for instance, 46 percent of respondents in June 2002 held a positive or very positive view of the market model, whereas 33 percent had a negative or very negative opinion and 21 percent did not take a stance. Similarly, 45 percent voiced approval for private enterprise, while 36 percent expressed disapproval and 19 percent held no view.[18] And in Bolivia, 67 percent of respondents in March 2002 (and 70 percent in March 2001) thought that "the market" or "supply and demand" should determine the prices of products; only 30 percent (23 percent in 2001) wanted the government to take over this role.[19] In Peru, support for price determination by the market remained at 61–66 percent of respondents from

[16] Latinobarómetro, "Informe de Prensa," 12.

[17] Latinobarómetro, "Confianza en la Gente que Conduce el País" (Santiago de Chile: Latinobarómetro, 2001), accessed on the website of Latinobarómetro at http://www.latinobarometro.org, 16 May 2003.

[18] Apoyo - Opinión y Mercado, *Opinión Data. Resumen de Encuestas a la Opinión Pública* 2 (17 June 2002): 3.

[19] Apoyo - Opinión y Mercado - Bolivia, *Opinión Data. Resumen de Encuestas a la Opinión Pública* 2 (31 March 2002): 4.

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1998 to 2000.[20] Even in Argentina, where the economic collapse of 2001–2002 made more-negative attitudes prevail, substantial support for the market system has persisted. For instance, agreement with the statement that "the free-market economy, with its good aspects and its bad aspects, is the best economic system for the growth of a country" fell only moderately from 41 percent in November 2000 to 34 percent in February 2002, while disagreement rose from 38 percent to 47 percent.[21] Thus, during this exceptionally severe crisis, opponents came to outnumber supporters, but not by a large margin. Furthermore, no alternative to the market system has garnered majority support, as popular views on economic policy approaches have been strikingly fragmented. For instance, a poll conducted in January 2002 found that preferences for and against the two basic principles of neoliberalism, low state interventionism and openness to the world economy, were more or less evenly divided and formed a cross-cutting cleavage.[22]

Overall, then, popular support for the new market model has remained quite strong in contemporary Latin America, despite the serious economic and social problems plaguing the region. While commitment to market principles has diminished in recent years, this decline has been surprisingly modest. Thus, economic-voting, relative-deprivation, and social-distributional arguments cannot account for the whole picture; the factors they stress seem to have less causal force than postulated, and counteracting tendencies play an important role as well. What other factors give popular commitment to the basic outlines of neoliberalism greater staying power than those arguments would predict?

Lasting Support for Economic Stability

First of all, notwithstanding its deficiencies, neoliberalism has achieved considerable success in one dimension that is crucial for many Latin Americans, namely economic stability. Despite the recent economic and social problems plaguing the region, many citizens continue to appreciate this accomplishment,[23] which regains higher salience in times of crisis. This success thus helps explain persistent support for orthodox economics.

In fact, market reform was enacted most thoroughly in countries that suffered from grave economic problems, especially hyperinflation, as in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru; long-standing economic stagnation, as in Argentina; and tremendous impoverishment, as in Peru. Hyperinflation, in particular, threatened to bring about an economic meltdown and undermine social order

[20] Apoyo - Opinión y Mercado, *Informe de Opinión* (April 2001): 39.

[21] Estudio Graciela Römer, *La Economía de Mercado* (Buenos Aires: Estudio Graciela Römer, 2002), 1.

[22] Ipsos - Mora y Araujo, *Análisis Sociopolítico de la Coyuntura Argentina. Datos Nacionales* (Buenos Aires: Ipsos - Mora y Araujo, 2002), 7.

[23] Carlos Gervasoni, "El Impacto Electoral de las Reformas Económicas en América Latina (1982–1995)," *América Latina Hoy* 22 (August 1999): 93–110; Remmer, "Elections and Economics," 43–49.

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and political stability, as the outbreak of rioting in Argentina in mid-1989 suggested. Besieged by such catastrophic difficulties, large numbers of people came to accept the economic and political risks of market reform and therefore endorsed the bold shock programs initiated by their presidents.[24] Market reform took hold in countries in which a "magical" solution to deep economic problems was absent. Venezuelans, by contrast, always hoped that an increase in global oil prices—triggered, for instance, by a conflict in the Persian Gulf—would resolve the crisis by boosting the export proceeds and fiscal revenues of this petroleum-producing country. Therefore, many Venezuelans regarded the rigors of structural adjustment as unnecessary.[25] Because other Latin American countries lacked such an easy escape from economic problems, they had to "bite the bullet" and swallow the bitter pill of neoliberalism.

Thus, far-reaching market reform was enacted where a profound open crisis induced many citizens to accept drastic policy reform. Indeed, market-oriented shock programs did succeed in ending severe problems. Bolivia, for instance, was a "basket case" in the mid-1980s, when explosive hyperinflation threatened to devastate the economy, exacerbate mass poverty, and undermine the country's hard-won, fragile democracy. The draconian market reforms imposed by President Víctor Paz Estenssoro unexpectedly turned the country around; while not ushering in sustained growth, they guaranteed economic and political stability.[26] Neoliberalism similarly ended hyperinflation in Argentina, Peru, and—eventually—Brazil, bringing relief to the suffering population, especially the poor, who were hurt the most by exploding price increases. Thus, despite its limitations and problems, orthodox economics has had some success in restoring economic stability.

In countries that had been plagued by hyperinflation, people continue to appreciate this economic stability. In Brazil, for instance, popular support for the Real Plan, which finally brought skyrocketing inflation under control in 1994, remained quite high, even after the devaluation crisis of early 1999. From mid-2000 until August of 2002, 38–46 percent of respondents evaluated this stabilization program as good or very good and another 32–39 percent rated it as OK ("*regular*"); only 17–28 percent rejected it as bad or very bad. Thus, al-

[24] Kurt Weyland, *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 94–133; Glen Biglaiser and Karl de Rouen, "Neoliberal Economic Reform in Latin America: A Prospect Theory Approach" (Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Bowling Green State University, 2003); Charles Blake, "Public Support for the Market" (paper presented at the XXIV International Congress, Latin American Studies Association, Dallas, TX, 27–29 March 2003).

[25] Alfredo Keller, "Motivación Electoral y Participación Política" in Ricardo Combellas, ed., *Gobernabilidad y Sistemas Políticos Latinoamericanos* (Caracas: Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 1996), 63–83. The same kind of thinking seems to have made it difficult to enact thorough market reform in other oil-exporting countries, such as Ecuador and Nigeria.

[26] James Malloy, "Democracy, Economic Crisis, and the Problem of Governance," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 26 (Winter 1991): 37–57; René Antonio Mayorga, "Bolivia's Silent Revolution," *Journal of Democracy* 8 (January 1997): 142–156.

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though economic growth was meager during those years, many people kept supporting the mainstay of economic stability.[27] Similarly, in Argentina, a clear majority of the population until the bitter end approved of the Convertibility Plan of 1991, which was widely seen as the cornerstone of economic stability. In November 2000, 67 percent of respondents in Greater Buenos Aires wanted the government to maintain this stabilization scheme, and even in mid-2001—after three years of recession—64 percent of Argentines in major urban centers held this view.[28] Thus, although many economists held the convertibility scheme responsible for the country's worsening economic difficulties, the achievement of economic stability continued to give it strong support in public opinion. This vote of confidence demonstrates the importance that many people attach to neoliberalism's clearest success.

Interestingly, while renewed economic problems tend to depress support for the market system, they also boost the salience of economic stability, demonstrate the indispensability of maintaining market reform principles, and thus prevent an evaporation of support for neoliberalism. This paradoxical effect of intensifying core support for the market system appears particularly if the new threats emerge from exogenous shocks. When countries experience contagion from crises afflicting other nations, the incumbent government can often shift blame for the renewed problems. For instance, Argentina's Carlos Menem gained electoral support in early 1995 because of the threat posed by Mexico's *peso* crisis. Similarly, Brazil's Fernando Henrique Cardoso increased his standing among voters in mid-1998, when the fallout from Russia's economic collapse posed a new threat to economic stability in Brazil.

For this reason, it is unlikely that a conjunctural downswing will prompt a mass defection from the market model in Latin America. Renewed threats increase the salience of economic stability, the area in which neoliberal economics achieved its most important success. In general, the severe crises of the 1980s and the successful stabilization efforts of the early 1990s have created strong support among the population and political elites for avoiding "irresponsible" economic measures that could undermine economic stability. The "economic populism"[29] that Latin American presidents often resorted to in earlier decades now faces a stigma. Even many leftist forces, which stress the need for economic expansion and social redistribution, are loath to endanger economic

[27] Datafolha, "Economia - Avaliação do Plano Real" (São Paulo: Datafolha, 2002), accessed at the website of Datafolha at http://www1.uol.com.br/folha/datafolha/po/real.shtml, 24 May 2003.

[28] Estudio Graciela Römer, *Informe Noviembre de 2000: Principales Conclusiones* (Buenos Aires: Estudio Graciela Römer, 2000), accessed at the website of Estudio Graciela Römer at http://www.romer.com.ar/informes/nov2000.htm, 12 April 2001; Gallup poll reported in "La Convertibilidad, con un Respaldo Mayoritario," *La Nación*, 2 August 2001, accessed at the website of *La Nación* at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/01/08/02/dp-324531.asp, 24 October 2002.

[29] Jeffrey Sachs, *Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America*, Working Paper No. 2897 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989); Rüdiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds., *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1–391.

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stability. They have learned from bitter experience that imprudent fiscal and economic policies, designed to offer quick economic and social improvements to the poor, soon trigger severe crises, which end up hurting the intended beneficiaries the most.

This widespread reluctance to endanger economic stability immunizes the new market model against demands for radical change. Given the risks of economic disruption inherent in any structural transformation, proposals for a profound transformation are unlikely to find widespread support in the foreseeable future. Only long-standing recession and economic collapse could depress this insistence on basic continuity and the corresponding preference for moderate adaptations over radical change.

Sources of Support for the New Market Model

In addition to the traumatic experience of hyperinflation, several other factors have prevented serious challenges to the market system from arising. Interestingly, the very losses created by drastic shock programs and determined restructuring have paradoxically exerted a stabilizing effect. The transitional costs of market reform in the early 1990s have made many citizens and interest groups reluctant to call for another fundamental transformation of the development model. These costs function as a "sunk investment," inducing people to give the new market economy a full chance. Due to this sunk-investment effect, the temporary losses that supporters of neoliberalism incurred in the recent past strengthen their commitment to this policy program and keep them from calling for another dramatic shift in course. This status quo bias, which has been documented in many cognitive-psychological experiments and economic field studies,[30] tempts people to "throw good money after bad" and continue to support a policy option that they had previously chosen. By attributing significant value to sunk investments and, thus, departing from strictly rational cost-benefit calculations, people make choices that become less sensitive to current external stimuli, such as the economic difficulties facing the new market model in contemporary Latin America.

The status quo bias helps explain persistent support for free-market principles. Radical recipes for a return to the old development scheme or for a big push in new directions would entail further transitional costs, which most people refuse to shoulder, given the painful memories of the sacrifices caused by neoliberal reform. Thus, the price they have already paid helps to lock them into the new market model. The status quo bias, which, during the 1980s, obstructed market reform, now protects its results.[31]

Many people also refuse to depart from the new market model because there is no credible, promising, and realistic alternative. While advancing a

[30] See, for example, William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 1 (March 1988): 7–59.

[31] Weyland, *Politics of Market Reform*, 183–189.

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plethora of complaints and grievances, even the radical critics of neoliberalism have failed to propose a clear, coherent development scheme of their own. On the left, socialism is too discredited worldwide to hold much attraction for voters. Even a return to the state-interventionist, protectionist scheme underlying import-substitution industrialization is not very appealing, given the long-standing problems plaguing this development model, which the left itself had criticized sharply. On the right, constructive programs are even more conspicuous by their absence. Given the lack of feasible alternatives, many people in contemporary Latin America see the new market model as the best available option—or the least bad option.

Obviously, the absence of feasible alternatives has resulted, in part, from the external constraints imposed by advancing economic globalization and continuing supervision by international financial institutions. These restrictions have greatly increased the costs of any attempt to abandon the market model. In particular, the volatility of capital markets, which react nervously to perceived threats to investor confidence, have helped lock in the new orthodoxy. In and of themselves, however, these external restrictions cannot account for the reasonably strong acceptance of the new development scheme in public opinion. In principle, external pressures could backfire and unleash a nationalist reaction to the cosmopolitan project of neoliberalism. But by reinforcing the widespread perception of absent alternatives, external pressures have enhanced the sustainability of the new development model. And this perception of absent alternatives, in turn, has made many people accept—however begrudgingly—that their government operate within the constraints set by global markets and international financial institutions.[32]

Moreover, development models have distributional effects that strengthen their beneficiaries and supporters and weaken the losers and opponents. For instance, business sectors that profit from trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization prosper, expand, and gain in political weight;[33] by contrast, the sectors that are hurt shrink or go bankrupt and thus suffer a decline in their political clout. Similarly, organized labor in uncompetitive sectors, which often led the opposition to neoliberalism, grows weaker because of labor market flexibilization and rising unemployment. While economic resources do not necessarily guarantee political influence, these relative shifts in economic fortune tend to have political repercussions; for instance, newly wealthy business people may make generous campaign contributions that boost the fortunes of politicians who defend the new development scheme. Thus, the distributional impact of neoliberal reform and the routine operation of the new market model

[32] In this vein, even during the depth of Argentina's economic catastrophe in January 2002, 71 percent of respondents agreed that it was "necessary to maintain good relations with the IMF" (Ipsos - Mora y Araujo, *Análisis Sociopolítico*, 17).

[33] Philip Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler, "Conclusions" in Philip Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler, eds., *What Kind of Democracy? What Kind of Market?* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 231.

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shift the balance of economic weight in favor of the new winners and presumable supporters and against the losers and likely opponents. Unless this redistribution is so skewed that it causes a powerful political backlash, it helps cement political support for the new development scheme.

Finally, democracy itself provides "fuses" that protect the new market model from fundamental criticism. The institutionalized possibility of alternation in power focuses popular discontent on the incumbent government and deflects it away from underlying institutions and structures.[34] Citizens often hope that a new government will eliminate the most objectionable aspects of neoliberalism and allow for modifications in the market system. Thus, while the absence of feasible alternatives discourages demands for radical change, democracy encourages expectations of moderate, gradual reforms. Since many people hope that the next administration will bring economic and social improvements,[35] they are willing to give the new development model another chance. The expectations attached to governmental turnover thus make people postpone demands for a deeper-reaching transformation.

In sum, the status quo bias, the absence of feasible alternatives, the distributional effects of neoliberalism, and the protective cushion of democracy have kept support for market principles at reasonably high levels in most of contemporary Latin America. Contrary to the predictions of the economic-voting, relative-deprivation, and social-distributional perspectives, the recent economic and social problems plaguing the region therefore have not immediately boosted popular rejection of neoliberalism. As a result, approval of the new development scheme's basic outlines has proven surprisingly resilient in the face of adverse economic and social conditions.

The Disjuncture between Popular Preferences and Governmental Decisions

So far, this essay has documented support for the new market model at the level of popular preferences. But of course, governmental decisions do not simply express these preferences. As scholars from a wide variety of theoretical and ideological perspectives—ranging from conservative public-choice authors drawing on Kenneth Arrow's "impossibility theorem"[36] to Neo-Marxists, *de-*

[34] Jorge Domínguez, "Free Politics and Free Markets in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy* 9 (April 1998): 72, 73; Jorge Domínguez, "Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America" in Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 379–380.

[35] On the economic optimism stimulated by election campaigns, see for the U.S. case Brandon Haller and Helmut Norpoth, "Let the Good Times Roll," *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (August 1994): 625–650.

[36] Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963), 1–120; William Riker, *Liberalism Against Populism* (San Francisco, CA: Freeman, 1982), 1–253.

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pendentistas, and left-wing critics of globalization—have argued, even under democracy, collective decisions often do not directly and faithfully reflect the aggregation of individual views and interests. Instead, a variety of institutional mechanisms or socioeconomic cross-pressures can introduce significant distortions. For instance, dilemmas of collective action often make it much easier for small groups to push for their special interests than for large, heterogeneous popular sectors to advance their needs.[37] Thus, opinion poll data and other evidence of citizens' viewpoints do not settle the issue of the political sustainability of the new market model; instead, the manner in which these views are translated into actual political decisions needs to be analyzed as well.

From this perspective, it is obvious that the views of powerful business sectors count significantly more than the opinions of the average citizen. These groups can use their disproportionate economic resources and resulting political influence to put pressure on the government, either via direct lobbying or via the indirect and often tacit threat of reducing their investment. As even neopluralists such as Charles Lindblom have pointed out, discretion over capital investment gives leading business groups considerable political power, despite the important competitive and political constraints that these groups face in exercising this power.[38] Indeed, although the rule of "one person, one vote" guarantees political equality in the paramount decisions under democracy, namely elections, skewed socioeconomic resources can influence people's vote choices. Business groups are crucial for funding politicians' election campaigns, which are extraordinarily expensive in patronage-infested and TV-addicted Latin America. To obtain such funds, politicians and parties are well advised not to espouse strident antibusiness rhetoric and programs. The material requirements of successful election campaigns thus provide a disincentive against fundamental attacks on the new market model. Certainly, many business sectors are by no means dogmatic neoliberals; in fact, they call for more state support and protection. But they advocate limited modifications inside the confines of the new development model, not a radical reversal and return to the old state interventionist system.[39] Thus, while business influence on elections often pushes for moderate deviations from neoliberal orthodoxy, it helps preserve the basic outlines of the market scheme.

Powerful pressures for maintaining the new development model also emanate from international financial institutions (IFIs), especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). While being pragmatic in permitting a variety of economic policy approaches, IFIs have consistently pushed for additional neoliberal reforms and have combated any effort to dis-

[37] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 1–178; Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 1–237.

[38] Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 170–188.

[39] See, for example, Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI), *Competitividade e Crescimento: A Agenda da Indústria* (Brasília: CNI, 1998), 9–97.

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mantle the new market model. Given the high debt burden of many Latin American countries, the IMF and WB command tremendous influence. Because market reform has made Latin American governments increasingly vulnerable to external shocks, they have had to resort to bail-out packages from IFIs on numerous occasions. Preserving the market system and enacting additional neoliberal adjustments are conditions for qualifying for such emergency aid. This external constraint thus ties the hands of Latin American governments.

Last but not least, the private investment community reinforces these external constraints. Neoliberalism has made Latin American countries more dependent on volatile international capital flows. Although countries can attract large sums of money, they can also lose them quickly if investors perceive signs of trouble. In fact, the frequency of financial crises in emergent markets has made Wall Street risk averse, tending to prompt overreactions.[40] Significant departures from market principles would therefore trigger large-scale capital outflows, hurting economic growth in any country that committed such imprudence.

Of course, if a large majority of the population rejected the market system, IFI and investor pressures for continued orthodoxy could backfire and trigger a nationalist backlash. Thus, external constraints alone cannot guarantee the market system's political sustainability. But given significant popular support for market principles, these external pressures have a substantial reinforcing effect. By increasing the cost of deviations, they discourage profound policy experimentation and strengthen the widespread view that there is no promising alternative to the new development scheme. In these ways, they bolster the acquiescence to the market model that is prevailing in contemporary Latin America.

The Political Fate of Market Reform in Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela

The power of these domestic and international economic constraints, which give the new market model even greater political sustainability than the above-mentioned opinion poll data suggest, is obvious in present-day Latin America. In particular, these pressures have influenced recent election campaigns as well as the policy course and political fate of governments, as the cases of Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela show.[41] These brief case studies deliberately focus

[40] Juan Martínez and Javier Santiso, "Financial Markets and Politics," *International Political Science Review* 24 (September 2003): 363–395; on the following, see in general James Mahon, *Mobile Capital and Latin American Development* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 1–208.

[41] Similar findings emerge from the cases of Peru and Ecuador, where neopopulist presidents have pursued fairly orthodox economic policies. On Peru, see Robert Barr, "The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to Toledo," *Third World Quarterly* 24 (December 2003). In Bolivia, the surprisingly strong electoral challenge from the radical Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) led by Evo Morales in 2002 induced established parties to form a coalition supporting the government headed by neoliberal Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, but this administration was weak and fell to popular protests in October of 2003.

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on countries that have experienced serious economic problems and apparent challenges to market reforms, not on nations in which the maintenance of the new development model seems assured, as the 2000 election victories of the governing *Concertación* in Chile and of the center-right *Partido Acción Nacional* in Mexico suggest.

The Brazilian presidential election of 2002 pitted José Serra, a former minister under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), who had pursued a fairly conservative economic policy course, against three critics. Serra's comparatively low share in vote intentions reflected the widespread demand for a change in economic policy, especially the promotion of economic growth and social benefits. While not necessarily criticizing the new development model as such, many people wanted to see it produce more beneficial results. Accordingly, in polls held from June 2001 to June 2002, only 11–16 percent of respondents indicated that they "would certainly vote for a candidate who would represent continuity with the policies of President Fernando Henrique [Cardoso]"; another group, which increased from 15 percent in June 2001 to 28 percent in June 2002, said that they "could potentially vote" for such a politician. But a majority that diminished only modestly from 65 percent in June 2001 to 52 percent in June 2002 stated that they "would by no means" ("*de jeito nenhum*") support such a candidate. And when asked which candidate represented continuity with Cardoso's policies, 43 percent pointed to Serra, whereas other contenders were mentioned by less than 10 percent.[42] Thus, large parts of the electorate demanded a policy change. This sentiment gave the most determined opposition candidate, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the socialist Workers' Party (PT), a strong lead in vote intentions and a convincing victory in October 2002.

But popular demands for a change in economic policies did not necessarily include a rejection of the new market model as such. In fact, one of the main reasons for Lula's electoral success was the significant ideological moderation of the PT during the preceding years, which turned it from a radical leftist force into a predominantly social-democratic party intent on reforming, not destroying, market capitalism. In fact, all candidates, including socialist Lula, tried hard during the election campaign to reassure domestic and foreign investors by promising basic continuity in adjustment policies and in the institutional framework of the new development scheme. These promises constituted a significant shift in course for the PT, which had stridently attacked neoliberalism during the 1990s, advocating a partial reversal of market reform and a transformation of Brazil in the direction of socialism. Three electoral defeats and the experience of governing at the state and municipal level had gradually moderated the PT, however. If the party ever wanted to win the presidency—by far the largest prize in Brazilian politics—it had to move closer to the median voter, who by 2002 demanded change, but not a radical break with neoliberalism. And if the

[42] CEPAC (Pesquisa e Comunicação Ltda), *Análise da Pesquisa IBOPE-CNI—Junho de 2002* (São Paulo: CEPAC, 2002), 9, 10.

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PT wanted to govern Brazil successfully, it had to appease important segments of the domestic and foreign business community,[43] whose investment decisions crucially affect economic growth and stability. In fact, business sectors had helped to sabotage the PT's first serious bid for the presidency in 1989. The president of the powerful Federation of São Paulo Industries (FIESP), for instance, had announced before the second round of the presidential contest of 1989, which pitted a still very radical Lula against conservative neoliberal Fernando Collor de Mello, that in case of a PT victory, 800,000 entrepreneurs would immediately abandon Brazil. Thus, allaying business opposition was crucial for improving the PT's electoral chances. And it was decisive for allowing any PT president to produce the economic growth and fiscal revenues needed for fulfilling his campaign promises of bringing greater prosperity to Brazil's large numbers of less-well-off and poor people.

In response to these pressures and constraints, the PT—especially the party leadership—substantially moderated its stance over the course of the 1990s. By the end of the decade, Lula's move away from radicalism had convinced conservative and entrepreneurial circles that they would not face a profound threat from a PT administration; therefore, they became willing to tolerate a PT president. In the 2002 campaign, which would probably have been his last if he had failed to win, Lula entered into an unprecedented electoral alliance with a center-right party and undertook enormous efforts to reassure the business community. As his rise in the polls scared many investors, drove down the value of the currency, and thus made it more difficult to service Brazil's voluminous internal and external debt, Lula promised to respect the requirements of economic stability and maintain market reforms. While this further moderation sought to bolster investor confidence, it also reflected the clear realization of the PT leadership that a serious economic crisis would make it virtually impossible to enact their program and improve the life chances of poorer sectors.

Accordingly, Lula appointed a surprisingly conservative economic team. Finance Minister Antônio Palocci, who had shown great fiscal prudence during his years as mayor of a midsized city, has successfully insisted on budget austerity, a tight monetary policy, and close relations with the IMF. And Central Bank President Henrique Meirelles, who has a long trajectory in the private banking sector, has made the defeat of inflationary pressures his overriding priority. Thus, during his first year in office, Lula clearly privileged economic stability over economic growth—precisely like his predecessor Cardoso, who faced increasing criticism for this preference. He also followed in Cardoso's footsteps with his initial agenda of structural reforms, whose highest-priority item has been a significant adjustment of Brazil's overly generous pension system for civil servants. Since civil servants are a core constituency of the PT, this economically prudent measure has been costly for the party in political terms. In fact, a few left-wing radicals have harshly attacked Lula's conservative eco-

[43] See Martínez and Santiso, "Financial Markets," 363–395.

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nomic policy course. But the party leadership has applied the institutional mechanisms derived from its "Leninist" origins in its efforts to expel these dissidents and silence other critics. Thus, at present, the chances are good that Brazil's major left-wing party will commit itself to the maintenance of the basic outlines of the market system and to responsible economic policies. This significant shift on the part of the PT, which used to be the loudest voice decrying Brazil's move to neoliberalism, constitutes a great advance towards the political consolidation of the new development scheme.

The obstacles to any effort to depart from market reform are also obvious in the case of Argentina, which suffered an economic catastrophe in late 2001 and early 2002. Governments of differing partisan coloration had clung to the convertibility scheme that had brought relief from hyperinflation in 1991 but had become clearly unsustainable in the late 1990s owing to exogenous changes and shocks, such as the substantial strengthening of the U.S. dollar and Brazil's drastic devaluation of January 1999. The resulting deterioration in external accounts made it ever more difficult to service the country's voluminous debt. Desperate efforts to maintain the convertibility scheme against all odds and the eventually unavoidable enactment of a substantial devaluation further aggravated a recession that had begun in 1998.[44] In 2002, the gross domestic product shrank by a stunning 15 percent, while unemployment reached a record high of 25 percent of the workforce. Because the country lacks an extensive informal sector that could provide alternative bases of economic sustenance and thus cushion people's fall out of the formal-sector workforce, many Argentines have had to eke out a living in the most miserable fashion, for instance, by sifting through trash cans or by resorting to crime and prostitution.[45]

This economic and social collapse boosted criticism of free-market principles, as reported above. It also induced recent governments to flirt with nationalist, expansionary, and redistributive policies. For instance, President Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003) initially sought to impose a large share of the economic cost of the unavoidable currency devaluation on the financial sector while protecting individual savers. And his minister of industry, a prominent businessman, advocated more protection for domestic enterprises. These proposals to deviate from the universalistic rules of the market system and interfere in the economy for political and social reasons immediately triggered powerful resistance from banks and international financial institutions, however. The IMF, in particular, assumed a very tough stance, conditioning any emergency assistance to a host of measures designed to guarantee a return to free-market principles. Given Argentina's desperate economic situation, Duhalde reluctantly decided not to follow domestic calls for going it alone, but instead incurred the substantial political cost of enacting a number of the legal and policy changes

[44] Steven Levitsky, "Argentina: From Crisis to Consolidation (and Back)" in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance*, 256–264.

[45] Salvatore, "Un-Making," 10, 11.

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demanded by the IMF. The Argentine case thus confirms the limited latitude that contemporary Latin American countries have in their economic policy making. Departures from neoliberalism are difficult to enact without triggering or exacerbating economic problems. And as argued above, these external constraints are tightest when countries face economic crises and are desperate to restore economic stability.

Moreover, the Argentine experience shows that even in the event of an economic collapse, the mass public is reluctant to abandon the new market system and to endorse radical alternatives. Given the decomposition of the Argentine party system, the 2003 presidential election was open to a wide variety of candidates. But radical outsiders—such as three extreme rightists and left-wing maverick Elisa Carrió—did not do well. The three leading vote-getters were ex-President Carlos Menem, who had enacted neoliberalism in Argentina; Ricardo López Murphy, an orthodox former economy minister; and incumbent Duhalde's hand-picked candidate, provincial governor Néstor Kirchner. Given widespread popular revulsion against the established political class, eventual winner Kirchner benefitted from being a fairly new face in national politics. And although he spouted populist campaign rhetoric, he has maintained continuity in his economic policy course by retaining the economy minister of the Duhalde government, Roberto Lavagna, who engineered Argentina's incipient economic recovery. While driving a hard bargain in negotiations with the IMF, foreign investors, and Argentina's creditors, President Kirchner has not challenged the basic contours of Argentina's market-oriented development model, and the citizenry has endorsed this economic policy course by giving their new leader sky-high popularity ratings. Thus, even in a country ravaged recently by a severe crisis, a large majority of the population does not fundamentally reject neoliberalism and vote for radical alternatives. In sum, in countries that enacted the market reform program to a large extent, the forces of continuity have remained strong at the levels of both the government and the citizenry.

Efforts to depart from neoliberalism made more headway in Venezuela, which had pursued market reform in a stop-and-go pattern and had never enacted important aspects of the neoliberal agenda.[46] As a result, economic stability remained precarious, and the 1990s saw an unending sequence of economic and political turmoil. As the established political class failed to turn the country around, more and more people were looking for radical alternatives. As a result, outsider Hugo Chávez, who had tried to overthrow Venezuela's long-standing democracy in a bloody coup attempt in February 1992 and who therefore constituted the starkest challenge to the status quo, won the presidential election of December 1998 in a landslide. Interestingly, popular aversion to market reform was not crucial for propelling Chávez into the presidency. Pre-electoral polls suggest that rejection of the established political class and critical

[46] See Corrales, "Market Reforms," 91.

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assessments of the economy were decisive; people's position towards privatization and state interventionism, by contrast, did not play a significant role.[47]

Regardless of the motivations of his electors, President Chávez and his supporters announced important departures from neoliberal principles. In particular, they passed a new constitution that mandated state-led development. For instance, the new charter prohibited any privatization of Venezuela's important oil industry; called for a reversal of market-oriented reforms in the social sectors; and stipulated a number of other nationalistic, state-interventionist, or redistributive provisions. Furthermore, Chávez indulged in radical rhetoric, announcing a "revolution," praising Cuban socialism, and berating domestic politicians and business people. Interestingly, however, the new administration has not enacted much radical change. For instance, it has not tried to expropriate enterprises or impose confiscatory taxes or excessive regulations on them (with the exception of the recent foreign exchange controls). In fact, the government has been quite cautious in implementing the antiliberal mandates of its tailor-made constitution. Furthermore, Chávez initially pursued an unexpectedly orthodox economic course, retaining the preceding government's finance minister during his first half year in office and responding to the precipitous drop in oil prices during 1998 with tough austerity measures. Thus, in his actual policies, Chávez has not challenged neoliberalism nearly as much as he has done in his fiery rhetoric.

But Chávez's diatribes quickly created enormous uncertainty among business sectors. In particular, the President's systematic concentration of political power and elimination of checks and balances, which have advanced to a worrisome degree,[48] give entrepreneurs ever less recourse if Chávez decides to make true on his "revolutionary" pronouncements. Therefore, business moved into open opposition to the government. For instance, its peak association, FEDECAMARAS, advocated a "No" vote in the plebiscite on the new constitution held in December 1999. More damagingly, the influx of foreign investment diminished while capital flight from Venezuela increased greatly, reaching an estimated US $8 billion by mid-2000. Despite high oil prices, economic growth has therefore remained disappointingly meager under the Chávez government, and unemployment and poverty have further increased.

From 2001 onward, the government's deficient economic performance and the resulting social problems began to erode the President's initially sky-high popularity ratings. The gradual weakening of Chávez's political position encouraged his opponents in civil society, especially business, organized labor, and the Catholic church, to oppose him more openly. Discontent inside the military grew as well. Protests of increasing intensity led to growing political polarization and turmoil. In April 2002, Chávez was unseated for two days in a coup,

[47] Kurt Weyland, "Economic Voting Reconsidered: Crisis and Charisma in the Election of Hugo Chávez," *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (September 2003): 833–837.

[48] Michael Coppedge, "Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy" in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance*, 165–192.

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which failed, however, owing to the blunders of the transition government. Although this political near-death experience induced Chávez to tone down his rhetoric temporarily, the front lines were already too hardened to permit true compromise.[49] As political polarization further intensified, the opposition called for a general strike and sustained it for two months (December 2002–February 2003), throwing the country into further economic chaos. Chávez, however, stubbornly sat out the strike, refused to make any concessions, and thus helped to perpetuate the political stalemate. In fact, he took advantage of the economic emergency to impose stringent foreign exchange controls, which he is currently using to squeeze his opponents in the business community. As a result, domestic and foreign investment has further dried up, and Venezuela seems headed toward continuing economic decline, which will hurt the battered poorer sectors even more.

Thus, Chávez's challenge to neoliberalism has resulted in economic and political failure. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is certainly not a shining model for other Latin American countries. Instead, this deterrent example has discouraged other governments—especially the Lula administration in Brazil and the new government of left-leaning populist Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador—from defying domestic and international investors and from departing substantially from the new market model. If Chávez's rhetoric elicited such a hostile and damaging response, any real effort to roll back neoliberalism would encounter even more stringent resistance. In fact, for a long time, Chávez's departures from neoliberalism remained mainly rhetorical, not real, precisely because there is no promising and viable economic alternative. Venezuela's recent experiences suggest that the stringent constraints emerging from globalization turn the new market model into the least bad of all feasible economic policy approaches for contemporary Latin America.

In sum, the recent fate of market reform in major South American countries suggests that the principles of orthodox economics face some challenges but are not at serious risk of being abandoned. Although many political forces advocate modifications of the new development model, very few promise radical departures. Indeed, the very fact that political leaders who did challenge neoliberalism—especially Venezuela's Chávez—have not managed to establish an alternative development model, have met with economic failure, and only precariously hang on to power serves as a warning. Furthermore, the substantial moderation of Brazil's Lula shows that even the most powerful and best-organized force of the Latin American left has—however begrudgingly—accepted the reality that it would be politically dangerous to challenge the basic outlines of the market model. In particular, large parts of the Latin American left have realized that maintaining economic stability—the single most important accomplishment of structural adjustment—is an indispensable precondi-

[49] Peter Hakim, "Dispirited Politics," *Journal of Democracy* 14 (April 2003): 115–116.

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tion for attaining their ambitious economic and social goals. This policy learning protects the new development scheme against radical challenges.

Conclusion

This essay has cautioned against the view that Latin America's new market system is facing dangerous challenges. Neither the pessimism—sometimes panic—on the right nor the excitement on the left seem justified. Latin America is certainly *not* moving "back to revolution" any time soon.[50] The economic-voting, relative-deprivation, and social-distributional arguments that underlie these expectations are one-sided in postulating a direct, immediate translation of economic and social problems into political discontent and contentious action. Instead, a number of perceptual and structural factors give support for the new market system significant persistence. While the recent troubles and travails plaguing Latin America have led to an erosion of popular approval for market principles, this decline has remained more limited than expected.

The traumatic experience of hyperinflationary catastrophes has instilled in many Latin Americans a basic preference for economic stability, a value that acquires increased salience in times of economic problems. And the status quo bias induces many citizens to give the new development scheme a full chance, rather than calling for another round of profound structural reform and policy experimentation. Furthermore, the lack of promising alternatives to neoliberalism prevents even people who are dissatisfied with the performance of the new development scheme from calling for a radical departure. Thus, people's assessments and judgments are more complex than economic-voting, relative-deprivation, and social-distributional arguments would predict. Citizens consider not only the benefits accruing to them but also broader systemic issues. With this basic argument, the present essay corroborates recent writings that stress the complexity of people's opinion formation and demonstrate the impact of subjective, psychological factors that do not directly reflect objective reality.[51]

Furthermore, as the literature on social movements has emphasized,[52] discontent and frustration do by no means automatically trigger contentious political action. Instead, the translation of popular preferences into actual political decisions is mediated by a host of structural and institutional factors. First of all, not every person's view counts equally; groups that control disproportionate economic resources have much greater influence on governmental decision making than do average citizens. And in the age of globalization, market forces and international financial institutions impose constraints on Latin American

[50] Lapper, "Back to Revolution," 12.

[51] See especially Graham and Pettinato, *Hardship and Happiness*, 1–153; Stokes, "Public Opinion," 1–32; Weyland, *Politics of Market Reform*, 37–70; Weyland, "Economic Voting Reconsidered," 822–848.

[52] For example, Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 71–90.

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countries.[53] While in principle, the democratic sovereign can disregard these limitations and elect leaders that promise a radical departure from free-market economics, the economic, social, and political cost of such an adventure would be high. Given substantial persistent support for market principles and the absence of feasible alternatives, few citizens and even fewer political leaders seem willing to incur such risks. Thus, structural constraints and the persistence of promarket attitudes seem to reinforce each other. Most likely, this synergy will prevent radical challenges to Latin America's new development scheme from emerging in the foreseeable future.*

[53] Barbara Stallings, "International Influence on Economic Policy" in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 41–88.

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

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

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Gender Differences in Attitudes toward Black Feminism among African Americans

EVELYN M. SIMIEN

Many black academics, feminist scholars, and grassroots activists argue that African American women are doubly disadvantaged in the social, economic, and political structure of the United States. Black feminists and critical race theorists, in particular, suggest that African American women are status deprived because they face discrimination on the basis of both race and gender. Building upon prior research, I posit that black feminist consciousness arises from an understanding of intersecting patterns of discrimination. Because the totality of black female experiences cannot be treated as the sum of separate parts, they must be analyzed together. If race and gender are studied as separate categories, one cannot explain how attitudes might change as a result of cross-pressures to subordinate the interests of black women so as to protect black men from racism. This article responds to the limitations of existing research, which tends to focus on either race or gender. From this point on, understanding that African American women have been theoretically erased from the literature on group consciousness is essential. Here, I argue that the choice of data that have been analyzed and the interpretation of those data rest upon a narrow and exclusive definition of group consciousness, which effectively conceals the political orientations of African American women.

Gender (or Feminist) Consciousness

Contemporary feminist scholarship has focused on the women's liberation movement and its ability to create strong bonds, raise awareness, and link con-

EVELYN M. SIMIEN is an assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Connecticut. She has published articles on race and gender in numerous journals.

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sciousness to political activism among potential and active members. Relying heavily on data from the National Election Studies, this research often fails to recognize how the use of specific survey items does not capture unique aspects of black family life, the everyday experiences of African American women, collective action strategies, and issue priorities as they differ between black and white women. None of these surveys tap attitudes toward issues that disproportionately affect black women (for example, protection from sterilization abuse). Nearly all of the research that has compared black and white women in national surveys lacks a large enough sample of African American women. Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Tate, for example, rely on data collected from four national surveys—Gallup 1986 and 1987, Yankelovich Clancy Shulman 1989, and Princeton Survey Research Associates 1990—where the sample size for black women ranges from 99 to 291 and the sample size for white women ranges from 876 to 1,868.[1]

Arguing that African American women are more supportive of gender equality, feminist priorities, and the women's movement than are white women, Mansbridge and Tate draw upon bell hooks and Ethel Klein for supporting evidence. bell hooks, who cites data from a Louis Harris Virginia Slims poll conducted in 1972, shows that African American women were more supportive of feminist ideology and more sympathetic toward women's liberation groups than were white women. At the same time, she contends that many African American women rejected the women's movement because of its failure to address issues relevant to all women. Ethel Klein, who cites data from a Virginia Slims American Women's Poll conducted in 1985, shows that African American women were most supportive of the Equal Rights Amendment. Like hooks, she makes the argument that "adherence to ideology of sex equality is not synonymous with a sense of membership in the women's movement or an endorsement of all its policies" and considers black feminists and their work outside of mainstream feminist organizations as evidence for her claim.[2] While most scholars agree that African American women are more supportive of gender equality and feminist priorities than are white women, I disagree with those who maintain that African American women are more supportive of the women's movement than are white women because traditional measures are deficient in several important ways.

Political scientists have used survey items for African American women that were designed to tap feminist consciousness among white women. In practice, this has meant that survey items speak to the experiences (or concerns) of primarily white, middle-class women. By ignoring work outside of the discipline,

[1] Jane Mansbridge and Katherine Tate, "Race Trumps Gender: Black Opinion on the Thomas Nomination," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 25 (September): 488–492.

[2] bell hooks, *Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1981), 148; Ethel Klein, "The Diffusion of Consciousness in the United States and Western Europe" in Mary Fainsod Katzenstein and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds., *The Movements of the United States and Western Europe* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987), 27.

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political scientists fail to consider the specialized knowledge created by African American women, which clarifies a standpoint of and for black women derived from their experiences with interlocking systems of oppression. Instead, survey researchers and public opinion scholars assume that white feminism and black feminism are similar. In *Measuring Feminist Consciousness*, Elizabeth Adell Cook combined the "feeling thermometer"[3] rating for the women's liberation movement with the "close to women" item in an effort to tap this specific strand of group consciousness among women. In her analysis, women who do not express closeness to other women are coded as lacking gender consciousness. Those who feel close to women, but who rate the women's movement fifty degrees or less, are coded as having low consciousness. Those who feel close to women and rate the women's movement fifty-one degrees or more are coded as having high consciousness. In this instance, Cook overlooked the full array of factors that thwarted a formidable interracial women's alliance and led black women to organize around their own interests.[4]

For decades, the women's liberation movement reflected white, middle-class bias in its objectives and aims. Its membership and leadership treated the interests of black women as secondary to their own by excluding them from the movement's agenda. Even today, these factors would likely influence the feeling thermometer rating for the women's liberation movement by black women. In fact, Claire Knoche Fulenwider documented a rising trend on the part of black women that indicated a lack of support for the women's movement and its tactics.[5] While black women were more supportive of feminist items that tapped perceptions of social reality, they were far less supportive of those items that measured attitudes toward abortion and tactics for social change. More specifically, black women opposed, to a greater extent than did white women, the women's liberation movement and the belief that women need to organize and work together to combat discrimination.

Using a measurement approach similar to Cook's, Pamela Conover drew insight from a woman-centered perspective and focused on the extent to which women consciously identify themselves as homemakers.[6] More specifically, she combined the feeling thermometer rating for feminists with the "homemaker" item—which asked the respondent whether she thought of herself as a "home-

[3] "Feeling thermometers" are used to assess feelings toward people, events, and organizations that have been in the news. Respondents are read the name of a person, event, or organization and asked to rate that person, event, or organization using something called the "feeling thermometer." They can choose any number between 0 and 100. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorably the respondent feels toward that person, event, or organization; the lower the number, the colder or less favorably they feel. Respondents would rate the person at the 50° mark if they felt neither warm nor cold toward them.

[4] Elizabeth Adell Cook, "Measuring Feminist Consciousness," *Women and Politics* 9 (Fall 1989): 71–88.

[5] Claire Knoche Fulenwider, *Feminism in American Politics* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1980), 93.

[6] Cook, "Measuring Feminist Consciousness," 71–88; Pamela Conover, "Feminists and the Gender Gap," *The Journal of Politics* 50 (November 1988): 985–1010.

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maker" most of the time, some of the time, occasionally, or never—in order to tap feminist identity. In her analysis, Conover also examined the relationship between feminist identity and other criterion variables (that is, feeling thermometer ratings for women, the women's movement, and the women's liberation movement) in order to establish the validity of the measure. In this instance, she overlooks the fact that the traditional housewife model has never fit most African American women.[7]

African American women are more likely than are white women to be heads of households; historically, their labor participation rate has exceeded that of white women, and they usually possess more decision-making authority in their parental and conjugal roles than do white women.[8] Without much choice in the matter, African American women have worked at higher rates than have white women because their families are burdened by family income inequality and two incomes are necessary for familial economic survival. Even today, these factors would likely influence responses to the homemaker item by black women. There are additional factors that have gone unexplored.

Historically, African American women have felt called upon to choose between their commitments to antiracist and antisexist struggles because the interests served by both have been cast as diametrically opposed.[9] This conflict of interest has manifested itself around most struggles for gender equality and feminist priorities, on the one hand, and racial uplift and black empowerment, on the other. Consider the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas episode, an example of a struggle around gender equality and feminist priorities. This high-stakes dispute between a black female law professor and a black male Supreme Court nominee called into question race loyalty for African Americans in general and African American women in particular. Still, the overwhelming majority of African American men and women expressed disbelief in Anita Hill's sexual harassment charges against Thomas.[10] In light of this, Mansbridge and Tate have argued that "the public image of a Black woman attacking a Black man" worked in Thomas's favor because "black women are often told to choose between race and gender, and often feel they must choose race" for fear they might be viewed as disloyal to the race.[11]

[7] Mae King, "Oppression and Power: The Unique Status of Black Women in the American Political System," *Social Science Quarterly* 56 (June 1975): 117–128; Pauline Terrelonge Stone, "Feminist Consciousness and Black Women" in Jo Feeman, ed., *Women: A Feminist Perspective* (Mountain View, CA: Mayflower Publishing Company, 1995), 607–616; Deborah King, "Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of Black Feminist Ideology," *Signs* 14 (Autumn 1988): 42–72; Beverly Guy-Sheftall, ed., *Words of Fire: An Anthology of African-American Feminist Thought* (New York: The New Press, 1995), 232; Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 11.

[8] King, "Oppression and Power," 117–128.

[9] Deborah Robinson, *The Effect of Multiple Group Identity on Race Consciousness* (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1987), 1–3.

[10] Katherine Tate, "Invisible Woman," *The American Prospect* 8 (Winter 1992): 74–81.

[11] Mansbridge and Tate, "Race Trumps Gender," 488–489.

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Consider also the dissension surrounding the Million Man March, an example of a struggle for racial uplift and black empowerment, in which black men were called on to assemble in the nation's capital for a day of atonement. Writing in 1999, Wendy Smooth and Tamelyn Tucker contended that many black women "experienced inner conflict" as to whether they should support a "gender-exclusive call to march" because of their dual identity as black and female.[12] Claudine Gay and Tate have termed this internal conflict "doubly bound," which suggests that "black women will support their interests as women, but their support can be muted and even overwhelmed" when those interests collide with the interests of their race.[13] Ostensibly, the hierarchy of interests within the black community assigns priority to race over gender.[14]

Race Consciousness (or *Linked Fate*)

Contemporary black politics scholarship has focused on the political behavior of those African Americans who identify themselves as members of an "oppressed group." Richard D. Shingles, for example, expanded the model of black political participation by demonstrating how mistrust, low political efficacy, and race consciousness related to heightened political participation among blacks.[15] In his analysis, Shingles seemed to grasp the importance of intragroup differences by devoting scholarly attention to class differences in political orientations—the levels of political trust and internal political efficacy possessed by poor, working-class blacks versus middle-class blacks in relation to their rate of political participation. Yet, he failed to recognize the importance of studying gender via categorical analyses that actually concealed the political orientations and behavior of black women. Simply stated, black women were not studied apart from black men. This approach to the analysis of race consciousness and its effect upon black political orientations and behavior guarantees that the uniqueness of black women and their "doubly bound" situation will be ignored. With few notable exceptions, very little work has looked at the political attitudes and political behavior of African American women directly.

Of those books that have, I must note in particular: *From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections* by Katherine Tate, *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics* by Michael C. Dawson, and

[12] Wendy G. Smooth and Tamelyn Tucker, "Behind But Not Forgotten: Women and the Behind-the-Scenes Organizing of the Million Man March" in Kimberly Springer, ed., *Still Lifting, Still Climbing: African American Women's Contemporary Activism* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 242–251.

[13] Claudine Gay and Katherine Tate, "Doubly Bound: The Impact of Gender and Race on the Politics of Black Women," *Political Psychology* 19 (March 1998): 183.

[14] Emma Coleman Jordan, "Race, Gender, and Social Class in the Thomas Sexual Harassment Hearings: The Hidden Fault Lines in Political Discourse" in Adrian Katherine Wing, ed., *Critical Race Feminism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 169–174.

[15] Richard D. Shingles, "Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link," *American Political Science Review* 75 (March 1981): 76–91.

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Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism by Frederick C. Harris. While they offer highly sophisticated and comprehensive explanatory models of black political behavior that place African American political thought at the center of their empirical analyses, these studies often fail to recognize the importance of theorizing gender. Relying heavily upon survey data from the 1984–1988 and 1996 National Black Election Studies (NBES), scholars have typically added the variable (gender) to a regression model and controlled for its effects statistically. By so doing, political scientists isolate the effects of gender from the influence of such confounding variables as age, education, and income. In this instance, gender is simply defined as whether a person is male or female and is most often used to predict party identification, evaluation of particular candidates, and attitudes toward specific policy issues. This is not sufficient for arriving at a complete picture of black public opinion and political behavior, especially when the categories of race and gender have been purposely deconstructed by feminists in general and black feminists in particular to avoid generalizations that purportedly apply to all women or all people of color.

A daunting task for researchers is to work through the many questions surrounding these two categories—race and gender—by expanding our knowledge base of African American women's traditional political activity: voting and electoral behavior; the general characteristics of African American women who are active in political parties, including the significance of education, social class, and professional or occupational backgrounds; patterns of political recruitment and elite membership at the elective, appointed, and bureaucratic levels; and the factors that facilitate their entry into the political arena.[16] Black political participation must be determined, in part, by an appreciation of the lived experience and the political objectives of African American men *and* women, especially considering that black feminist organizations have long been active in the policy-making process, specializing in research, policy analysis, litigation, and constituency development. Protest activities, lobbying, monitoring public policy implementation, coalition formation, and campaigning are all strategies that have been used by black feminist organizations. Of course, the most useful approach to the study of African American women in politics would be one that privileges their ideas and experiences versus comparative analyses with other race-sex groups that report aggregate differences on the basis of race and gender defined as purely biological traits. This approach would also entail considering the cultural and social expectations prescribed by contemporary American society.

Unfortunately, most empirically trained political scientists who investigate aggregate gender differences in black public opinion and political behavior de-

[16] Shelia F. Harmon-Martin, "Black Women in Politics: A Research Note" in Hanes Walton, Jr., ed., *Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 209–217.

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fine gender in biological terms—how men and women ought to behave politically—without exploring varying ideas about masculinity and femininity or alternative kinds of activities and characteristics that are appropriate for men and women within the black community. For the most part, the public opinions and political behavior of African American women have been measured against those of black men, white men and women, or other women of color. For example, *From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections* by Katherine Tate is marred by a tendency to consider black men's political attitudes the norm against which black women's political attitudes are measured and found lacking. Tate avers, "Black women have weaker racial identities than Black men" and speculates that black women might form weaker racial identities because they are less likely than black men to see themselves as victims of racial discrimination.[17] Despite the fact that black women participated in higher numbers than did black men in the Civil Rights Movement, which would suggest that black women possess stronger racial identities than black men, Tate stops short of empirically investigating the why question—why do black women not possess stronger racial identities than black men? Thus, the question of why African American women were less likely to report racial awareness than were African American men has not been resolved to date. The near absence of any further analysis of black women, particularly as voters in American elections, is disappointing when the black female voter has long been described as an enigma.

The second text, Michael C. Dawson's *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*, examined the relationship between *linked fate* and black political participation. A significant predictor of race consciousness and black political behavior, *linked fate* constitutes an advanced stage of group identification that starts with a mere feeling of closeness to others (who identify as African American) and involves the acceptance of the belief that individual life chances are inextricably tied to the race. In other words, *linked fate* connotes an acute sense of awareness (or recognition) that what happens to the group in question will also affect what happens to the individual members of the group.[18] In his work, Dawson asserts that "whether an African American believes his or her own fate is linked to that of the race as a whole is *not* (emphasis added) predicted by either socioeconomic status or gender," but by the extent to which "an African American individual is integrated into the black community and tied to black information networks" in addition to that person's

[17] Katherine Tate, *From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 29.

[18] Michael C. Dawson, *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 76–81; Arthur H. Miller, Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk, "Group Consciousness and Political Participation," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (August 1981): 494–511; Mary Herring, Thomas B. Jankowski, and Ronald E. Brown, "Pro-Black Doesn't Mean Anti-White: The Structure of African-American Group Identity," *The Journal of Politics* 61 (May 1999): 363–386; David Jaynes and Robin Williams, *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989), 526–548.

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individual assessment of the "relative economic status of African Americans" at large.[19] However, political scientists have relied almost exclusively upon one single indicator, the *linked-fate* item, to measure race identification among African Americans. The most commonly used item asks, "Do you think what happens to *black people* (emphasis added) in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?"[20] Respondents who answer affirmatively are then asked, "Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?" The responses to both items are usually combined. It is this writer's view that survey researchers and public opinion scholars must develop measures of race identification that consider in-group variation. The use of a single survey item that asks about blacks in general is insufficient because this approach fails to consider differences between and among individual members of the black population.

Given the salience of interlocking systems of oppression, as they circumscribe the lives of individual black women, African American women need and deserve their own items. Otherwise, the study of political attitudes and behavior will continue to conceal the political orientations of African American women as they differ from African American men and white women via categorical analyses that purportedly apply to all African Americans or all women. For these reasons, the use of a single item to measure race identification should be avoided in survey research. Instead, I recommend the use of parallel items that ask, "Do you think what happens to [black women, black men] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" Using this approach, political scientists could expand the traditional *linked-fate* model to include items that assess in-group attachments.

The third text, Frederick Harris's *Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism*, focuses explicitly on black female experiences as a point of departure for his analysis of the relationship between religiosity and support for gender equality within the black community. Harris argues that the black church has validated the patriarchal nature of male-female relationships through sermons and teachings of gender inequality. It is the case that "black women's exclusion from clerical leadership and key decision-making processes in their congregations" legitimizes black male authority and reinforces gender role stereotypes of black women as "doers" and "carriers" in charge of the private sphere.[21] Harris finds that church attendance and active membership determine black women's support for gender equality. Black women who are most active in their churches are least supportive of the idea that African American women should share equally in the political leadership of the black community

[19] Michael C. Dawson, "African American Political Opinion: Volatility in the Reagan-Bush Era" in Hanes Walton, Jr., ed., *African American Power and Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 141–142.

[20] Michael Dawson, Ronald Brown, and James S. Jackson, *National Black Politics Study Codebook* (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993).

[21] Fredrick C. Harris, *Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism* (New York: Oxford Press, 1999), 155.

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and least supportive of the notion that black churches or places of worship should allow more African American women to become members of the clergy.

Harris challenges conventional definitions of politics by adopting an approach that puts the perspectives and experiences of African American women at the center of his analysis. But at the same time, he casts male clergy as the model of leadership against which women are found lacking when women are sometimes unable or unwilling to assume masculine postures. Although he devotes some attention to the obstacles impeding equality and empowerment for African American women, he falls short of making the case for the feminist implications of his work by not compelling us to consider how current black politics research might be changed (or transformed) if the perspectives or lives of these women were taken into consideration. If Harris wants to fully explore the correlation between African American women's participation in the church and gender as a construct of theoretical importance, then he must articulate how changes in these women's lives and activities reflect, influence, or perhaps destabilize patriarchal authority. Identification of differences and commonalities among African American women and men must also dispel false universalism, which sets up African American men (in this case, clergy) as the norm against which African American women appear to be deviant cases. While few scholars have focused as explicitly on the relationship between public and private domains as Harris has done here, even fewer have offered empirical assessments of the simultaneous effects of race and gender.

Empirical Research

Political scientists who have studied the simultaneous effects of race and gender on feminist consciousness have taken two main approaches. First, scholars have used items that were designed to tap feminist consciousness among white women to measure black feminist consciousness.[22] As stated earlier, this approach is problematic because it assumes that white feminism and black feminism are similar. There are many differences, both historically and in contemporary times, between the ways in which black women and white women experience sexism in this country. Thus, I argue that using survey items designed with white women in mind results in a measurement of support for white feminism among black women—not black feminist consciousness. Second, social scientists have measured gender identification and race identification and then used the interaction of these two variables to create a measure of the politicized group identification of black women.[23] There are disadvantages to this approach. Given that this measurement strategy assumes that race and gender identification are separate constructs, it cannot account for the ways in which attitudes might change as a result of the hierarchy of interests within the black

[22] Clyde Wilcox, "Black Women and Feminism," *Women and Politics* 10 (Fall 1990): 65–84.

[23] Gay and Tate, "Doubly Bound," 183; Robinson, *Effect of Multiple Group Identity*, 10–19.

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community. In other words, the construction of an interaction term offers no means of measuring the simultaneous effects of race and gender oppression when black women are often called upon to choose between antiracist and antisexist struggles. Thus, black respondents should be asked to consider both constructs simultaneously because black women do not have the luxury of choosing to fight only one battle when multiple forms of oppression impinge upon their lives. Arguably the best measurement approach is one that focuses squarely on the ideas and experiences of black women, inasmuch as patterns of race and gender discrimination uphold and sustain each other. Finally, the interaction term fails to measure a commitment to and an attitude toward the underlying themes that delineate the contours of black feminist consciousness.[24]

Black Feminist Consciousness

Black feminist consciousness is the recognition that African American women are status deprived because they face discrimination on the basis of both race and gender. Having to bear the burdens of prejudice that challenge people of color in addition to the various forms of subjugation that hinder women, African American women continue to lag behind other race-sex groups on practically every measure of socioeconomic well-being. They occupy the lower stratum of the social hierarchy, are predominately in clerical and service jobs, and are more likely to be single heads of households.[25] As a result, African American women are subject to multiple burdens—joblessness and domestic violence, teen pregnancy and illiteracy, poverty and malnutrition—that define their cumulative experience with race and gender oppression in the United States.[26]

To date, black feminist scholars have played a critical role in bringing to the academic fore the study of black male and female attitudes toward actualizing the goals of feminism. While these scholars provide a range of perspectives, several recurring themes in their work delineate the contours of black feminist consciousness. I will discuss some of the most salient themes in the following section.

First, black feminist scholars have focused on the concept of intersectionality, which suggests that interlocking oppressions circumscribe the lives of black women through day-to-day encounters with race and gender oppression.[27] In

[24] While I am critical of this approach, I would like to note that these scholars were working with data sets not designed to measure black feminist consciousness and thus were forced to rely on items available to assess the concept; and that these studies provide important insights, despite their limitations, especially when considering that the actuality of black female experiences is multiplicative, as opposed to additive.

[25] Irene Browne, ed., *Latinas and African American Women At Work: Race, Gender, and Economic Inequality* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 4–11.

[26] Wing, ed., *Critical Race Feminism*, 30–31.

[27] Kimberle Crenshaw, "Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew" in Cathy Cohen, Kathleen Jones, and Joan Tronto, eds., *Women Transforming Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 540–568.

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other words, black feminist consciousness is the product of this experience with intersecting patterns of race and gender discrimination. Other scholars argue that systems of domination based on class and sexual orientation are linked with racism and sexism.[28] In fact, Tamara Jones reminds us that African American women "don't have the luxury of choosing to fight only one battle" because they must contend with multiple and interlocking systems of oppression.[29] According to Adrian Katherine Wing, the actuality of layered experiences is multiplicative as opposed to additive.[30] The parts cannot be treated as separate categories because black women are subject concurrently to multiple burdens.

Second, black feminist scholars have addressed the issue of gender (in)equality within the black community. During the Civil Rights Movement, black women were not recognized for their numerous political activities, such as behind-the-scenes organizing, mobilizing, and fundraising, and leadership positions were reserved for black males.[31] Smooth and Tucker, who cite the Million Man March as a classic example of gender inequality within the black community, argue that in more recent years, black women's activism has been ignored and black men have been given credit for its success.[32] Other critics have charged that the black church has validated the patriarchal nature of black male-female relationships through its biblical teachings, in addition to its exclusion of black women from the clergy, key decision-making processes, and financial governing boards.[33] In short, the struggle to eliminate patriarchy in all aspects of black life is a prominent theme in black feminist literature.

Third, black feminists have maintained that feminism benefits the black community by challenging patriarchy as an institutionalized, oppressive structure and advocating the building of coalitions. In fact, black feminists have made conscious efforts to avoid attacking individual black men in order to work with them to further their cause of equality and justice for women. Patricia Hill Collins, in particular, argues that black feminism is a social justice project and suggests that building coalitions is essential to advancing that project.[34] Similarly, Deborah Robinson avers that the "black community must move from the position of singular activism" and commit to the struggle against both racism

[28] See Audre Lorde, *Sister Outsider* (Freedom, CA: Crossing Press, 1984), 114–123; Barbara Smith, "Some Home Truths About the Contemporary Black Feminist Movement" in Guy-Sheftall, ed., *Words of Fire*, 254–266.

[29] Tamara Jones, "Building Effective Black Feminist Organizations" *Souls* 2 (Fall 2000): 56.

[30] Wing, ed., *Critical Race Feminism*, 30–31.

[31] Charles M. Payne, *I've Got the Light of Freedom* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 266–283; Belinda Robnett, *How Long? How Long? African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 182–184; Evelyn M. Simien, "Black Leadership and Civil Rights: Transforming the Curriculum, Inspiring Student Activism," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36 (October 2003): 747–750.

[32] Smooth and Tucker, "Behind But Not Forgotten," 242–251.

[33] Harris, *Something Within*, 155–175.

[34] Collins, *Black Feminist Thought*, 41–43.

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and sexism for the sake of the Civil Rights Movement.[35] Finally, Pauline Stone insists that black feminism benefits the black community by enabling black men and women to gain a more accurate and deeper level of understanding of the occupationally segregated labor market, where there are male and female jobs, black and white jobs.[36]

Fourth, black feminist scholars have suggested that a sense of belonging or conscious loyalty to the group in question (that is, black women) stems from lived experiences, specifically, day-to-day encounters with race, class, and gender oppression. Shared experiences with interlocking systems of domination, then, drive black women to political activism. In other words, the individual who identifies with the group label comes to realize that individual life chances are inextricably tied to the group and that collective action is a necessary form of resistance. This politicized group identification is referred to here as *linked fate with black women.*

Research Questions/Hypotheses

This project addresses two questions empirically. First, do the principle components of black feminist consciousness differ across gender? The expectation is that items used to measure black feminist consciousness will load differently for black women and black men. The *both movements* item in particular is expected to align itself with a separate factor because it forces respondents to consider the hierarchy of interests within the black community, which prioritizes race over gender. This item asks whether black women suffered from both sexism within the black movement and racism within the women's movement. Second, does the level of support for black feminist consciousness differ across gender? Researchers have found legitimate differences between men and women in their relationship to feminism. For this reason, I investigate whether the level of support for black feminist tenets differs between black women and black men.

Data

The 1993–1994 National Black Politics Study (NBPS) is unique in that it contains questions that measure black feminist consciousness. It was conducted between December 1993 and February 1994. Respondents were selected in two ways, from a national random digit dial sample or in a random selection from a list of households in black neighborhoods. The response rate was 65 percent, resulting in 1,206 black respondents, all of whom were voting eligible. A full description of the survey may be found in the codebook, which was compiled by its principal investigators, Michael C. Dawson, Ronald E. Brown, and James S. Jackson.

[35] Robinson, *Effect of Multiple Group Identity*, 83

[36] Stone, "Feminist Consciousness and Black Women," 607–616.

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Measurement

Because there is no one definitive measure of black feminist consciousness used in survey research with African American respondents, six items were selected from the 1993–1994 NBPS to construct this measure, reflecting four salient themes. The first theme is intersectionality, which suggests that interlocking systems of oppression circumscribe the lives of black women via day-to-day encounters with race, class, and gender oppression. It is measured by two survey items: the first item asked whether racism, poverty, and sexual discrimination were linked together and should be addressed by the black community (*address all discrimination*), and the second item asked whether black women suffered from both sexism within the black movement and racism within the women's movement (*both movements*).[37] The second theme is that gender (in)equality exists within the black community and beyond. It is also measured by two survey items: the first asked whether black women should share equally in the political leadership of the black community (*black women leadership*), and the second asked whether more women should become members of the clergy in black churches (*more women clergy*). The third theme is that black feminists benefit the black community by advancing the agenda of women. It is measured by one survey item that asked respondents whether black feminist groups help the community by advancing the position of black women or instead divide the community (*black feminist help community*). The fourth theme involves the acceptance of the belief that individual life chances are inextricably tied to the group in question. It was also measured by one survey item that asked whether respondents thought that what generally happens to black women in this country will have something to do with what happens in their own life (*linked fate with black women*). The same items were asked of black women and black men. All items were rescaled to a 0-to-1 format, with "1" indicating high black feminist consciousness (see Appendix A).

Analysis Strategy and Results

Using a statistical technique known as factor analysis, I explain the total variation in responses provided by African American men and women to six questions that arguably measure black feminism. I determine whether these six questions are, in fact, related to one another. More specifically, I assess whether all six questions measure six different attitudes or just one attitude, referred to here as black feminism. I am also interested in whether all six questions are equally effective measures of black feminism for both sexes.

[37] Another item asked respondents whether there is a tendency for white society to attack and silence strong black women like Anita Hill and Lani Guinier; this item was discarded because a large percentage (19 percent) of respondents refused to answer the question. It is this writer's view that the average respondent, who has not graduated from college, may have felt uncomfortable responding to the item when he/she knew very little about Lani Guinier and her nomination to the U.S. Justice Department.

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All six questions account for 25 percent of the total variance in responses, and each individual factor score ranges from moderate to high, which means all six items are closely related; however, they are not all equally effective measures of black feminist consciousness. Considering that the *address all discrimination* item yields the highest score, the common factor space is likely driven by a sense that racism, sexism, and poverty are all linked together and must be addressed by the black community. Other scores within this range similarly suggest that black respondents recognize that black feminist groups help (versus divide) the black community by advancing the position of black women, support more women clergy at the pulpits of black churches, and believe that black women should share equally in the political leadership of the black community—all of which constitute hot-button issues that black academics, public intellectuals, and grassroots activists have devoted significant energy to debating. Given that the *both movements* item yields the lowest factor score and that the wording of the question invokes the hierarchy of interests, I perform a factor analysis at a later stage for African American men and women separately to examine this result further.

A long-standing debate exists within the black community about the relationship between black feminist consciousness and race loyalty. Black civil rights organizations and their predominately male leadership have argued that feminism detracts from race loyalty and divides its membership into separate camps. From this perspective, a focus on sex discrimination inhibits, or even precludes, the development of racial awareness and black empowerment. Robert Staples avers, "Any Movement that augments the sex-role antagonisms extant in the black community will only sow the seed of disunity and hinder the liberation struggle. Whether black women will participate in a female liberation movement is, of course, up to them. One, however, must be cognizant of the need to avoid a diffusion of energy devoted to the liberation struggle lest it dilute the over-all effectiveness of the movement."[38] That is to say, the need to subordinate matters of vital concern to African American women for the sake of the Civil Rights Movement should take precedence, so as to protect black men from the forces of racism. Despite this position, many black feminist activists (for example, Michelle Wallace, Ntozake Shange, Alice Walker, Angela Davis, and Kimberle Crenshaw) have spoken out against sexism in their community to later find themselves criticized by black men and women who argued that "airing dirty laundry" only fed white efforts at racial domination. Still, black feminists maintain that interlocking systems of oppression (racism and sexism) must be addressed simultaneously because they are intimately related to the unequal distribution of power and privilege in the United States. Thus, it is consistent with the underpinnings of black feminist consciousness that feminist identification and race identification would be associated with it—at best,

[38] Robert Staples, "The Myth of the Black Matriarchy," *Black Scholar* (January–February 1970): 15–16.

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a positive relationship between black feminist consciousness, feminist identification, and race identification, so as to suggest that black feminist consciousness is related to yet distinct from these two constructs.

I turned to other criterion variables to which black feminist consciousness might be related in order to test whether it is indeed a valid measure, using bivariate correlations. More specifically, I examined the relationship between black feminist consciousness and feeling thermometer ratings for feminists and blacks as well as the feminist identification measure, which asked to what degree black female respondents support feminist ideals, and the black identification measure, which asked to what degree black male and female respondents felt that what happens to black people in this country has something to do with what happens in their own life. Then, I examined the relationship between black feminist consciousness and an interaction term constructed from one measure of race identification and another measure of gender identification. Both items asked the respondents whether they felt that what happens to [blacks and women] in this country will have something to do with what happens in their life (see Appendix B).

While the relationship between black feminist consciousness and the feminist feeling thermometer is statistically significant, the two variables are weakly correlated. In addition, the relationship between black feminist consciousness and the feminist identification measure is weak and not statistically significant. However, the relationship between the feminist feeling thermometer and the feminist identification measure is statistically significant, and the correlation between these two variables is moderate, which suggests that a stronger relationship exists between these two measures of white feminism than with black feminist consciousness. My results bolster the claim that items designed to tap feminist identification among white women are problematic because they yield a measurement of support for white feminism among black women—not black feminist consciousness. It is fair to say that white feminism is related to yet distinct from black feminism.

The relationship between black feminist consciousness and the black feeling thermometer is statistically significant, but the correlation is weak. Similarly, the relationship between black feminist consciousness and the race identification measure is statistically significant and the correlation between these two variables is moderate. Likewise, the relationship between the feeling thermometer for blacks and the race identification measure is statistically significant. However, these two variables are weakly correlated. Most striking is the relationship between black feminist consciousness and the interaction term. In prior research, political scientists have measured gender identification and race identification and then used the interaction of those two variables to create a measure of black feminist consciousness. This strategy treats gender and race identity as separate constructs and equates high levels of gender identity and race identity with black feminist consciousness. Here, the relationship between the interaction term and black feminist consciousness is statistically significant

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and the correlation is moderate. Considering that the interaction term assumes that race and gender are separate constructs and that black feminist consciousness emphasizes the simultaneity of oppression, the results were fairly predictable. If black feminist consciousness were to have both a statistically significant relationship and moderate correlation with any one measure, it would be with the interaction term because it contains one measure of gender identification and one measure of race identification. In other words, the interaction term versus the feminist feeling thermometer and feminist identification measure, as well as the black feeling thermometer and race identification measure, represents the one measure that comes closest to capturing two components (gender identification and race identification) of black feminist consciousness. All things considered, the empirical findings mentioned here bolster my claim: black feminist consciousness is related to yet distinct from feminist identification and race identification.

The second stage of examination again involved factor analysis, delineating the principal components of black feminist consciousness for black women and black men separately, however. It is believed that the *both movements* item may be more difficult for respondents to answer because this item activates a sense of internal conflict invoked by the hierarchy of interests often experienced by black women and men when women's liberation is pitted against black civil rights. This internal conflict is what Gay and Tate have termed "doubly bound," which suggests that black women will support their interests as women, but that their support can be muted or even overwhelmed when those interests collide with race. The *both movements* item forces respondents to consider whether African American women suffer from both sexism within the black movement and racism within the women's movement or whether they suffer primarily from the same problems as do black men. The result of this analysis for all six items, which appear to tap one clear underlying dimension of black feminist consciousness for black women only, yields factor scores that are all relatively high. With black men absent from this analysis, original factor scores rose slightly, and the result of this analysis for all six items, which appear to tap two underlying dimensions of black feminist consciousness for black men only, also yields factor scores that are relatively high. However, the *both movements* item determines a second dimension to black feminist consciousness for black men. That is to say, this particular item is uncorrelated (or correlated more weakly) with the other five survey items that comprise the first dimension and appears to stand alone in a column by itself that reveals a second dimension to black feminist consciousness for black men, rather than black women, when the two are studied separately.

The third stage of analysis involved cross-tabulation in an effort to determine whether the level of support for black feminist consciousness differs across gender. More specifically, the proportion of black women who possess black feminist consciousness was compared to the proportion of black men who support its fundamental tenets. The result of this analysis reveals that black femi-

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TABLE 1

Support for Black Feminism Reported in Percentage

Survey Items	*Black Women (N = 781)*	*Black Men (N = 425)*	*Total (N = 1,206)*
The problems of racism, poverty, and sexual discrimination are all linked together (*address all discrimination*)	71	68	70
Black feminist groups help the black community by advancing the position of black women (*feminist help community*)	69	65	68
Black women should share equally in the political leadership of the black community (*black women leadership*)	77	79	78
Black churches or places of worship should allow more women to become members of the clergy (*more women clergy*)			
Agree	54	59	55
Strongly agree	41	53	47
What generally happens to black women in this country will have something to do with your life (*linked fate with black women*)	70	72	71
Black women have suffered from both sexism within the black movement and racism within the women's movement (*both movements*)	55	49	53

Note: For the first three items, table entries are the percentage of respondents who chose that option when presented with two choices. For the *more women clergy* item, the first table entry is the percentage of respondents who indicated that they agreed with that statement and the second table entry is the percentage of respondents who indicated that they strongly agreed with that statement. For the *linked fate* item, the table entry is the percentage of respondents who indicated that they thought what generally happens to black women will affect them a lot or some.

nist consciousness is quite widespread among both black women and black men (see Table 1). Roughly 70 percent of all respondents believe that race and sex discrimination are linked. Another 68 percent report that black feminist groups are beneficial to the black community because they advance the position of black women. An even greater proportion, 78 percent, endorse the notion that black women should share equally in the political leadership of the black community and express that what generally happens to black women in this country will have something to do with their own life. While there is less support for black female clergy, a majority (55 percent) indicate that more black women should be allowed to become members of the clergy. Perhaps one of the most interesting findings is that black men are equally and, in some cases, more likely than are black women to support black feminism. When we examine just those who "strongly agree" with the position that there should be more black women clergy, a twelve-point difference exists between black women and black men. It is no secret that the black church has played a prominent role in inhibiting the development of black feminist consciousness, which makes this particular finding perplexing.

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Of course, an alternative explanation could be that many black men are cognizant of and sympathetic toward the particular predicament of black women, but that when women's liberation and black civil rights are pitted against each other they will prioritize race over gender and argue that black women suffer primarily from the same problems as do black men. African American men and women both suffer from race oppression and class exploitation in the occupationally segregated labor market. The income and earnings of African American men lag behind those of white men, which suggests that black men are subordinate to white men in the occupational structure of the United States. Similarly, the income and earnings of black women lag behind those of white women, which suggests that black women are subordinate to white women in the occupational structure of the United States. Together, black women and black men are burdened by poverty, lack of job skills, and wage inequality. Given their shared experience with race oppression and class exploitation, many black men might recognize that such twin barriers tie their individual fates inextricably to the race as a whole. Identifying with black women as another marginalized group, black men are willing to support the interests of black women, as long as they do not perceivably jeopardize the movement for black civil rights.

Still, the black church is perhaps the most important social institution in the black community. It has validated the patriarchal nature of male-female relationships through sermons and teachings of gender inequality, in addition to purposefully excluding black women from clerical leadership, key decision-making processes, and financial governing boards. Male-dominated groups such as the deacon and steward boards govern the church with formal authority and power in deciding church policy and financial matters; women-dominated groups such as the deaconess and stewardess boards govern with far less power and authority.[39] These women-only groups manage Sunday schools, child day-care services, youth groups, and bake sales (tasks that black men perceive to be menial and willingly assign to black women). Despite the fact that more women are becoming deacons and stewards today, these women continue to govern with less authority than their male counterparts in similar positions because sexism within the black church remains prevalent. As a result, black women have created alternative and separate religious spheres that enable them to assert some influence on decision-making processes despite resistance from male-dominated spheres. In fact, some black women have begun to found their own congregations and storefront churches. Still, many black women are not so disenchanted with black churches and fail to resist blatantly chauvinist attitudes when exhibited by their brothers and sisters in the church because they have come to accept positions that are secondary to black men as traditionally female. Conditioned not to see patriarchy, they willingly accept the

[39] Harris, *Something Within*, 155–175.

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most demeaning and uncreative service jobs so as not to undermine black male authority.

Given that the majority of black women (55 percent) indicate that black women suffer from both sexism within the black movement and racism within the women's movement and that the majority of black men (51 percent) report that black women suffer primarily from the same problems as do black men, these findings can be interpreted in the following way: The majority of black women refuse to rank interlocking systems of oppression and reject the hierarchy of interests within the black community and, at the same time, the majority of black men refuse to "air their dirty laundry" and pledge loyalty to the race. It would appear, on the basis of the findings cited here, that the *both movements* item activates the sense of internal conflict invoked by the hierarchy of interests when women's liberation is pitted against black civil rights, particularly for black men. African American men and women both experience some sense of internal conflict invoked by the hierarchy of interests; however, it does not produce the same divisive outcome for black women as it does for black men. By openly addressing the hierarchy of interests within the black community that assigns priority to race over gender, the *both movements* item makes it more difficult for black men to uphold the black feminist position because they must consider whether black women experienced sexism within the black movement. All things considered, the question that remains unanswered is whether black men have truly progressed in their thinking about traditional gender roles.

In an effort to address this question, I explore whether these results (particularly the likelihood of black men and black women advocating the black feminist agenda equally) reflect the type of question asked more than the reality and perhaps, as well, the ingenuity of black men to respond with politically correct answers. Additional items might yield greater insight and provide more substantive answers to the question of whether black men have truly progressed in their thinking about traditional gender roles. While we look to alternative data for this answer, we might also find questions that mark a clear distinction between black women and men on these issues.

Using data from the 1984–1988 NBES,[40] I found that there was a significant difference in the responses to three items by black women and black men that might tell us a great deal more. One item asked respondents whether men were better suited emotionally for politics. Another asked whether [men and women] possess too much influence, just about the right amount of influence, or too little influence (see Table 2). The results of this analysis indicate that roughly 39 percent of black women strongly disagree with the statement that men are better suited for politics versus 27 percent of black men. And while less than half of the male respondents (45 percent) indicated that men have too much

[40] The 1984–1988 NBES were comprised of 1,150 interviews of black citizens taken during the 1984 and 1998 national elections. Modeled after the University of Michigan's landmark National Election Studies (NES), a full description of the surveys may be found in the codebook, which was compiled by its principal investigators, Katherine Tate, Ronald E. Brown, Shirley J. Hatchett, and James S. Jackson.

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TABLE 2

Percent of Black Women and Men Who Take Each Position

Survey Items	*Black Women (N = 777)*	*Black Men (N = 439)*	*Total (N = 1,216)*
Men are better suited for politics			
Somewhat disagree	59	47	53
Strongly disagree	39	27	33
Men have too much influence, agree	60	45	53
Women have too little influence, agree	66	50	59
Women have far too little influence, agree	30	24	27

Source: 1984–1988 National Black Election Studies.

Note: The first item asked respondents whether they strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement that men are better suited for politics. Other items asked whether [men and women] possess too much influence, just about the right amount of influence, or too little influence.

power, the majority of women (60 percent) indicated that men did in fact possess too much power. Finally, a third of black women (30 percent) believed that women have far too little power, in contrast to less than a quarter of black men (24 percent). Of course, these items do not capture the full essence of black feminist thought. However, they do successfully capture some component of feminism. In prior research, scholars have used similar items that tapped perceptions of sex role socialization and the comparative influence of women in society. In fact, Fulenwider identified such items as "basic to the core belief structure of a feminist belief system."[41]

Using data from the 1972–1976 American National Election Studies, Fulenwider discovered a startling trend in minority attitudes toward feminism. In 1972, minority men were almost twice as likely as minority women to oppose feminism. But by 1976, the reverse became true; while 29 percent of minority women opposed feminism, only 13 percent of minority men opposed feminism.[42] Item analysis revealed that minority women were more opposed to the women's liberation movement than were minority men, when they were asked to rate, according to a feeling thermometer, the movement and its tactics for social change that involved women—of any race—organizing and working together. Given that the women's liberation movement reflected the aims and objectives of white, middle-class women, that its leadership treated the interests of black women as less important than their own, and that many black women organized separately around their own interests, this trend on the part of black women is not particularly surprising.

Using data from the 1993–1994 NBPS and the 1984–1988 NBES, I discovered a similar trend in attitudes toward gender equality and feminist priorities among African Americans. The fact that black men are equally and, in some

[41] Fulenwider, *Feminism in American Politics*, 44.

[42] Fulenwider, *Feminism in American Politics*, 77.

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cases, more likely to endorse black feminist tenets than are black women lends support to the idea that the attitudes of African American women and men toward gender equality and feminist priorities have changed over time. Of course, further analysis must be conducted to investigate this phenomenon in more detail.

Conclusion

The study of black feminist thought is charged with political significance because, at the very least, it means that black feminists have a voice, and with this newfound voice comes an unquestionable dilemma. Black feminists are situated at the center of two political movements that, when cast as diametrically opposed, create uneasy alliances. For black women, who are the physical and material representation of the race-sex correspondence, the level of discomfort is never lost and adopting a dispassionate, objective stance toward cross-cutting issues that so obviously affect them personally is virtually impossible for them. They are neither prepared to suffer publicly, through intense and passionate advocacy, nor willing to be dismissed, belittled, or rejected by other members of their race or gender for identifying with one group over another. As reported here, the factor analysis of black feminist consciousness for both sexes yielded one dimension, and the factor analysis of black feminist consciousness for black women alone yielded one dimension. However, the factor analysis of black feminist consciousness for black men alone clearly yielded a different structure, with two dimensions instead of one. The *both movements* item, which captures the sense of internal conflict invoked by the hierarchy of interests when women's liberation is pitted against black civil rights, clearly defined the second dimension of this construct for black men only. While it would appear that black feminist consciousness is quite widespread among black women and men, black men, in particular, are equally and, in some cases, more likely to support black feminism, with one exception—the *both movements* item—and when we examine just those who strongly agree with the position that there should be more black women clergy, a twelve-point difference exists between black women and black men.

Given the history of the black church, the above finding is particularly perplexing. Of course, an alternative explanation might be that black men so identify with black women that they recognize their unique disadvantaged status. Still, black churches have played a prominent role in inhibiting the development of black feminist consciousness and, as a result, the question that remained unanswered is whether black men have truly progressed in their thinking in regard to traditional gender roles. For this reason, I turned to another data set with more difficult questions that marked a distinction between black women and black men. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the items available in the 1993–1994 NBPS failed to raise the bar high enough to truly separate those with a genuine commitment to black feminist principles from

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those with only a fleeting recognition of the discrimination faced by black women. Using data from the 1984–1988 NBES, I found that black women and men differ in their beliefs related to sex role socialization and the comparative influence of women in society.

All things considered, it would appear, on the basis of the principal components analysis cited here, that black citizens' beliefs about equality for black women fall along one clear dimension—a dimension of black feminist consciousness. This construct organizes the way black people think about political issues affecting the lives of black women. Although these items are quite diverse in that they address the problems of racism, poverty, and sexism, black feminism as a racially divisive issue, linked fate as an advanced stage of group identification, gender equality within the black community as well as the black church, and an awareness that black women suffer from both sexism within the black movement and racism within the women's movement, responses to these questions are driven by the same sense of black feminist consciousness. Using data from the 1993–1994 NBPS and the 1984–1988 NBES, I conclude that black feminist consciousness is a stable construct that shapes the beliefs of black women and black men toward gender equality and feminist priorities.*

* An earlier version of this article received the Jewel Prestage Award for best paper on gender, race, ethnicity, and political behavior at the 2001 annual meeting of the Southwest Political Science Association. It was also recognized as best graduate student paper presented at a state, regional, or national political science association meeting by Pi Sigma Alpha (the national political science honor society) at the 2001 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

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APPENDIX A

Measures for Black Feminist Consciousness

"People have different ideas and opinions about politics. We would like to know what you think about the following matters. For the next several questions I'm going to give you two choices. Please tell us which choice is most true for you." (Some respondents volunteered "both"; those respondents were coded as a 0.5.)

Address all discrimination. The problems of racism, poverty, and sexual discrimination are all linked together and must be addressed by the black community OR blacks should emphasize the struggle around race.

Both movements. Black women have suffered from both sexism within the black movement and racism within the women's movement OR black women mostly suffer from the same type of problems as black men.

Black women leadership. Black women should share equally in the political leadership of the black community OR black women should not undermine black male leadership.

Black feminist help community. Black feminist groups help the black community by working to advance the position of black women OR black feminist groups just divide the black community.

"I'm going to read some questions and please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree."

More women clergy. Black churches or places of worship should allow more women to become members of the clergy.

Linked fate with black women. Do you think that what generally happens to black women in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?

Adapted from the 1993–1994 National Black Politics Study.

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APPENDIX B

Measures for Other Criterion Variables

Feminist Feeling Thermometer

The respondent is asked to rate feminists in accordance with a feeling thermometer that runs from zero to one hundred degrees. Ratings between fifty degrees and one hundred degrees indicate that the respondent feels favorably and warm toward the group. Ratings between zero and fifty degrees indicate that the respondent does not feel very favorable and is cool toward that group. Respondents may use any number from zero to one hundred to tell the interviewer how favorable their feelings are toward the group in question.

Feminist Identification Measure

Do you consider yourself to be a feminist? Would you describe yourself as: being strongly opposed to feminist ideals, somewhat opposed to feminist ideals, not at all opposed to feminist ideals?

Black Feeling Thermometer

The respondent is asked to rate blacks in accordance with a feeling thermometer that runs from zero to one hundred degrees. Ratings between fifty degrees and one hundred degrees indicate that the respondent feels favorably and warm toward the group. Ratings between zero and fifty degrees indicate that the respondent does not feel very favorable and is cool toward that group. Respondents may use any number from zero to one hundred to tell the interviewer how favorable their feelings are toward the group in question.

Black Identification

Do you think that the movement for black rights has affected you personally? Did it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?

Interaction (Race × Gender Identification)

Do you think that what generally happens to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?

Do you think that what generally happens to women in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?

Note: All variables are coded on a 0-to-1 scale, with 1 indicating high group consciousness.

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Book Reviews

Governor Reagan: His Rise to Power *by Lou Cannon. New York, Public Affairs, 2003. 592 pp. $30.00.*

Former *Washington Post* staff writer Lou Cannon is the leading chronicler of the life and political career of Ronald Reagan. Cannon covered Reagan back during the gubernatorial era and then through the presidential campaigns and presidential years. He knows every detail of Reagan's life and career, as well as all the major players who surrounded Reagan. His years of covering Reagan and his access to Reagan's people pay off wonderfully in this and other books he has written on Reagan. Indeed, this is Cannon's fifth book on the former president, going back to the 1969 publication of *Ronnie and Jesse: A Political Odyssey*.

There is, therefore, some significant overlap with some of Cannon's earlier Reagan books. For example, the four chapters on the 1976 and 1980 campaigns draw largely from the 1982 volume, *Reagan*. But this overlap does not detract from the value of this latest volume as a stand-alone study. Few readers will have absorbed Cannon's four previous books on the subject. There is real value as well to having much of the earlier material integrated into this volume on Reagan's governorship. And at over 500 pages of text, perhaps there is even too much of a good thing here, although one will not find a more comprehensive review and analysis of the Reagan gubernatorial years.

The book is segmented into three major sections, with just one of these covering the Reagan governorship. The first section traces his early life, his screen acting career, and his eventual entrance into politics. The second provides a detailed overview of the gubernatorial years. The third is largely duplicative material about Reagan's presidential campaigns, followed by a brief review of his presidency. Although section two is the most original and valuable overall, it is helpful to have included the other sections to place into one text a broad-ranging look at how the early years led Reagan toward politics and affected his governorship and then, most significantly, how his governorship affected Reagan's national political career.

Cannon based much of his analysis on numerous personal interviews with Reagan insiders. He also gained access to many original gubernatorial records that Reagan associates shared with him. The Reagan Library and the Reagan

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Presidential Foundation provided Cannon with access to even more materials, many of which have not been used by other Reagan researchers. Thus, the wealth of new material makes this volume a worthy resource for scholars.

Cannon's analysis throughout is sensible and fair-minded. He is neither a Reagan-basher nor a sycophant. To be sure, those on both of these sides in the battle to define Reagan will find bits and pieces from the book to confirm their own views. For Reagan critics, for example, Cannon provides a tough critique of the president's environmental record, made all the more devastating by the author's meticulous review of Reagan's much more balanced gubernatorial record on conservation issues. Nonetheless, the portrait that emerges is of a man who was much smarter and savvier than his critics ever allowed. But also, Cannon pictures Reagan as much more moderate and pragmatic than most conservative Reagan-worshippers will admit.

Governor Reagan is a fine addition to the literature concerning the former politician. Without a doubt, Reagan will be one of the twentieth century's most thoroughly analyzed presidents, along with FDR, Truman, JFK, Nixon, and Clinton. Like those of Nixon's and Clinton's legacies, especially, people's views of Reagan's legacy will clash considerably for many years. Lou Cannon's many books will remain useful and even-handed accounts of the Reagan years for a long time to come.

MARK J. ROZELL
George Mason University

Reaganism and the Death of Representative Democracy *by Walter Williams. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2003. 306 pp. $26.95.*

The American system of Madisonian representative democracy is in serious disrepair: a passive electorate is largely disengaged from its civic responsibilities, profit-driven media sensationalizing politics does little to inform serious political deliberation, government agencies are set up for failure, and moneyed interests distort congressional policy choices. Walter Williams's chronicle of these deficiencies is not simply one more academic jeremiad (something he hopes to avoid), but is instead a serious and thoughtful critique of the state of democratic governance in the United States. At the heart of this critique is the assertion that "Reaganism," which now dominates the basic character of American politics, is the key trigger in the decline of effective governing institutions and the country's movement toward outright plutocracy.

Reaganism connotes a political movement that is not quite a systematic ideology but is instead a blend of several unchallengeable principles (state and local government is superior to federal authority, which should be extremely circumscribed; unregulated capitalism is a costless system yielding future prosperity; necessary self-reliance equates to few social welfare obligations for gov-

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ernment; and America is a uniquely just and righteous country) animated by a charismatic leadership figure. The Ronald Reagan presidency gave this perspective (which has deep historical antecedents) a particular resonance and hence was transformational: the federal government is no longer viewed as a legitimate venue for addressing a range of social problems, but instead is widely seen as ineffectual and counterproductive.

The claim of a degeneration into plutocracy is no doubt controversial, but the argument Williams develops to support it is the core strength of the book. Williams carefully lays out how Reaganism has had deleterious consequences for the presidency (in terms of counterproductive management practices within the executive branch), has undermined the integrity of Congress (now frequently hostile to compromise and credible deliberation), and has lead to a problematic maldistribution of wealth and to broad corporate corruption. Government failures, ranging from the savings and loan scandal, to Enron, to decaying public infrastructure, to airport security failures that facilitated September 11 have a common thread: the resource investments necessary to ensure competent governance that would prevent such events have been lacking, in large part due to the triumph of the Reaganist philosophy—in concert with the influence of powerful concentrated interests that benefit from a lack of vigorous federal oversight.

Williams's arguments on the democratic consequences of contemporary antifederalism (Reaganism) are particularly compelling if one accepts the premise that the federal government has been the repository of much positive social change (for example, civil rights and environmental, consumer, and worker protections) and has helped enhance democratic practices. It is also important to note that Williams fully recognizes that other factors contribute to a less-vibrant public sphere, such as structural trends in congressional election dynamics, the nature of money in politics, and the dynamics of news media attention to frequently nonsubstantive political information.

Conservatives will undoubtedly chafe at the suggestion that the Reagan anti-federal government orientation is deleterious to American democracy. Moreover, the criticism that Williams conflates a policy preference (proactive federal government) with a conception of healthy representative democracy is a reasonable one. But if one considers the George W. Bush administration a full expression of Reaganism, its extraordinary procorporate tilt gives credence to Williams's basic contention that the country has shifted toward government operating nearly exclusively for the powerful and wealthy. Whatever one's position, Williams's *Reaganism and the Death of Representative Democracy* is an exceptional starting point for dialogue regarding the relative health of American democracy and what might be done to reinvigorate it.

BRIAN J. GERBER
Texas Tech University

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Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership
by Rogers M. Smith. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 248 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $22.00.

Our moral prescriptions should be informed by our knowledge of the world. Informed by this commitment, Rogers Smith explores how political communities have been constituted through discourses of membership in order to advance a moral argument about the kinds of stories that *should* be cultivated in order to produce a more just and democratic world (p. 174). The resulting book, *Stories of Peoplehood*, joins a scholarly "is" to a pragmatic political "should."

In Smith's analysis, stories of peoplehood are linked to "projects that aim to construct communities that are also enduring structures of political power" (p. 41). He begins by characterizing two dimensions of variation that can be recovered from extensive literatures in history, political science, sociology, and anthropology. First, stories differ in their strength and scope, in the claims for the primacy of a particular allegiance and the range of activities over which that allegiance holds. Strong and wide stories are intolerant of difference and demand allegiance across many domains of life; weak and narrow stories may not constitute a community of sufficient power to get the job done, to provide for security and material well-being. Second, peoples may be constituted through three different types of narratives—economic, political, and ethically constitutive—which may be woven together to construct political communities and to advance partisan elite interests (p. 69). While acknowledging the importance of economic and political narratives, the aim of the first half of *Stories of Peoplehood* is to make a case for the distinctive importance of ethically constitutive stories.

In contrast to stories that appeal to either material wealth or to the quest for (and maintenance of) power, ethically constitutive stories are particularly effective and particularly dangerous. In addition to providing powerful accounts of membership and individual worth, these stories are less-easily undermined by evidence than are accounts of material prosperity, which can be undone by shortage, or narratives of power, which can falter with defeats and insecurity (pp. 99–100). Consequently, ethically constitutive stories may sustain peoplehood even when wealth and security are absent, are secured illegitimately, or are threatened by change.

These qualities of ethically constitutive stories of peoplehood frame the moral challenge confronted by Smith: "If ethically constitutive stories are inescapably an integral element of all processes of political people-making, and hence of all political life, what do we do about their obvious potential to define and advance viciously unjust political projects?" (p. 125). Above all, he argues, we should not ignore this potential. Whereas many contemporary political philosophers offer visions of universal or rational or procedural democracy that seek to encompass differences within institutional or communicative

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commitments, Smith offers a more muscular approach. Rather than suppressing particularism or reserving it for marginalized groups, he advocates a Madisonian approach in which proponents of different constitutive accounts actively engage one another, challenging each other's stories. Smith's own candidate for a "story of American peoplehood" features a "pioneering people," an account that can be nested in an identification with the history of the nation as well as in an aspirationally universal understanding of human history as experiment and change: "A century and a half after Darwin, it now seems clear to all but the most traditionalist fundamentalists that humanity is plausibly understood as a highly evolved and still evolving animate species" (p. 166). Both the attraction of history and the potential of evolution to serve as a universal narrative frame may reveal the particular preferences of a contemporary academic and understate the difficulties of crafting an account that will not marginalize the considerable number of "traditionalist fundamentalists" who find the concept of evolution more than a bit problematic. But with his own thought experiment, Smith challenges others to offer different candidates for constitutive stories.

As befits Smith's commitment to an empirically informed normative theory, his prescriptions for ethically constitutive stories and discourses of peoplemaking also set a new agenda for scholarship. What can we learn about the cosmopolitan societies of the past, those that encompassed multiple religious or ethnic affinities within a single system of rule? We should pay particular attention to the processes by which such cosmopolitan "settlements" fail and, more hopefully, to the erosion of overly strong, exclusionary, and vicious stories of peoplehood and the regimes that they sustain.

ELISABETH S. CLEMENS
University of Chicago

Benjamin Franklin: An American Life *by Walter Isaacson. Riverside, NJ, Simon & Schuster, 2003. 608 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $16.95.*

In the two hundred years since Benjamin Franklin's death, almost every conceivable sort of book about him has been written. His public life has drawn historians and biographers to his politics, his diplomacy, and his involvement in the cities of colonial America and in the empire of Great Britain. Studies of his mind and scientific achievements abound, as do those that look at him as a family man and lover. His friends and enemies, his community service, his religion, his humor, even his prose style, have also received careful scrutiny.

Many of these books have brought illumination into the life of Franklin and his time. General studies—large-scale biographies—have proved less successful, as only a handful have succeeded in pulling together much that is reliable in what has been written about him into a rounded life. The greatest of all of these books is Carl Van Doren's *Benjamin Franklin*, published in 1938. Van Doren's is much longer than Walter Isaacson's, covers more ground, and

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is better written, but inevitably has gradually proved less and less useful as fresh scholarship has appeared in the sixty-six years since it first appeared. In particular, scholarship on Franklin's political life in Pennsylvania is better now, as it is on his scientific achievements and his diplomacy during the Revolution.

Perhaps the greatest weakness in Van Doren's book—and it is not glaring—is his treatment of Franklin's diplomatic achievements in securing the alliance with France in 1778 and the Treaty of Paris ending the Revolutionary War in 1782–1783. Much more is known now of what occurred on the English side as the Rockingham government gave way to Shelborne's. The relationship of Richard Oswald and Thomas Grenville, two of the English negotiators, to their American adversaries is also more carefully traced in Isaacson's book. And the inside of the American commissioners' actions—in particular, those of John Adams and John Jay, in addition to Franklin's—are laid out in commendable detail by Isaacson.

Isaacson's account of Franklin's public life is set against a rich evocation of his private life and, in part, of his daily life. All this is done with ease. Isaacson breaks his chapters up into several parts, frequently of only a few pages; in places, these short sections bring together seemingly disparate subjects. In chapter 10, "Agent Provocateur," for example, a discussion of Franklin's extended family in Philadelphia jostles against discussion of the Stamp Act, which gives way, in turn, to an account of his daughter Sally's relations with Benjamin Bache, whom she would eventually marry; then comes more on the extended family, followed by Franklin's reactions to the Townshend duties on trade. The chapter ends with an appraisal of Franklin's patriotism in 1768–1770 and his troubled relationship with Lord Hillsborough, the colonial secretary. Isaacson's skill as a biographer and a writer is clear in this chapter, as in all others, for these subjects, apparently so different from one another, are connected in some fashion. The thread of the story is never lost, nor does the reader feel abandoned, left to the task of making sense of the materials presented.

Isaacson's Franklin is a pragmatic figure, deeply rooted in the intellectual and political forces of his time. He was not an abstract thinker, nor did he seem to have grand and noble purposes guiding his life. As Isaacson points out, he is sometimes underestimated because the spiritual side of life seemed unimportant to him. But, as Isaacson argues, Franklin's democratic faith was stronger than that of any of the great Founders. And for Franklin, it was a useful faith, a conviction, Isaacson demonstrates, that gave his life its importance and value.

ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF
University of California, Berkeley

Welfare and the Constitution *by Sotirios A. Barber. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2003. 184 pp. $27.95.*

Despite its potentially misleading title, this book is not primarily about the constitutional dimensions of poor relief, but is, rather, an argument that the U.S. Constitution is most faithfully interpreted by according foundational status to

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the substantive ends enunciated in its preamble, the most significant being its promise to "promote the general welfare." In advancing this argument, Sotirios Barber takes on the claim that the Constitution is fundamentally a charter of negative liberties, instituted to protect certain rights. He makes the case for a "positive-benefits" reading of the Constitution, which holds that particular provisions must be understood in light of the substantive ends or positive benefits they were designed to achieve. Generally speaking, this argument will be familiar to those acquainted with Straussian readings of the Constitution. Barber's objective is both to set that argument on firmer foundations and to suggest that by the light of contemporary political categories, it might be conducive to liberal (as opposed to conservative) ends.

A positive-benefits model, Barber contends, is the only reading that is consistent with the basic principles of liberal contractarianism because a rational individual will only enter into a social contract if it entails some affirmative duty on the state's part to protect him, at least so far as his life is concerned. It is thus nonsensical to establish a government for the sole purpose of limiting it. This demonstrates the ineluctability of a constitutionalism of ends. Barber buttresses his contractarian arguments with references to the text and appeals to the authority of Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln (chiefly) and of long-standing historical practice. By recurring to these varied touchstones, Barber endeavors to provide the groundwork for leaving "living constitutionalism" (and, to a certain extent, civic republicanism) behind and anchoring liberal public policy conclusions (such as economic and social rights and strict church-state separationism) in traditionalist and foundationalist constitutional sources.

Having established that the Constitution must ultimately be aimed at ends, and at least entails a duty to protect the lives of those who live under it, Barber moves on (with nuance I cannot provide here) to argue that there is no principled way to distinguish the state's duty to protect one's life from a duty to police. In turn, he argues, there is no principled way to distinguish a duty to police from a duty to provide for the poor. And in light of these failures of distinction, the conclusion is unavoidable that at its base, the American constitutional project is anchored in a general duty of all constitutional actors—not just judges—to take those steps that best advance the collective public good or general welfare. Because for Barber that good is an objective truth, albeit one about which our knowledge is incomplete and uncertain, this means that constitutional reflection amounts to an aspirational quest at the national level for the collective good.

Barber does not argue here that a positive-benefits understanding will necessarily yield any particular policy result. On this score, he is deliberately suggestive rather than conclusive (he describes this book as "a prolegomenon to the legal issues" [p. 120]). His aim is broader and his concerns more abstract: Barber wants us to conceive of the constitutional project, and hence to talk about constitutional questions, in a different way.

In many ways, this book is white-shoe constitutional theory at its best, a model of the way one might expect constitutional theory to be done. The

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argument is intricate and painstakingly careful. Barber seems alert to all possible objections and makes patient and serious attempts to meet them. Indeed, there are few criticisms I could raise here that Barber in some way has not anticipated and sought to meet somewhere.

Still, when taken as a whole, the book seems to miss something of the spirit of American constitutionalism, if not the spirit of constitutional government itself. This is most evident in his presentation of the constitutional thought of historical figures, from whom Barber draws selectively to suit his purposes. It is crucial for him, constitutionally speaking, that Lincoln once claimed that the leading object of government is "to elevate the condition of man" (pp. 3, 58, 114), that Jefferson wrote that governments are established by the people "to effect their safety and happiness" (p. 3), and that Madison wrote in *The Federalist, No. 45* that "the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued" (pp. 16, 93, 94, 155). Barber is less focused on the fact that the Founders then went on to frame a particular government with particular institutions and institutional constraints that they had designed to serve those ends. Ever careful, Barber acknowledges this. But where, one wonders, is the Jefferson who, not despite but because of his concern for the people's safety and happiness, was also a staunch individualist, decentralist, and strict constructionist? Lincoln may be closer to Barber in this regard, but mainly because of the unique and morally overcharged nature of the slavery crisis. That he would have approached more routine constitutional questions in the same spirit is far from clear.

Barber quotes Madison's observation in *The Federalist, No. 49* that "in a nation of philosophers . . . [a] reverence for the law would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato" (p. 59). But he has not absorbed its import. He has, however, assimilated the by now long-standing critique of efforts to conceive of judges as uniquely positioned to serve as philosopher kings. Barber's solution is to call upon every constitutional actor to be a philosopher king. This would open up all the questions that key Founders would have simply assumed to be legally settled, either by the constitutional text, by original understanding, or by long-standing practice. Perhaps this is not exactly anticonstitutional. But it certainly does away with much that many would associate with a constitutional project. This may simply be another way of saying that Barber is a modern constitutionalist. In this regard, although they are not mentioned, Barber's true affinities lie less with Madison and Jefferson than with Lester Ward and Herbert Croly, men who were unconflicted in their commitment to a positive-benefits understanding of national power.

KEN I. KERSCH
Princeton University

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The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
by Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 512 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $25.00.

Much has been said about the democratic peace, so much, in fact, that a large portion of what has been said is bound to be untrue. There exist many explanations for democratic peace, each vying for roughly the same empirical space. The challenge for researchers is to separate the wheat from the chaff, to distinguish likely explanations from the merely plausible. Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee take up this task with talent, imagination, and much effort. The book is empirical in the best sense of the word. The authors seek to advance the state of knowledge on this important subject by drawing out additional implications of a number of major arguments and then assessing the hypotheses with a rich new dataset on territorial conflict that is extensively documented in the text. Their findings are informative and nuanced, like the book itself.

The text is organized into ten chapters and six appendices. The core of the text consists of three theoretical and three empirical chapters. The three theory chapters develop empirical implications of democratic peace explanations, with each chapter focusing on a different archetypal form (political accountability, political norms, political affinity). Accountability theories involve constraints on the executive, or signaling theories, in which information is conveyed about resolve. Norms arguments emphasize the impact of appropriate behavior. The affinity category discusses arguments about the effects of like political systems. The three empirical chapters evaluate the different stages of the territorial escalation process (challenge the status quo, offer concessions in negotiations, escalate with military force). The appendices (A through F) detail coding rules for the territorial dispute dataset and also offer a brief narrative for each observation in the sample.

The authors begin with an apology for providing yet "another study of democracy and international conflict" (p. 1). Why is the research community so quickly jaded by a bit of good news, when war and its ancillaries have received lavish attention for generations? The democratic peace *is* important, not just because there are so few "lawlike" relationships in international relations, but because this relationship is indicative of so much we wish to encourage. In fact, the text offers much that is original, while avoiding altogether "me too" theorizing. The authors draw out and test hypotheses (by my count, thirty-eight) in the setting of territorial disputes. Their analysis of these hypotheses is detailed ("we suspect that many readers hope never again to look at another table") (p. 277), but much worth the effort. One concern, in fact, is that there is so much here that it becomes difficult to construct a synthesis. The authors do reject political affinity arguments. "We conclude that the similarity of political institutions between states and the corresponding incentives to cooperate with potential political allies is not a strong and consistent motivating force . . ." (p. 284). Elsewhere, the text's empirical pluralism leads

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to problems. The authors find support for constraint arguments (escalating is more costly for democratic leaders) and for signaling explanations (democratic leaders reveal information in escalating). "We do not believe the models and arguments of scholars that focus on different types of audience costs should necessarily be viewed as rival approaches" (p. 289). These *are* rival approaches. Each posits a causal theory of war that is different, and largely incompatible. The fact that the hypotheses can coincide empirically does not mean that two theoretical worlds fail to collide.

The text reflects an awareness of strategic interaction, but the follow-through is lacking. The authors make a virtue out of applying abstract formulations. But there are occasional lapses. For example, in a section on policy relevance, the authors note that their results "on the importance of the electoral cycle for the initiation and outcome of negotiations suggest that a 'ripe' time for mediators to push democratic leaders to open talks and offer concessions is shortly after national elections" (p. 294). One wonders whether the results are themselves a reflection of such intervention, or indeed whether new governments are occasionally elected in part to respond afresh to ongoing foreign policy crises (the recent surprise in the Spanish elections after the al Qaeda bombing comes to mind). The point is that recommending that policymakers seize the moment is, at least in some cases, likely to be a bit redundant.

Use of territorial conflicts as the unit of analysis is troubling, since it presumes that regime type and other variables do not influence the development of latent territorial conflict. The authors assert that "the existence of a territorial disagreement is a logical place to begin the analysis, since arguments about democratic norms and institutions focus on how state leaders can manage conflicts of interest and not why conflicts of interest emerge to begin with" (p. 27). The political affinity model suggests precisely that democracies lack the basis for conflict (democracies may or may not resolve conflicts that occur better than other states). To the degree that the democratic peace involves processes that remove territory as the basis for conflict, the research design consists of classic selection on the dependent variable. Huth and Allee's own data reveal a dramatic decline in the frequency of territorial disputes over the past eighty-five years (Figure 1.1, p. 28), a decline that at least superficially conforms to the rise of democracy and economic development. Since territorial dispute onset varies, and since we cannot say why, one should be cautious in accepting the conclusions of the text as more than partial explanations of the relationship(s) between democracy, territory, and peace.

The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century is in the vanguard of efforts to build better theories of international peace by breaking down existing accounts and parsing out their implications. The authors offer the best available comparative analysis of most major democratic peace theories. Their insights about how to address empirically the problems of an over-determined theoretical space are compelling, as are their advocacy of mapping the escalation process and their emphasis on departing from dyadic analy-

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sis. There remain questions that will benefit from further tests using a different research design. The study's findings are bound to shape thinking about the democratic peace and, thus, to contribute to the next generation of theoretical research linking liberal politics to peace.

ERIK GARTZKE
Columbia University

Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace *by Charles Lipson. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2003. 259 pp. $32.50.*

A consensus has emerged among scholars of international relations that the democratic peace—the proposition that liberal democracies seldom if ever fight wars against one another—is a fact in want of a theory. A number of explanations for the democratic peace have been offered, invoking the peculiar domestic institutions of democracies, their norms or ideologies, or both. In this lucid and compelling book, Charles Lipson synthesizes and augments several strands of the domestic-institutional explanation into what he calls a contracting theory of democratic peace.

Lipson argues that democracies avoid fighting one another because their domestic institutions enhance their ability to enter into and keep efficient agreements. The link between efficiency and peace is provided by the rationalist approach to war (recently explicated by James Fearon, Kenneth Schultz, and others), which assumes that states are unitary actors with exogenous preferences (p. 70). Inasmuch as war is always costly, to victor as well as vanquished, a satisfactory peaceful bargain is always available in principle. Wars break out when states sufficiently misjudge one another's capabilities or intentions or when they are unable to make credible commitments. Democratic institutions, argues Lipson, mitigate these problems. Democratic states are more transparent, allowing other states to see more clearly their capabilities and intentions. Their governments are constrained to continue policies of their predecessors, giving foreigners confidence that they will not suddenly renege; they face higher domestic "audience costs," that is, they are accountable to domestic actors for broken international agreements; and they are restrained by constitutions that disperse power and thereby render commitment breaking more difficult. When a democracy faces a nondemocracy, however, the opacity and mutability of the latter introduce inefficiencies into bargaining and make wars more likely.

The contracting theory is elegant and synthesizes various parts of a well-developed theoretical tradition. It accommodates more easily than do norm-based theories "near-misses," or cases in which democracies have nearly come to blows. It avoids the futile zero-sum intellectual contests that often afflict international relations studies by allowing, for example, that democratic institutions both constrain governments and inform their negotiating partners. In

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Chapter 6, Lipson shows how various empirical studies yield findings consistent with various implications of his contracting theory. For example, agreements among democracies appear to feature relatively fewer hedging or self-protective mechanisms. Lipson also draws upon the argument of Lars-Erik Cederman and others (pp. 150–152) that democracies are relatively good learners and hence, over time, become better able to read other states' capabilities and intentions (although this causal mechanism seems analytically distinct from Lipson's contracting theory).

Not all will be convinced, however. The main conceptual difficulty stems from Lipson's inclusion, in what is otherwise a rationalist theory, of the proposition that the preferences of democracies are relatively likely to remain constant through changes in government. If nondemocracies' preferences may change with their rulers, then rationalist theory does not apply to them; rationalist theory would then be subsumed by a liberal international relations theory that links variation in preferences to domestic regime type. This difficulty is manifest in Lipson's fascinating chapter on wars triggered by monarchical succession. He argues that governmental transitions in democracies are less likely to entice foreign intervention than are transitions in monarchies precisely because the former transitions are less likely to produce changes in state preferences. If that is so, then we are dealing not with a state-centric rationalist theory but with a liberal theory that specifies when preferences vary. (Lipson does acknowledge that preferences matter in practice.)

Too, some readers will want to see new, rigorous, empirical tests of Lipson's propositions rather than the anecdotal evidence he cites and the review of empirical literature in Chapter 6 (see above). No book can do everything, and this book's theoretical and expository virtues are significant. But at the very least, more large-N and small-n tests are called for before we can declare Lipson's contracting theory the best explanation of democratic peace.

All the same, Lipson's book will likely alter the debate on one of the most active and important questions in political science and, indeed, in U.S. foreign policy. Relations among democracies have been unusually strained of late; Lipson's conclusion that democracies' domestic features will likely keep their partnerships strong is welcome indeed.

JOHN OWEN
University of Virginia

The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People *by Jonathan Schell. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2003. 448 pp. $27.50.*

If concepts are tools for understanding and shaping the world, this book is an indispensable toolkit for political scientists, policy makers, and citizens in the twenty-first century. Jonathan Schell rethinks the meanings of war, power,

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sovereignty, and other concepts and forges an analytical instrument for understanding the historical transformations of the twentieth century and their significance for the future.

The author begins with the Clausewitz paradigm: that war is paradoxically both an instrument of politics and an arena in which purely military considerations are decisive. For war to serve its political function, there must first be military victory or the credible threat thereof. Second, such victory must compel the defeated population's cooperation with the victor's political agenda. Two developments in the twentieth century, according to Schell, undermined these assumptions.

First, nuclear-armed adversaries can no longer contemplate victory, only mutual annihilation. By nullifying victory, nuclear weapons nullify war, forcing politics back into other, nonviolent channels. This is why the United States cannot consider war with Pakistan, a leading proliferator of nuclear weapons technology, or with North Korea.

Second, "people's war" demonstrated that purely military considerations are *not* always decisive and that military victory does *not* always compel cooperation. The Chinese and Vietnamese communists, for example, compensated for conventional military weakness through a combination of guerilla tactics on the battlefield and political organization of the populace, enduring ongoing military defeats but never submitting to political control by the adversary. American colonists pioneered such methods against the British Empire, and Iraqis now deploy them against the United States.

Even as nuclear weapons and people's war increasingly paralyzed the war system, new forms of political action developed, Schell argues, notably, nonviolent campaigns such as Gandhi used to defeat the British Empire. In the 1980s, nonviolent renewals of civil society in Eastern Europe helped liberalize, then unravel the Soviet Empire, with the nonviolent cooperation of the Russian people themselves. Such events require a new concept of political power based on popular consent, not on control of the state's machinery of violence. Schell develops and then uses this concept to shed new light even on violent revolution, showing that nonviolent political change was the decisive factor in the American, French, and Russian revolutions.

What does this eclipse of the war system and ascendancy of civil society portend for international relations? Schell argues that the indivisibility of national sovereignty—the major stumbling block for collective security—is based implicitly on the conventional concept of power as coercion. But the new paradigm of power as popular consent opens the possibility of dividing sovereignty, as it is, in fact, divided in the U.S. Constitution between the states and the federal government and among the branches of government.

The United States today is at a crossroads, according to Schell, where it must generalize such power sharing to the field of international relations, either helping to create new and more effective multilateral institutions or destroying its own republican traditions and perhaps the world itself in the process of

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trying to institute a universal American empire. Schell's book assembles and brings into focus all of the reasons that only the first course can succeed in the twenty-first century.

The only gap worth mentioning in this remarkably comprehensive book is the failure to mention the pioneering work of Gene Sharp, who came to conclusions about the nature of political power similar to those of the author. To its great detriment, the field of political science mostly ignored Sharp and is now long overdue for a paradigm shift that can parallel the transformations of violence and politics that have actually occurred in the world. I know of no better statement of this new paradigm than *The Unconquerable World.*

BRIAN D'AGOSTINO
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America *by William E. Odom. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2003. 288 pp. $24.95.*

Reform proposals advocating changes to intelligence agency organizational structures or processes are scattered throughout the intelligence literature, but most have never been implemented, and as a result, in the aggregate, they have had minimal effect on actual intelligence community operations. Now, with the post-September 11, 2001 examination of the intelligence community's flaws in full swing, William Odom, a retired Army Lieutenant General and former director of the National Security Agency, revisits a number of proposals originally put forth in a 1997 study and argues that substantial structural and managerial reforms are necessary to improve the functioning of the United States's burgeoning intelligence bureaucracy.

Odom's goal is to "look for malfunctions (due to underlying structural and organizational problems) and prescribe needed repairs" (p. 7). Accordingly, he argues that the cause of many of the imperfections in intelligence community effectiveness are due to overlapping authorities and responsibilities between the fifteen organizations that make up the intelligence community, inadequate means to assess intelligence agency effectiveness, and inefficient mechanisms for prioritizing and allocating spending. Odom's ambitious plan to address these problems and "fix" intelligence consists of simplifying areas of responsibility and lines of control by redrawing the structural responsibilities of the various intelligence community entities and expanding the ability of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)—the nominal coordinator of the entire intelligence community—to carry out already-existing authorities by modifying the relationship that he and his staff have with the rest of the intelligence community.

Specifically, Odom argues that for purposes of efficiency, the authority for intelligence collection should be centralized into single institutions corresponding to the various methods used to collect intelligence, such as human intelligence (espionage), signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. He also argues

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that analytic capabilities should be more widely distributed and closer to the users of the intelligence, including on policymaker staffs. In order to more clearly delineate the responsibilities of the DCI and those of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Odom recommends that the DCI be organizationally and physically separated from the CIA and that both be provided with larger staffs able to evaluate programmatic effectiveness and allocate funds accordingly. In addition, Odom recommends that the DCI's analytic staff be expanded by enlarging the National Intelligence Council and reassigning the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence in order to assist the DCI in managing intelligence community collection and analysis as well as to supplement his ability to provide intelligence to the nation's top policymakers.

Odom's structural reform proposals boldly challenge conventional intelligence community management thinking, but the potential effects that the reforms might have on the intelligence community's effectiveness are impossible to evaluate because he does not address organizational processes. Intelligence agencies have established standard operating procedures, informal processes, task forces, and working groups as malleable mechanisms to bridge the inadequacies of organizational structure. Insofar as it does not address existing processes, Odom's assessment is incomplete. Structure and process work together in a complementary fashion, and structural changes alone without corresponding changes to existing processes would simplify the workings of the intelligence community in some ways, but cause greater complexity in others.

Structural reforms also entail substantial costs to organizational effectiveness as new roles and systems are created to replace the old and should be undertaken only when a clear need is demonstrated and the benefits of the new system would outweigh the costs of the transition. Unfortunately, Odom's exclusive focus on structural issues ensures that his account alone is insufficient to make that determination. Nonetheless, for purposes of acquiring a rare perspective on the complexity of intelligence community management from a former practitioner who has "been there and done that," Odom's book is worth a careful examination by those interested in the contribution that the intelligence community makes to national security policy making.

STEPHEN MARRIN
University of Virginia

The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of the Nixon-Era Strategy *by Jeffrey Kimball. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2004. 384 pp. $34.95.*

As its title suggests, this is not a conventional history. Rather, after a forty-page tour of Nixon's policy on Vietnam, the book is given over to documents, prefaced by brief summaries and bits of connective material. Readers who are unfamiliar with the issues will probably get lost, and experts who have followed

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the issues closely will find little that is new; but those who know the basic story but who have not kept up with the emerging details will learn a great deal, and all readers will benefit by thinking again about these difficult years.

Johnson's Vietnam policy is much more studied than is Nixon's, despite the fact that at least as much American combat occurred during the Nixon years as did during the Johnson years. This approach parallels the general bias in the study of war: how and why countries enter wars is examined more closely than how wars are terminated. This is a shame because the latter focus raises a host of important theoretical issues, almost all of which, especially Vietnam, present us with important historical puzzles. This work by Jeffrey Kimball, who wrote a major book on the subject prior to the release of some of these documents, is a good guide to the declassified record; students of Nixon, diplomatic history, and Vietnam will find the selections fascinating, ranging as they do from White House tapes to records of the Paris negotiations and Soviet-American interactions, and even a few records from North Vietnam, including some interviews that Kimball himself conducted. Significant American documents remain classified, but from the context of what has been released, it is hard to see how national security would be endangered by releasing the full record.

The nature of this book makes it hard to summarize, but the basic American dilemma comes through clearly (and decision makers on all sides understood it): domestic pressures made it necessary for Nixon to reduce American involvement, but this would simultaneously reduce American leverage over North Vietnam and, unless Vietnamization could fully succeed, in the absence of agreement, would leave the South at the North's mercy. Nixon and Kissinger developed two strategies to work around this dilemma. One was "linkage," the attempt to put pressure on the USSR—and after 1971, the People's Republic of China—to put pressure on North Vietnam. Despite the implausibility of this approach (noted at the start by Averell Harriman [p. 66]), Nixon and Kissinger held out hope for it until close to the end.

If linkage was as much Kissinger's idea as Nixon's, the second pillar of policy was much more the latter's. This is the "madman theory": Nixon would reinforce linkage and intimidate North Vietnam by showing that he might escalate irrationally. While the outlines of this approach have been known for quite a while, Kimball provides chapter and verse, including striking quotations from several contexts. In perhaps the most dramatic example, first surfaced by Seymour Hersh and documented in an article that Kimball co-authored with William Burr, Nixon compensated for his decision to back away from dramatic military escalation in his first year of office by ordering a nuclear alert that was secret from the American people but designed to be picked up by the Soviets. This policy, too, failed. The Soviets hardly registered the alert and misinterpreted it when they did notice it. Neither then nor later did America's adversaries appear to have been worried that Nixon would go berserk. Nixon often talked very tough, probably to try out ideas and impress others (and himself), but in the end settled for less confrontational courses of

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actions. Even the infamous December 1972 bombings, which many people felt were disproportionate and unnecessary, in fact ran little risk and did less damage than both defenders and opponents believed. Kimball's documentation is valuable, but students of international politics will be disappointed in his failure to more fully discuss the bargaining theory behind this approach or the subtle variations that he lumps together under one category. Those who appreciate historical ironies will be interested to learn that the theory was best elaborated by Nixon's nemesis, Daniel Ellsberg.

Given that the United States did not have any good options, it is perhaps not surprising that the administration was vacillating, inconsistent, and uncertain. But this picture is quite contrary to that given in the Nixon and Kissinger memoirs and presented in many standard accounts by both friends and critics of the policy. One of the major contributions of this volume is to reveal how Nixon and Kissinger, for all their intellectual firepower, were unable to fully come to grips with their situation and chart a clear course. Instead, as in so much foreign policy, we see a great deal of improvisation.

On several important points, however, the memoirs are revealed to have been correct. Most importantly, the standard criticism that the United States could have gotten out of Vietnam on the same terms three or four years earlier is shown to have been wrong. Even though by 1970 the United States had abandoned the crucial demand that North Vietnam remove its troops from the South, the North continued to insist that the United States overthrow the Thieu regime. This Nixon and Kissinger adamantly refused to do, arguing that it would be totally dishonorable and have enormous repercussions on allies and domestic opinion. Only when the North dropped this demand could a peace agreement be reached. There are two ironies here. First, although Nixon and Kissinger were wrong in much of their analysis and the North was right (it is striking how often in the negotiation the North referred to the correctness of its assessments), they were quite correct that the North's behavior was foolish, in that the ultimate outcome in the South would depend much less on what was specified in the agreement than on the political and military dynamics that would develop after it was signed. Second, the administration made more concessions than the mainstream domestic opposition had called for. If Nixon and Kissinger had been willing to be honest with the American people, they might have been able to gain more domestic support, adopt a stronger policy, and minimize postwar recriminations. But their worst nature got the better of them.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

Checking Executive Power: Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective *edited by Jody C. Baumgartner and Naoko Kada. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2003. 196 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $24.95.*

This book dares to say something new and different about a subject—presidential impeachment—that most political scientists probably figure has been

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overanalyzed. In addition to editing the book, Jody C. Baumgartner and Naoko Kada each contributed chapters, and seven other political scientists contributed chapters as well. In all, the chapters offer a rare, systematic analysis of the utility of presidential impeachment. The Framers intentionally designed a federal impeachment process that deviated from the British model in certain important respects, and many other countries have experimented with impeachment as well. *Checking Executive Power* provides case studies of the seven presidential impeachments that have occurred during the past decade, and in the concluding chapter, Kada examines the implications of the editors' finding that there are ninety-three "democracies . . . with explicit provisions for presidential impeachment and removal by impeachment, [but as] of the end of 2002 only twelve countries have thus far attempted to impeach their president . . ." (p. 137). She suggests that the relative infrequency of impeachment and the ineffectiveness of impeachment as a check on presidential misconduct are the result of procedures that make removal difficult, of legislative support for presidents, and of public opinion that does not support removal. Also useful, in addition to the interesting case studies, are the data collected in the book's thirty-two tables.

In the opening chapter, Baumgartner states that the "basic assumption of the book . . . is that impeachment is a political, rather than a legal proceeding" (p. 2). In the next chapter, William B. Perkins explores in detail the connections between partisan shifts in Congress and presidential impeachment attempts and presents, in an interesting table on partisanship, a breakdown according to party of votes for and against removal in twenty-eight impeachments. None of this information is mentioned, much less explored, in any of the books written about impeachment in the aftermath of President Clinton's acquittal. In Chapter 3, Yuko Kasuya explores in equal depth the fascinating case of Philippine President Joseph Estrada's impeachment by the Philippine House of Representatives and the extraordinary "extra-constitutional" decision by the Philippine Supreme Court to swear in a successor after the Senate's startling failure "to open an envelope that allegedly contained damning evidence about Estrada's illegal financial transactions" (p. 45). In the fourth chapter, Victor J. Hinojosa and Anibal Perez-Linan examine how Colombia's President Ernesto Samper stayed in office despite intense international pressure, resulting from suspicions his campaign had been funded by drug dealing, to remove him. In Chapter 5, Philip M. Allen tells of a successful presidential impeachment—a rarity in itself—when Madagascar "became the first African state ever to dismiss a sitting president through constitutional impeachment" (p. 81). Baumgartner explores in the following chapter how and why Boris Yeltsin came close to being impeached by the Russian Duma. In Chapter 7, Kada examines two impeachment attempts—against presidents Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil and Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela—that succeeded because "public opinion in each country supported—if not demanded and welcomed—each president's departure" (p. 113). In the book's final chapter, Kada stresses that

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ousting a president by constitutional means is highly unlikely without strong public support. Together, these essays are by no means a ringing endorsement of impeachment. Instead, they offer immensely useful insights into the limitations of impeachment as a check on presidential misconduct.

Nevertheless, the driving assumption of the book—that impeachment is a political rather than a legal proceeding—is problematic. First, it conflicts with Kada's observation that impeachment is relatively infrequent, in part because "the crafters of most constitutions have designed impeachment and/or removal of the president to be fairly difficult" (p. 139). So, constitutional structure matters. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution set up several obstacles to easy removal of a president, including dividing the impeachment authority between the House and the Senate, restricting the grounds for removal, and allowing for removal only if supported by at least two-thirds of the Senate. The structure clearly has an impact on the utility of the process and on both the discourse and attitudes within it.

The distinction between law and politics that underlies much of the book's analysis is untenable. Impeachment proceedings are unique constitutional events that combine law and politics. They are not supposed to proceed like other legislative business. In his short treatise on impeachment, Charles Black characterized impeachment as a "hybrid" of civil and criminal proceedings in which an extremely sophisticated group of people—U.S. senators—sit in final judgment. In presidential impeachment proceedings, members of Congress are called upon to decide whether a constitutional standard was violated. They do not get to make up the standard. The question is how they go about implementing that standard.

Some legal scholars argue that the Constitution authorizes two kinds of lawmaking—ordinary and higher. Ordinary lawmaking is what we see every day in Washington in the course of making legislation. Higher lawmaking entails rare, largely dispassionate deliberation on big questions of constitutional meaning. Impeachment is supposedly an act of higher lawmaking. The book does not clarify the extent to which higher lawmaking occurs or is possible in impeachment proceedings. This shortcoming hardly diminishes the value of the book, which undoubtedly helps sharpen our understanding of the utility of the different constitutional mechanisms around the world for handling presidential impeachment.

MICHAEL J. GERHARDT
William & Mary School of Law

Politics & Religion *by Steve Bruce. Oxford, England, Polity Press, 2003. 304 pp. Cloth, $61.95; paper, $26.95.*

That religion influences politics and vice versa is no longer a source of academic controversy. Yet, most political scientists and sociologists explore this relation-

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ship by focusing on a narrow range of countries (often one) and a narrow range of eras (also often one). In this volume, Steve Bruce draws on a dazzling array of cases across the globe and across time to explore the nature of the relationship between religion and politics. The cases themselves are often fascinating, and their diversity is almost overwhelming.

But Bruce does not merely pile up anecdotes. Instead, he systematically explores a series of questions about the relationship between religion and politics. He begins by focusing on the relationship between religion and empires, then proceeds to nations and political parties. He then focuses on a pair of issues—how religious leaders provide a prophetic voice to criticize the state and how states seek to control religion. Although his is not a quantitative analysis, it is rigorously comparative. By drawing from so many nations in so many eras, Bruce attempts to control for a variety of cultural and economic factors that might also account for the patterns he observes. In his discussion of the relationship between Catholicism and democracy, for example, Bruce traces the history of the Church in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and compares this history to that of Protestant churches in the same countries.

This is an inductive study. Bruce does not begin with a theory, but instead draws his generalizations from his cases. It is in his conclusion that we get the bigger payoff. Here he suggests that several key variables affect the relationship: whether the religion is monotheistic, whether it is tribal or universalistic and evangelistic, the way that the religion views other religions, whether a religion is communal or individualistic, and whether the religion represents the powerful or the poor. As he draws the implications of these variables, he is careful to note exceptions, and to refute popular but oversimplified generalizations.

Bruce does not pull his punches in this book. He writes that the greatest contribution of religion to liberal democracy is in its decline, which permits greater individual freedom. He spends considerable time on the contrast between Christianity and Islam, and in this, his writing lacks the usual scholarly qualifications and hesitation. He argues for a strong connection between Islam and theocratic regimes that deny basic religious and political freedoms. He refers to the Prophet's treatment of women as "invidious." Yet, he is equally blunt about Catholicism, Hinduism, evangelical Protestantism, and all other religions.

Overall, this is an excellent book. Its range is extraordinary, its arguments clearly laid out, and its writing clear and lucid. As I read through the book, I marked interesting cases—the collaboration of Anglican, Catholic, and Presbyterian churches in criticizing Moi's regime in Kenya, the birth of the Baha'I in Iran in the 1860s and the reason for their focused persecution, divisions in the Ukrainian Orthodox community in the 1990s, and the progressive gender politics of the Turkish regime in the 1920s. There are dozens of these cases throughout the book. This book will be of great interest to political scientists and sociologists who study the intersection between religion and politics.

CLYDE WILCOX
Georgetown University

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Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair *by Adeed Dawisha. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2003. 352 pp. $29.95.*

Adeed Dawisha takes readers on a marvelous journey, charting the escalation of pan-Arab nationalism from its ideological founder, Sati' al-Husri, to Gamal Abdel Nasser's reign in the Middle East. In great detail, he carefully outlines the historical developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that structured the emergence of pan-Arab nationalism, an ideology that "bestowed many gifts on its children: independence from the outsider; purposeful strides onto the road to social and economic modernity; a sense of dignity after the long years of colonization; a set of words and phrases that allowed the Arabs to narrate their own history; an abiding belief in their own ability to sweep aside all doubters and naysayers who blocked the road to progress" (p. 312). By the end of the twentieth century, however, Dawisha argues, "The inability of the Arabs to achieve Arab unity signaled the demise of Arab nationalism, and with that sank the hopes and expectations of the nationalist generation" (p. 313).

Through meticulous and detailed research, relying on both primary and secondary source material, Dawisha puts together one of the most comprehensive studies on pan-Arab nationalism to date. Convincingly, he argues that pan-Arabism, as a movement, reached its height during the Nasserist era yet suffered several blows from inter-Arab rivalry. This inter-Arab rivalry, Dawisha posits, is shaped by the conflict that emerged between two forms of Arab Nationalism: *wataniya* (state nationalism) and *qawmiya* (pan-Arab nationalism). Because Arab leaders were more concerned about state interests and sovereignty, they placed their personal regimes above and beyond the goals of pan-Arab nationalism.

These two forms of nationalism are important to an understanding of the levels of nationalist sentiment in the region as a whole. The dichotomization of this concept, however, may be less useful when examining the decline of pan-Arab nationalism. Dawisha attempts to attribute the dwindling support for pan-Arab nationalism to increasing levels of support for state nationalism. In his formulation, any government that wished to strengthen citizen allegiance to the state was seen as operating against the basic principles of pan-Arab nationalism. That is, strong states in essence would clash with pan-Arab ideals. Yet, would *qawmiya* only succeed if states were *already* weak? In fact, many of Egypt's state-led activities that served *wataniya* purposes—the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the building of the Aswan Dam—were also huge events that bolstered pan-Arab support among the citizens of the region. In other words, could state nationalism not be seen as an ideology complementary to *qawmiya*?

Further, if Dawsiha's argument holds that it is growing state nationalism that reduces support for pan-Arab nationalism, then *wataniya* should have replaced *qawmiya*. Yet, this is hardly the case, as the Arab world has not seen

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a surge in state nationalism in the last two to three decades. Perhaps one of the reasons Dawisha argues that pan-Arabism lost its support to state nationalism is because he more or less confines his study to state elites and the choices they made about pan-Arabism. Dawisha posits that citizens as well became less supportive of pan-Arabism because state elites altered their discourse from one structured around pan-Arab nationalism to one centered on state nationalism. Yet, other alternative explanations for the decline of pan-Arab nationalism are not fully explored. For example, widespread disenchantment emerged in the Arab world owing to a new generation of citizens growing up under authoritarian rule and living under dire economic conditions. In these alternative formulations, the potential conflict between state nationalism and pan-Arab nationalism becomes less useful as an analytical framework when explaining the decline of pan-Arab nationalism.

Leaving these concerns aside, this book is a must read for any student of Middle East politics. It is an authoritative source of well-documented information about the emergence and decline of pan-Arab nationalism.

AMANEY JAMAL
Princeton University

Islamic Political Identity in Turkey *by M. Hakan Yavuz. New York, Oxford University Press, 2003. 336 pp. $49.95.*

Lately, there has been loose talk about the virtues of "Turkish Islam" and its potential to serve as a model for other countries in the Muslim world. Unfortunately, the Western public remains ignorant of Islam in Turkey. This book might help the uninitiated reader to understand what the different Islamic groups in Turkey represent. Nevertheless, it also indicates that the idea that "Turkish Islam" is a potential source of liberation for the rest of the Muslim world is not always based on sound theoretical and empirical grounds.

M. Hakan Yavuz supplies the reader with a useful survey of the development of the *Nakşibendi*s, the most significant religious order in Turkey, followed by an analysis of its different offshoots. These include communities that still define themselves as *Nakşibendi*, as well as neo-*Nakşibendi* groups and Islamic political parties. To date, no source in English exhibits such a broad coverage of various Islamic groups in Turkey. However, this advantage comes with a price.

Even though Yavuz states that his analyses are based on fieldwork and interviews, nowhere in the book does he discuss his methodology. Indeed, the description of a broad range of groups results in the lack of any in-depth analysis of a single group. Instead, the author offers a cursory history of all the different groups, sometimes with hasty conclusions derived from these histories. For example, Yavuz contends that the "majority of voters [of the ruling conservative party in Turkey] hoped to create a morally justifiable

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modern and participatory life in which civil society is in charge of its own fate" (p. 256), without providing any material to support this claim, which is quite integral to his main arguments. Had there been a section on methodology, we would at least have a sense of where such information came from.

Another problem with the book is that the narrative does not always match the theoretical framework. The two main arguments of the book are that Islamic groups in Turkey are the expressions of civil society vis-a-vis the authoritarian state and that these groups are increasingly becoming centered on civil society rather than seizing the state. Yet, Yavuz reveals in Chapters 6–8 that the *Nakşibendi* and *Nurcu* movements, which he presents in Table 1.2 (p. 32) as the exemplars of "society-centric" Islamic groups, have been empowered in conjunction with the official attempts at creating a Turkish-Islamic state and society: their institutions have been funded by central authorities, some of them have collaborated with the national intelligence organization, and their ideologies have become quite nationalistic as a result of their interaction with the Kemalist (secularist-nationalist) state. This mutual constitution between certain sectors of society and the state puts into doubt the author's framework, which conceptually opposes society and state. Moreover, Yavuz himself shows how the most powerful Islamic groups and parties have become exclusive of minority populations (Chapters 8 and 10), while his theory posits that Islamic groups are Turkey's best bet to form an inclusive society (p. 271).

Despite these reservations, I recommend this book to those who want to know more about Islamic currents in Turkey. Judgments about the liberal nature of "Turkish Islam" should be suspended, however, until a scholarly account can really demonstrate this. Such an account would also have to justify the exceptionalism implicit in labeling the political expression of Islam in Turkey as "Turkish," since Islamic ideologies in Turkey have been shaped by translations of the writings of non-Turkish Muslims. Yavuz surprisingly fails to note this foreign influence in his discussion of the development of Islamic ideology in Turkey.

CIHAN Z. TUGAL
Northwestern University

Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians *by Baruch Kimmerling. London, England, Verso, 2003. 234 pp. $22.00.*

Baruch Kimmerling, an Israeli sociologist at the Hebrew University and the University of Toronto, has published an authoritative account of Ariel Sharon's attempts to dissolve the Palestinian national existence. This book offers a powerful indictment of this Israeli Prime Minister.

Professor Kimmerling argues that the election of Sharon as Prime Minister of Israel in 2001 marked a turning point in the character of the Israeli government and its political culture. Under Sharon, Israel became an agent of destruc-

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tion for others and for itself. It did so because of its fixation on politicide, the process aimed at dissolving the Palestinian social, political, and economic existence. That process, according to Kimmerling, will ultimately lead to undermining the moral foundation and the very existence of the Jewish state.

Kimmerling traces Sharon's rise to power from his early military days. We learn that Sharon always viewed military service as a means to political office. His military career was colored by his personality and his ambition, as it was by his childhood. His resentment of Arabs is long-term and has roots in his parents' attitudes. His willingness to go to extremes in order to kill Arabs was a hallmark of his military career. The 1953 example of Qibiya is used by Kimmerling to illustrate Sharon's brutality toward the Palestinian Arabs. In that incident, Sharon and the troops under his command blew up forty-five houses while their inhabitants were inside. Sixty-seven men, women, and children died unnecessarily. Sharon's unrestrained drive to kill Arabs was further shown in other incidents and incursions, many of which were later investigated and deemed inappropriate by the establishment.

The most disturbing incident of politicide was that of the horror at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon. Anywhere from 700 to 2,000 Palestinian men, women, and children where slaughtered over a period of two days. The Israeli committee of inquiry, The Kahan Commission, found that Sharon bore a major part of the responsibility for the massacre. At that time, it seemed that Sharon's political career would be over. As we all know, that was not the case. In 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister in a landslide victory.

The second part of Kimmerling's book traces the background of Sharon's comeback. It discusses the first Intifada and the consequent Oslo Accords. The eventual failure of the Palestinian National Authority and the peace process as a whole paved the way for Sharon to take the helm of Israeli politics. Sharon's victory was perceived as a mandate to nullify the Israeli-Palestinian agreements, to destroy the Palestinian National Authority, and to regain control over the "Land of Israel" in its entirety. In other words, this was seen as a victory for the settlers who want to keep all of the West Bank and Gaza.

Kimmerling argues that the ascendancy of Sharon to the premiership was the result of a power vacuum left behind by the established Ashkenazi political elite. Sharon's new-found power materialized in Operation Defensive Shield, in which Israeli forces rolled into the West Bank and Gaza to imprison and destroy. Palestinian National Authority infrastructures were devastated, and thousands of Palestinians were imprisoned. Even water treatment facilities and power plants were not spared. Churches, mosques, and schools were also hit. The devastation of the Palestinian infrastructure was almost total. When Palestinians resisted, there was an overwhelming Israeli response.

An interesting assessment is made of the second or al-Aqsa Intifada. Kimmerling points out that the symbol of the first Intifada was the Palestinian child throwing stones, while the suicide bomber was the symbol of the second one. Israelis see the suicide bombings as a proof of the cruel and primitive

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Palestinian nature. The Palestinians, on the other hand, see them as a reaction to humiliation, hopelessness, and the perpetual violence by Israel against the Palestinians. Such reactions, Kimmerling argues, reflect the inability of each group to understand its opponent. Clearly, Sharon himself makes no attempt to understand the Palestinians. His vision is focused on destroying them. Even when Sharon talks of a Palestinian state, his aim is to lower Palestinian expectations, crush their resistance, isolate them, and make them submit to some Israeli-imposed arrangement that would eventually lead to their "voluntary" mass migration.

This brings us back to Sharon's early belief that Jordan is the Palestinian state. He has never deviated from that objective, although his pronouncements may seem to indicate otherwise. Sharon is a pragmatic person, who understands that the international community will not tolerate large-scale ethnic cleansing of the West Bank. Therefore, he continues to plan for a rather limited and dependent Palestinian state in isolated areas of the West Bank, which the Palestinians would accept in return for peace and which would eventually collapse. Its inhabitants, Sharon believes, would leave for Jordan of their own free will.

The current crisis is discussed as being at its deepest right now. Both sides lack adequate leadership. The prospective leadership that does exist is frightening. But a breakthrough is not out of the question. Both peoples are beginning to understand that they are in a no-win situation. Their futures are intertwined. In Kimmerling's view, without a peaceful resolution to the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Israel "will become a mere footnote in world history" (p. 217).

Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians is a powerful book. It is easy reading, forces hard questions, and should be read by anyone who cares about justice and humanity.

JAMAL R. NASSAR
Illinois State University

The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars *by Douglas H. Johnson. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2003. 256 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $24.95.*

The African continent serves as a living laboratory for exploring at least five types of guerrilla insurgencies: first, national liberation insurgencies directed against colonial empires and white minority regimes unwilling to cede power peacefully, such as the successful struggle of the African National Congress for black majority rule in South Africa; second, national reform insurgencies that seek the overthrow of incumbent regimes, as witnessed by the overthrow in 1997 of Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; third, regionally based reform insurgencies intent on achieving greater rights for their

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specific regions, inclusive of the Casamance guerrilla insurgency in southern Senegal; fourth, separatist insurgencies intent on achieving the secession and ultimate recognition of their territories as independent countries within the international system, as witnessed by Eritrea's independence in 1993 after nearly thirty years of guerrilla warfare; and fifth, warlord insurgencies that often lack a coherent vision of the future beyond the more immediate goal of overthrowing an existing regime and are typically unable to reestablish centralized states after achieving victory, as demonstrated by the continued de facto division of Somalia into warlord-based fiefdoms more than ten years after the overthrow of the Somali regime of Mohamed Siad Barre.

The civil wars of Sudan, the topic of Johnson's timely and insightful book, have pitted authoritarian central governments of various ideological and religious stripes against a series of guerrilla insurgencies, the primary protagonists of which have alternated between the desire for reform of the governing structures of the country as a whole and a desire for the right of self-determination and ultimate independence. Drawing on his experience as a historian and relief worker in the region, Johnson offers a masterful analysis of the various root causes of Sudan's civil wars, thereby discounting those who offer up simplistic arguments based on the "clash of civilizations" (that is, northern "Arabs" versus southern "Africans") or the imposition of an artificial set of boundaries inherited from the colonial era. Among the various root causes explored in the book are: patterns of governance that existed during the precolonial independence era; the introduction during the late nineteenth century and reemergence during the late twentieth century of a particular brand of militant Islam; the institutionalization of unequal patterns of socioeconomic development under colonial rule; the emergence of a narrow, elite-dominated nationalist movement and the failure of postindependence elites to achieve consensus concerning national unity, regional development, and power sharing between the central and regional governments; severe economic crisis during the 1970s and 1980s; the internationalization of conflict within the larger geopolitical setting of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union; and rising foreign interest in exploiting natural resources, most notably water and oil.

Those interested in how the root causes of Sudan's civil wars can be mustered to promote an enduring peace will find the final chapter, "Ideas of Peace & War in the Sudan" (pp. 167–180), wanting in this regard. Johnson describes peacemaking efforts at the internal, regional, and international levels, but does not do so in a systematic fashion or in a way that systematically returns the reader to the various root causes of the conflict set out in earlier chapters. It is also unclear whether there exists a hierarchy of root causes (that is, is one root cause more important than another), which, in turn, would suggest a potential pathway for resolving Sudan's civil wars. These critiques are minor, however, in comparison to Johnson's artful presentation of why Sudan finds itself in its current predicament, permitting others to take the analysis one

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step further in the search for a durable peace. The book also includes two highly useful appendices: a very insightful bibliographical essay (pp. 181–194) and a detailed chronology of events from 1972 to 2002 (pp. 195–221).

PETER J. SCHRAEDER
Loyola University, Chicago

Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America *by Manuel Antonio Garretón. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 224 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $24.95.*

Manuel Antonio Garretón's intent in this work is ambitious. The book takes on the analytical challenges of situating contemporary Latin American states (what he terms the "Latin American problematique" [p. 9]) in the contexts of globalization and fundamentally transformed sociopolitical relations ("or socio-political matrices" [p. 11]). He wrestles conceptually with the issues of citizenship, representation, and democracy in the wake of the rise and fall of developmentalist, inward-minded models that had once oriented themselves toward a national-popular state. Albeit perhaps more cautiously than postmodern theorists of the region, Garretón explores the ways in which classic conceptions of social collectivities and their political mediations fail to capture contemporary realities, in which there are fragmented, individuated, as well as alternative forms of social, cultural, and political organization. As Chile's leading sociologist, Garretón's theorizing is also infused with a sense of the brutal defeat of past progressive projects, and is therefore sobered by the enormity as well as the complexity of the task of reconstructing a democratic politics.

Although Garretón's work addresses democratization processes in Latin America as a whole, his primary contribution here, as elsewhere, is his authoritative, synthetic analysis of Chile's "incomplete democracy." The book includes a succinct analysis of the elements that led to Chile's democratic crisis and breakdown in 1973; the innovations and enduring dimensions of the military project from 1973–1990; the nature, complexity, and evolution of the Chilean political opposition during the dictatorship; and, perhaps most importantly, both the achievements and failures of Chile's democratic consolidation from 1990 to the present.

Garretón's analysis of the most recent period of Chilean politics warrants particular attention. The author deliberately avoids both the overly laudatory praise of Chile as a model of transition and the overly condemning charges of Chilean postauthoritarianism as a continuation of the General Augusto Pinochet project. Rather, Garretón focuses on the post-1990 political elites' missed opportunities to reform institutional guarantees that effectively grant veto power over attempts to confront authoritarian enclaves embedded in the military-sponsored 1980 Chilean constitution and in other spheres of social and political life.

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In comparison to most established democracies, the Chilean military enjoys unusual autonomy from civilian authority over key dimensions of the military as an institution. The president does not appoint the commanders in chief of the military branches. The military-designed electoral system for determining legislative seats deliberately over-represents the political minority, namely the Chilean right. In addition, the Pinochet regime placed nine military-appointed senators-for-life in the congress, and Pinochet wrote himself into postauthoritarian politics as a senator-for-life upon his retirement as commander in chief of the army. Garretón condemns Pinochet's March 1998 entry into the senate as a "symbol of supreme violence" (p. 161) to Chilean democracy, a stab into the heart of legitimizing a democratizing politics. Although the tables turned on Pinochet, and he no longer enjoys his senate seat, it is far from clear that this would have been the case had the general not first been arrested by Scotland Yard.

Garretón does not accept the common wisdom among analysts of Chile who argue that given the political correlation of forces, placing authoritarian incumbents in bad stead only threatened a democracy that required the consent of such incumbents for even modest reforms. Instead, Garretón asserts that missed opportunities at key moments during the successive administrations of Patricio Aylwin (1990–1994) and Eduardo Frei, Jr. (1994–2000) have produced a weak, "low-quality" democracy (p. 146). Moreover, Garretón signals both specific instances and more general dimensions in which the behavior of the Chilean political elite continues to mire Chilean democracy in "incompleteness." He specifically cites the government's stance on the Pinochet arrest. In more general terms, Garretón's analysis is a challenge to the political class to escape its own insularity, to contribute to the construction of a more responsive and representative state through policies and politics that involve the Chilean citizenry in negotiating their own social, cultural, and economic futures.

KATHERINE HITE
Vassar College

Europe Unites: The EU's Eastern Enlargement *by Peter A. Poole. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2003. 232 pp. Cloth, $64.95; paper, $24.95.*

The enlargement of the European Union (EU) in May 2004 is about much more than the simple addition (accession, in EU parlance) of ten new member states to the previous fifteen. For Europe, the accession of eight former communist countries and the Mediterranean island states of Malta and Cyprus represents the overcoming of old Cold War divisions (but hopefully not the creation of new ones) and the achievement of a level of political unity not seen since the early days of the Holy Roman Empire. For the EU itself, enlargement will have a transformative impact, one that expands the geographical scope of the Union and incorporates many new governmental actors and interests.

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Although the immediate impact of enlargement could be to weaken the EU by undermining its internal cohesion and functional effectiveness, in the long run it could lead to a more integrated Europe that is an increasingly important strategic and global power.

It is this more optimistic message about the long-term future of the EU and the relationship between enlargement and integration that is the background theme of this book. However, in the book's fourteen brief but insightful chapters, the author, a former Foreign Service Officer, also correctly stresses the many problems posed by this uniquely challenging enlargement. Although the EU has enlarged several times before, none of the previous enlargements have generated quite the adaptive pressures for the EU that this one will, owing to the sheer number of (mostly small) countries joining, their low levels of economic development, and, for most of them, the continuing effects of their communist legacies. The enlarged EU will also border upon or be closer to some of the historically most troubled and unstable parts of Europe and the world.

After comparing the present "Eastern" enlargement with previous enlargements and describing, in chronological fashion, the process of enlargement from the fateful year of 1989 up through the conclusion of accession negotiations in December 2002, the author briefly discusses the promise and problems of EU membership from the perspective of each of the ten Central and Eastern European applicants (the eight who joined in May, plus Romania and Bulgaria, who are scheduled to join in 2007). The remaining seven chapters examine the main challenges posed by enlargement for the EU in the areas of agricultural and regional development policy (the main expenditures in the EU budget), the reform of decision-making institutions, immigration and the control of external borders, and the formation of a more coherent and effective common foreign and security (including defense) policy. While soberly presenting the challenges confronting the EU in each of these areas, the author remains generally upbeat about the capacity of the Union to find a resolution through deeper integration. The final chapter, written in the midst of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition, includes some early rumination about the impact of the Iraq crisis on both the prospects for further enlargement (especially to Turkey and the western Balkans) and transatlantic relations.

On the whole, this book is very informative and easy to read. It is extremely comprehensive in its coverage of the various issues linked to enlargement—although this breadth comes at the expense of depth—and factually accurate. It is written in a very concise fashion and in a way that is jargon-free and highly accessible to nonexpert readers. It also contains many helpful and illustrative tables, maps, and figures. If one is looking for a good, fairly up-to-date (through early 2003) primer on EU enlargement and its consequences, this is an excellent choice. It is appropriate both for informed general readers and as a text for advanced undergraduate courses on the EU and European politics.

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If one is searching for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of EU enlargement and integration, however, this book is not enough. While highly informative, it does not add much to what a regular reader of the *Financial Times* or other authoritative news sources on the EU would already know, although it does bring this information together nicely in a comprehensive and concise manner. It is also devoid of theoretical analysis or discussion, thus providing only a limited explanation or understanding of enlargement and EU politics. For such explanation and understanding, one must turn to the growing body of theoretical work on EU enlargement. But this is book a good place to start for an overview and the basic facts.

MICHAEL BAUN
Valdosta State University

Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe *by Piero Ignazi. New York, Oxford University Press, 2003. 270 pp. $65.00.*

Piero Ignazi, a specialist on the Italian far right, provides competent descriptions of extreme-right parties in Western Europe. Following two introductory chapters, the book consists of seven country case studies, two chapters that survey extreme-right parties in Scandinavia and the Mediterranean countries, and a conclusion.

Ignazi claims that many contemporary extreme-right parties are a new breed, fundamentally different from older extreme-right parties linked to fascism. Indeed, he asserts that this contrast helps explain their success. The resurgence of extreme-right parties is a product of—or, rather, is a backlash against—the rise of postmaterialist values. "In short, the same process which fostered the leftward post-material value set mobilized the rightward 'non-material' value set. . . . Where the crisis of conventional moral standards, to take one issue, was greeted as liberation by the leftward offspring of post-industrialism, the same issue was viewed as a highly regrettable, negative occurrence by its right-wing counterpart" (p. 202).

By providing a useful compendium of the current state of extreme-right parties in Western Europe, the book competently accomplishes one of its two aims. It fails, however, to accomplish the more ambitious aim of explaining the character and renascence of extreme-right parties. To do so would require supplementing country case studies with systematic comparison.

A key feature that one would expect to be a prime focus of analysis is the considerable variation in the strength of extreme-right parties. In the 1990s, the popular vote for extreme-right parties ranged from under 2 percent of the popular vote in Germany and the Netherlands to over 17 percent in Austria. Similarly, some parties' electoral support tripled from 1980–1989 to 1990–1999, whereas other parties' support barely increased. Yet, Ignazi does not exploit this opportunity to test his argument.

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Absent rigorous comparison, the argument is not persuasive that the recent success of extreme-right parties derives from their opposition to postmaterialism. On the one hand, it is not clear what distinguishes the postmaterialist-driven extreme right from traditional fascism or neofascism. Ignazi claims that the new breed of parties "share a precise set of properties quite different and innovating [sic] regarding the previous (neo-fascist) tradition" (p. 2). The new parties are "anti-system as they undermine the (democratic) system's legitimacy. . . . They are fiercely opposed to the idea of parliamentary representation and partisan conflicts. . . . [T]hey are against the idea of pluralism because it endangers (the ideal of) societal harmony; they are against the universal idea of equality as rights should be allotted on the basis of ascriptive elements . . .; and finally they are somewhat authoritarian . . ." (p. 2). Why does this description not apply equally to fascist and neofascist parties?

On the other hand, the postmaterialist-based explanation sheds no light on the widely differing levels of support for extreme-right parties. In what respects are Austria, France, and Italy closer to the postmaterial ideological pole than the Netherlands, Germany, or Sweden, where extreme-right parties are weak?

Two other concerns: In studying extreme-right parties within their national party and political systems, Ignazi is in a good position to analyze the impact of these parties as, for example, spoilers, potential coalition partners, and shapers of the ideological climate. However, he chose not to analyze these key issues.

And finally, the book suffers from careless translation and editing. Two examples: "Much ink has been used on the assessment of the heuristic futility . . ." (p. 4); and "The 'good society' forecasted (sic) by neo-conservatism is no longer encroached (sic) in the British tradition" (p. 24).

Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe is a useful survey of extreme-right parties. But the book fails to ask, much less answer, why some parties have been able to increase their support, what the extent and nature of their impact has been, and what explains variations in these and other respects.

MARK KESSELMAN
Columbia University

The Front-Loading Problem in Presidential Nominations *by William G. Mayer and Andrew E. Busch. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 226 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper $22.95.*

Some will argue that the 2004 presidential primary process ended on Super Tuesday, 2 March 2004, when Senator John Edwards—the only viable candidate that still remained in the race after Vermont Governor Howard Dean, Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman, and Missouri Congressman Richard Gephardt (amongst others) had tossed in the towel—cleared the way for

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Massachusetts Senator John Kerry to emerge as the eventual Democratic nominee. Others may claim that the primary season *effectively* ended on 27 January 2004, when New Hampshire primary voters affirmed Iowa caucus voters' earlier preference for Kerry. Either way, whether it ended one week or six weeks after Iowa, the 2004 presidential primary cycle was one of the shortest in recent history. By Super Tuesday, over 2,000 delegates (out of 2,162 needed for the nomination) had been selected, making 2004 one of the most compressed—front-loaded—presidential primary periods ever.

William Mayer and Andrew Busch present an excellent study of the front-loading phenomenon in *The Front-Loading Problem in Presidential Nominations*. The authors define front-loading as "an important recent trend in the presidential nomination process, in which more and more states schedule their primaries and caucuses near the beginning of the delegate selection season" (p. 4). Their analysis, which is both descriptive and analytical, is thoughtful and convincing. It is data-driven, methodologically sound, and historically rich. The authors explore the effects and consequences of front-loading from a variety of perspectives, leaving the reader confident that the analysis is thorough and complete. Mayer and Busch ultimately conclude that front-loading is problematic for American politics, arguing that front-loading is a "classic example of what is often called the tragedy of the commons. A set of autonomous actors (in this case, states) pursue a course of action that is designed to make them individually better off—but the aggregate effect of these individual decisions makes everybody worse off (or, at least, everybody except Iowa and New Hampshire)" (p. 51).

The authors advance their argument in a logical and skillful way. After they document the rise of front-loading in nomination campaigns in the first chapter, they proceed to explain it in the following chapter. They posit that the "single most proximate cause of front-loading is 'New Hampshire envy'" (p. 23). That is to say, other states, which perceive New Hampshire to derive "a substantial array of political and economic benefits" by strongly influencing the outcome of the primary process by holding the first primary, want to play in the game (p. 23). The authors demonstrate that this reasoning makes sense. They present evidence to show that early primary and caucus states receive disproportionately more press coverage, campaign spending, attention from candidates, even special policy concessions. They also show that these early contests substantially influence later results, thereby rendering votes in later primaries less consequential.

The consequences of front-loading clearly trouble the authors. In Chapter 3, they develop arguments to support their claim that the artificially accelerated voter decision process "makes the whole system less deliberative, less rational, less flexible and more chaotic" (p. 56). Front-loading deteriorates the quality of campaigns, making them increasingly superficial and nonsubstantive, advantages well-funded and well-known candidates, and restricts candidate choice by

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locking in a front-runner too soon. Front-loading also depresses participation, especially in later contests.

Critics have proposed several reforms to confront the front-loading "problem." The authors carefully summarize and evaluate four "comprehensive" proposals—a national primary, a system of regional primaries, the "small-states-first" or "Delaware" plan, and a national preprimary convention—and a series of "incremental" reforms, including incentives for states to hold later primaries, changes in campaign finance laws, and switching the winner-take-all delegate selection method to a proportional system.

In the ensuing chapter, Mayer and Busch discuss the formidable political obstacles reformers must overcome to improve the current system. To begin with, the key players involved in the process—political parties, states, and candidates —must agree to the adoption of reforms. Proposals that call for federal legislation are susceptible to charges that it is beyond Congress's constitutional authority to legislate on the matter. State-by-state efforts require full cooperation, and even the national parties may not be able to impose national rules and standards on state parties. The authors ultimately suggest that political parties must lead in the path to reform.

Throughout the analysis, the authors are careful to counterbalance their viewpoints with alternatives. (They even briefly discuss why front-loading may actually be beneficial to parties by minimizing the harmful impact of "divisive primaries," for example.) Their analysis is fair and balanced. In their concluding remarks, they offer support for a series of practical reform measures to mitigate some of the deleterious consequences of front-loading. Thus, the authors advance beyond the description of the problem to prescriptions about how to fix it.

There is no more comprehensive and systematic analysis of the complex and increasingly important front-loading phenomenon currently available. Mayer and Busch balance solid research, public policy solutions, and practical application in a refreshing and successful way.

COSTAS PANAGOPOULOS
New York University

The Independence Party and the Future of Third-Party Politics: Adventures & Opinions of an IP Senate Candidate *by William McGaughey. Minneapolis, MN, Thistlerose Publications, 2003. 472 pp. Paper, $18.95.*

In 2002, William McGaughey sought the Senate nomination of the Independence party of Minnesota. He received 31 percent of the vote, 8,482 votes, finishing second in the three-way primary. The winner, James Moore, received about 2 percent of the vote in the November election. McGaughey has now published his account of the campaign, supplemented with accounts of pieces of his personal history, philosophical musings (and sometimes rants), and appendices containing most of his campaign literature, letters to editors, travel diary, and manifestos.

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Losing a minor party primary is not much of a qualification, but McGaughey's book is worth reading. First, it offers a valuable inside look at the party that recruited and elected Jesse Ventura, and that may yet return to prominence; second, it reveals a complex, fascinating individual who typifies a widespread political phenomenon: the hopelessly doomed perennial candidate.

The Independence party of Minnesota was formed by Perot campaign activists in 1992. It joined the Reform party when Ross Perot started it, but left and resumed its old name in protest over Perot's heavy-handed maneuvering to control the party's presidential nomination in 2000. When Ventura declined to seek a second term as Governor in 2002, the party nominated ex-congressman Timothy Penny, who received 16 percent of the vote, finishing third. It is a single-state party, but one with links to the Independence party in New York and an informal national network of ex-Reformers who still hope for a new national party.

McGaughey is weak on the processes of the Independence party, but he gives a good picture of the obstacles it faces and has an excellent sense of the beliefs and feelings that motivate its activists. He sees both major parties as dominated by special interests, devoted to partisan bickering, and uninterested in solving the problems of ordinary Americans. Millions of Americans seem to share that view, so third-party politics is likely to remain an intermittent force.

Of course, discontent with the major parties does not lead to support for any particular program or to the organization of an effective political party to support such a program. Those who voted for Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996 shared the discontent of those who voted for Ralph Nader in 2000, but they disagreed on many issues.

McGaughey's own solutions were eccentric, and his campaign methods were primitive. He had a single $168 sign printed. One side read "I believe that the Federal Government should reduce the standard workweek to 32 hours by 2010"; the other side read "I believe in the full citizenship, dignity and equality of white males (and of everyone else, too)" (p. 37). He conducted much of his campaign by holding this sign in parades or on street corners. The rest of his campaign consisted of faxing statements to the press and driving around Minnesota to visit the small-town editors. He raised no funds (spending about $2,000), hired no staff, recruited no volunteers, and did little advance work, frequently driving an hour to reach a newspaper office only to find that it was closed for lunch or to learn that it got its political coverage from a reporter in the Twin Cities. His only political assets were his energy and the appeal of his ideas—enough to get him 8,000 votes.

McGaughey has a fascinating personality. He has published other books, on topics ranging from free trade to *Rhythm and Self-Consciousness*; he collaborated with the poet Robert Bly and the politician Eugene McCarthy; and he fervently espouses both a shorter workweek and the rights of landlords. He is eccentric and unique, but hundreds of equally eccentric and unique individu-

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als run for office every year. Occasionally, they win. This book will help you understand why they do it.

JOHN C. BERG
Rothermere American Institute
University of Oxford

The Campaign Continues: How Political Consultants and Campaign Tactics Affect Public Policy *by Douglas A. Lathrop. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2003. 216 pp. $65.00.*

There can be little doubt that the craft of campaigns has changed dramatically over the last half century. Part of this change includes the increasing importance of political consultants to all sorts of campaigns, especially those for federal office. Political scientists once ignored the consultants or treated them as historical oddities. However, it is now impossible to ignore their contributions. Political consultants have moved from the margins of democratic affairs to the mainstream. Studies of consultants over the last ten years have unearthed some very interesting findings. For example, the presence of political consultants helps to account for the success or failure of campaigns, the tone of campaigns, and in the case of some direct democracy contests, the occurrence of a campaign at all. It is now time to examine the role that consultants play in the policy-making process and to consider seriously how their activities may affect the quality of that process.

Policy making in the United States has always included a political element. The question for policy makers has always been how much politics should be included as various policy options are considered and implemented. Politics presumably undermines the efficient and scientific component of policy making and should, therefore, according to some, have a limited impact. However, what happens when policy making must cope with the kinds of activities normally confined to the campaign environment?

The Campaign Continues is an important and interesting effort to understand more fully what some of those effects may be. It seeks to describe the various methods that political consultants use and then examines the ways in which those methods are increasingly used in a "postelectoral consulting" phase. The strength of the book rests on the rich case studies of particular pieces of public policy. It begins with a case study of the passage of Medicare in 1965. This important piece of legislation traveled a long and difficult route to passage but did not need to contend with the challenges posed by political consultants and the tactics they employ. The Clinton health care reform effort was not so fortunate. The next chapter details the ways in which politicians used political consultants to mobilize public opinion, including the "Harry and Louise" ads, to make it more difficult to deliberate about this policy option. The next case study details the ways in which consultants helped to shape the

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development of the *Contract with America* and the legislative strategy to get it passed. The lesson from the three case studies is clear: political consultants, once a peripheral part of American politics, are now a permanent feature of any significant policy endeavor.

The book raises intriguing questions about the modern policy process and the extent to which it may have been permanently altered by the presence of political consultants. Future studies of political consultants should take up the challenge of this book and investigate the questions it raises. For example, do the activities of consultants have a particular influence at different stages of the process, or is their influence more pervasive, changing the very environment in which policy making takes place? Is the effect of political consultants on policy making the same for all types of policies (for example, distributive or redistributive)? Are political consultants more likely to be used when policies are of a redistributive nature, or are consultants now simply a feature in all policy battles? *The Campaign Continues* convincingly examines why political scientists should be concerned about these questions.

KELLY D. PATTERSON
Brigham Young University

Realignment: The Theory That Changed the Way We Think About American Politics *by Theodore Rosenof. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. 248 pp. Paper, $26.95.*

This book is an intellectual history of the idea of partisan realignment, which is a theoretical approach to understanding political change that developed from analyses of the New Deal realignment and then had to grapple with the very different politics of the 1960s and beyond. At the same time, the book is (necessarily, as the author points out) a history of American electoral analysis and its various practitioners.

Realignment theory—its specifications, its alternatives, and the question of its continuing utility—remains central to literatures on electoral behavior, public opinion, policy change, and political parties. From my point of view (and, I imagine, from the point of view of historians), a strength of the book is its combining of biographical details with electoral analysis. Theodore Rosenof has synthesized a vast amount of scholarly research on parties, voters, and elections and has examined a good bit of archival material (particularly letters) as well. The descriptions of the careers and ideas of Samuel Lubell and Harold Gosnell are especially interesting. The book offers numerous fascinating glimpses into their work and lives and, more generally, into the scholarly community in the immediate postwar area. The latter includes one of my favorite quotes—V. O. Key saying that a Gallup poll is to a Survey Research Center survey as a "two-bit magnifying glass is to an electron microscope" (p. 75).

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I do, however, believe that there are some disadvantages to telling the story primarily through a focus on individual scholars. The focus on people rather than on theory provides a particular perspective that may obscure other, more institutional or intellectual, factors. For example, the sudden introduction of "survey research" rather than "electoral data" described in Chapter 7 is placed in the context of the emergence of the Michigan Scholars, including Philip Converse and Donald Stokes; but one might also want to understand a bit more about the history of polling and about the strengths and limitations of the analysis of aggregate data versus that of individual-level survey data. The author characterizes the difference between Paul Lazarsfeld and his group, on the one hand, and Michigan, on the other, as being sociology versus social psychology; but the story is framed as institutional and personal competition, rather than providing a good understanding of what is really different about the survey questions, the analysis, and the theoretical underpinnings of the two approaches. As a general point, we are told about the claims made by the various scholars but not enough about the basis for those claims.

Following on this, I would like to have seen, perhaps in the conclusion, a discussion that more directly addressed the question of how, exactly, realignment theory *did* change our view of American politics. The author touches on this throughout, but the focus (except in the earliest chapters) is on the internal working-out of the theory within the community of political scientists and political historians. It would have been useful to have taken a step back and discussed the ways in which the theory altered previous conceptualizations of politics and political change.

This having been said, Rosenof's book is an interesting approach to an important idea. The points the author makes about the persistence of cyclical theories; the difficulty of altering paradigms; the tension between, on the one hand, the necessity of historical perspective for understanding realignment and, on the other, the desire to understand current politics, and about the interesting precursors of realignment theory (for example, Stuart Rice and Arthur Holcombe) make this book a fascinating and worthwhile contribution to the literature on parties and elections.

KRISTI ANDERSEN
Syracuse University

Florida 2000: A Sourcebook on the Contested Presidential Election
edited by Mark Whitman. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. 300 pp. $65.00.

One might reasonably ask if we need yet another book on the 2000 presidential election and its aftermath. There are, of course, dozens in print already and they offer all manner of approaches to the subject. Some (particularly journalistic accounts) describe the drama as it unfolded; others are polemical views of the

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U.S. Supreme Court's ultimate decision in *Bush v. Gore*; still others attempt to provide impartial analyses of the entire event. Many of these books are edited volumes, which allows for a variety of perspectives in one text, and a few collect key documents from the legal battles that occurred in the thirty-six days following Election Day.

Mark Whitman's book is of the latter type and, as a result, one is tempted to say its publication is overkill. A glance at the book suggests similarities to E. J. Dionne and William Kristol's *Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary*. A closer look, however, reveals the extent to which Whitman focuses on legal documents—including both lawyers' briefs and judicial opinions—making his an original and worthwhile contribution to the universe of Election 2000 books.

Whitman breaks the postelection period into six phases and provides comprehensive coverage of the legal battles that took place during each of those phases. The book begins with a brief examination of the protest and recount phase, wherein Vice President Gore pursued recounts in select counties. Court cases multiply in the second phase, as recounts in four Florida counties and the attempt by Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris to certify the election results on 14 November are challenged (by the Bush and Gore campaigns, respectively). Phase three concerns the procedure for recounting votes, which was allowed to continue by the Florida Supreme Court (in *Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris*). This is followed by the "first trip to Washington" (as Whitman calls phase four), where the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the previous decision of the Florida Supreme Court and sent the case back to them for further consideration. Meanwhile, in phase five, the Gore campaign contested the election in Florida, asking for a review of "rejected ballots" in specific counties (a request denied by the Leon County Circuit Court judge only to be granted by the Florida Supreme Court). The "denouement"—the U.S. Supreme Court case of *Bush v. Gore*—is the final phase of the controversy and fittingly receives extensive coverage by Whitman. The book ends with a conclusion written by Whitman, in which he answers the "whys and wherefores."

Whitman's selection of legal documents is impressive and quite comprehensive. He includes items not found in many sources, most notably a brief by Gore's attorneys intended for submission, but never sent, to the Florida Supreme Court in response to *Bush v. Gore*. Whitman also makes judicious use of contemporaneous popular commentary on the various cases to supplement the legal documents; the number of such pieces is appropriate to provide perspective on the briefs and opinions without detracting from the focus on official court papers.

Although the excerpts from some of the documents are not as extensive as those in Dionne and Kristol, this hardly amounts to a weakness in the book, given the greater overall number of documents found in Whitman. The only noticeable omissions are the concurring and dissenting opinions (of Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia, respectively) to the U.S. Supreme

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Court's 9 December grant of a stay in *Bush v. Gore* (which mandated an end to all vote counting in Florida). Opinions on such grants are rarely issued, and these are short enough to have been included without lengthening the book significantly. Furthermore, these opinions, particularly Justice Stevens's dissent, are unusually sharp—one might even say bitter—and address a decision arguably as important as the Court's per curiam final opinion in *Bush v. Gore*.

Perhaps the most useful aspect of the book consists of Professor Whitman's introductory essays at the beginning of each phase and in the conclusion. His description of events recreates a timeline that is easy to follow and serves as a valuable reminder of exactly how the developments occurred. In addition, the evenhanded way in which he addresses the decisions made by various participants in the cases provides considerable insight.

Election 2000 is as much a legal story as it is a political one. Mark Whitman is concerned with the former, and his book is a welcome contribution to our understanding of that complicated aspect of a controversial election.

STEPHEN K. MEDVIC
Franklin & Marshall College

Giving Voters a Voice: The Origins of the Initiative and Referendum in America *by Steven L. Piott. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 2003. 330 pp. $39.95.*

Important recent works on the initiative in both political science and journalism, such as those by Elizabeth Gerber and David S. Broder, demonstrate that after nearly a century of political adaptation, interest groups and elected officials have wrestled considerable control over the institutions of direct democracy from the popular forces that built them. But exactly who were these forces, and what were their original goals in constructing the initiative and referendum? Political historian Steven L. Piott's *Giving Voters a Voice* investigates such questions. Many of the answers that his thorough work uncovers from a wide range of primary and secondary sources will interest political scientists studying direct democracy today. Still, the way in which Piott structures his book—around case studies of sixteen of the twenty-two states that adopted the initiative or referendum from 1898 to 1918—prevents him from resolving the key question of why direct democracy movements were successful in some states but failed elsewhere.

The first intriguing pattern that emerges from Piott's set of narratives is that the initiative and referendum have their roots primarily in the populist movement, although in some states, their backers had to wait until the progressive moment arrived to pass stalled constitutional amendments. It was not always the Populist party itself that carried the mantle of reform, and Piott is careful to note when that party's goals diverged from the aims of activists. But the consistent profile of leading direct democracy advocates is similar to

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that of J. W. Sullivan, whose publications and AFL-sponsored speaking tour helped spark the movement. Sullivan came from a New York typographers' union, just as leaders in many states emerged from the ranks of the Knights of Labor, the Socialists, and farmers' groups. The initiators of this set of reforms, in most cases, were not the same businessmen and professionals who led other progressive drives.

A second valuable lesson is that the entrepreneurs leading each movement were often motivated by an explicit policy goal, rather than by a desire for abstractly "good government." Sullivan and a majority of the leaders that Piott profiles pursued direct democracy primarily as the means for achieving the end of enacting Henry George's "single tax" program. Many of those who opposed the initiative and referendum also fought them with one concrete issue in mind. The liquor lobby tried to stop Nebraska's reforms for fear that voters would pass a prohibition initiative, while the Women's Christian Temperance Union in North Dakota worried that their alcohol restrictions would be repealed by referendum.

Third, Piott shows that flaws appeared in the new institutions as they were put into practice. Although South Dakota passed the nation's first initiative law in 1898, it was not until 1908 that a citizen-proposed measure qualified for the ballot—and it lost. (Piott's invaluable 40-page appendix details the first decade or so of experience with the initiative and referendum in each state covered, reporting the subject and source of each initiative and the vote on it. Perhaps the most notable trend is that even in the years immediately following the movement's triumph, most proposals lost.) The first set of direct democracy amendments in Michigan had such onerous signature-gathering provisions that it was not until they were rewritten by a friendly governor that they proved effective. By contrast, thirty-two initiative and referendum measures qualified for Oregon's 1910 ballot, filling a 208-page voter guide. Piott's account, along with other recent work by Thomas Goebel and Richard J. Ellis detailing the emergence of initiative consultants and paid signature gatherers early in the twentieth century, shows that none of the ailments of today's direct democracy are entirely new.

Although Piott provides answers to many of the questions surrounding the origins of direct democracy, his analysis omits one central query: why did every state not enact the initiative and referendum? The only state mentioned by Piott in which the movement failed is New Jersey, and he never probes the reasons for its failure. By selecting cases so that its primary dependent variable does not vary, *Giving Voters a Voice* cannot pinpoint just what caused a state to adopt the institutions of direct democracy. Were reformers successful because their states had particularly corrupt politics, as in Oregon and California, or because economic power was monopolized by exceptionally few firms, as in the Dakotas? Did movements flourish only where those who led them possessed extraordinary organizational abilities? Was legislative approval of each constitutional amendment simply the result of favorable timing in the partisan

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politics of each statehouse? Because it only looks at success stories, Piott's account cannot resolve whether it was the rottenness of the status quo, the qualities of an entrepreneur, or an accident of political history that endowed a state with the lasting legacy of direct democracy.

THAD KOUSSER
University of California–San Diego

White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890–1945
by Thomas A. Guglielmo. New York, Oxford University Press, 2003. 296 pp. $45.00.

Between the late nineteenth century and World War I, Italian immigration to America increased dramatically. This wave of newcomers, largely from southern Italy, in contrast to earlier immigration from northern Italy, brought poor, illiterate, unskilled, and largely unwelcome families to America's largest cities. Thomas Guglielmo details the assimilation of Italians in Chicago from this period through to the end of World War II, looking at the major events and themes that characterized this era of immigrant history. His data sources are extensive in what was his dissertation: oral histories, archival materials from many collections, and local journals and newspapers, in addition to secondary sources.

When his chapters are pieced together, they are insightful and they illuminate the experience of Chicago's Italian community in important ways. He examines their participation in local and party politics, showing how they organized, slowly at first, to play an important role in each of the political parties. He tells of the rise of the Italian influence on organized crime, spurred on by Prohibition. The labor movement also saw the rise of the Italian leader who often worked in solidarity with other groups, such as African Americans, who experienced similar discrimination in employment.

In another area, relations with Italy, he describes internal divisions over Fascism and Benito Mussolini, although until the Second World War, Mussolini's successes—including to some extent his Ethiopian adventure—were largely supported by Italian Americans. The war brought that support to a rapid end.

The chapter on private and public housing is perhaps the most compelling in terms of the overall theme of his study—that by being defined as white on arrival in the United States, the Italians gained a significant advantage in generally being accepted into the larger American society. The shift in housing patterns—moving into new neighborhoods—was at first a matter of Italians seeking their rights to decent housing on their way toward upward mobility. Over time, particularly when large numbers of African Americans arrived in Chicago's overcrowded communities, the struggle for the Italians became one of exclusion, of protecting their homes and neighborhoods. The lines were most sharply drawn when federal housing agencies required that policies regarding access to housing be explicit. These became the focus of intense dispute and,

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in some cases, violence. Finally, Italians claimed their whiteness directly and overtly, and in doing so, competed with blacks in a very open and hostile way.

Guglielmo's basic thesis is that Italians were initially classified according their ethnicity—and this was even broken down as southern Italian or northern Italian—and that at first, this was regarded as more significant than their color classification as "white." Over time, their ethnic characterization diminished in importance, and in the process of their assimilation, their status as white Americans became more significant. This characterization, it turns out, was largely responsible for securing legal, political, and later social equality.

As the struggle for the rights of African Americans intensified, Italians, who, at the time of their immigration, had been sympathetic to the cause of black Americans, came into conflict with them, particularly in the struggle for decent housing. Guglielmo does not minimize the struggle that the Italian strangers to America experienced in achieving success, even distinction, in every facet of American life. He chronicles the most outrageous forms of discrimination. His thesis, however, presented with great skill, is that the absence of a color barrier was a powerful factor in the success of Italian Americans. His work represents a significant addition to the field of urban American history.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA
St. Francis College

A Voice for Nonprofits *by Jeffrey M. Berry and David F. Arons. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 210 pp. $26.95.*

Why do so many nonprofits so dedicated to serving their constituencies avoid opportunities to represent them in the policy process? For charitable 501(c)(3) organizations, it turns out that perception is nine-tenths of the law. While IRS regulations permit lobbying, they limit lobbying expenditures and require annual reporting to the IRS. Standards about what constitutes excessive lobbying are so vague and the reporting so complex that many groups decline to participate fully in the policy process.

In this book, Jeffrey Berry and David Arons bring their knowledge of political science to the nonprofit sector, and political scientists get a glimpse of nonprofit organizations through the prism of lobbying regulation and its effects on nonprofit interest groups. A team of researchers and activists from OMB Watch, Charity Lobbying in the Public Interest, and Tufts University designed and implemented this research to bring more concrete, systematically gathered data to bear on four main questions. Was the tax code deterring the participation of 501(c)(3)s? If so, what were the consequences? Were regulations on legislative lobbying and grassroots mobilization acting as a deterrent to unregulated administrative or agency lobbying? What do politically effective nonprofits look like?

What they found is disturbing for democracy. While only a few groups yearly approach expenditure limits, the limits loom large. Nonprofits perceive

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the erratic use of the IRS audit as an omnipresent threat. When it comes to legislative influence, nonprofits go to lengths to avoid the appearance of 'being political' through their choice of language and practices. And while nonprofits are reluctant to engage in regulated legislative lobbying, they lobby agency administrators, an unregulated area of advocacy, without reserve.

Lobbying regulations have the most serious consequences for the representation of disadvantaged constituencies. This book is clear: a re-examination of lobbying regulation is necessary so that all sides will be heard in the legislative process. Berry and Arons promote the full implementation of the H election, a simplified form of reporting lobbying expenditures that takes the guesswork out of the amount groups can spend yearly on lobbying.

I was surprised to read that staff and membership size and organizational wealth were not related to government-initiated contact. "In short, the larger organizations do not attract more interest from policymakers or create more reasons for interaction"(p. 133). Berry and Arons do not speculate on the reasons for this finding, but I wish they had. Instead, they emphasize two variables that do make a difference in political effectiveness: having someone in charge of public policy in an organization increases the chances that groups will engage in advocacy; and solid research is important, particularly at the state and local levels of government.

By the end of the book, I wondered whether Berry and Arons had overstated the impact of regulation on levels of engagement by nonprofits. In the case studies at the Urban Institute, organizational capacity, leadership skills, and network connections were as frequently mentioned as was regulation as influences on levels of nonprofit policy engagement. More empirical research is needed to understand the interaction between regulation, policy engagement, and political representation.

The current regulatory environment for nonprofits is in a state of flux. Recent campaign finance reforms are altering the structuring and financing of nonprofit advocacy in this election. Reforming 501(c)(3) lobbying regulation means balancing sound tax policy, open political expression, and the need for public accountability of private groups as public actors. Berry and Aron's case is so well argued that I wondered whether their remedy was enough. Altering perceptions of nonprofit leaders and restoring a voice for nonprofits might require more than an adjustment in reporting standards. Perhaps the IRS needs to get out of the business of monitoring lobbying altogether.

ELIZABETH REID
Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy
The Urban Institute

The Presidency and Women: Promise, Performance, and Illusion *by Janet M. Martin. College Station, Texas A & M University Press, 2003. 368 pp. $55.00.*

When we think about women's political influence, the focus is most often on electoral politics and campaigns for public office. But gaining a comprehensive

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understanding of the involvement of women in the political life of the United States also requires an assessment of their efforts to achieve influence within the executive branch of the federal government. The presidency became the center of policy making and power in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, to ignore women's efforts to gain positions and influence within presidential administrations would be to neglect a significant domain of presidential politics. Janet M. Martin contributes to the growing body of literature that expands, both in scope and in history, our knowledge of women's efforts to achieve equality in political leadership. She provides readers with a rich historical look at the efforts of women and women's groups to gain appointments for women in the executive branch before and during the initial years of the second Women's Rights Movement in the late 1960s.

Martin examines the drive to influence the presidential appointment process from the Kennedy through the Carter administrations and assesses the influence of women involved in these administrations. She provides an overview of women's employment in the executive branch back to the nineteenth century. It is a study, as she says, "of the institution of the presidency vis-à-vis one group in society—i.e., women" (p. 5). Martin mines a great variety of sources in order to to tell her story and assess the development of the presence and influence of women in the executive branch. Materials come from collections in presidential libraries and the National Archives; the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States series; congressional documents, as well as archival material, especially from the historical records kept by the Federation of Business and Professional Women; and memoirs, autobiographies, contemporary news accounts, and a variety of secondary sources. She focuses on policy making in regard to women's rights and on appointment of women to the bureaucracy and to positions within the White House.

The effort to increase the presence of women in the executive branch did not begin with the inauguration of the second wave of the Women's Rights Movement. Women's groups had developed organized efforts years earlier. Administrations varied greatly in their response to these efforts and in the attention they paid to the public relations significance of having an administration that was a reflection of the American public.

The subtitle of Professor Martin's book includes the word *illusion*. What she means by illusion is that after decades of organizational and individual efforts, women only have the illusion of power within the presidency. At the end of the Clinton administration, women appointees were still pretty much absent from the inner circle of decision making within the White House and women's rights issues that were on the contemporary agenda were similar to those that had been discussed in the 1963 Report of the President's Commission on the Status of Women.

Martin has done a masterful job of unearthing information from presidential and other records to present a historical record of what women have accomplished and the limits of their efforts in the second half of the twentieth

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century. Presidents have tremendous demands on their attention and are also products of their political culture. Women have had to compete with myriad forces to attract the attention of the White House. Professor Martin discusses the tactics they used, their successes, and the limits to their success. Her work is a thorough and thoughtful contribution to the study of women and the presidency.

BARBARA BURRELL
Northern Illinois University

Women and Power on Capitol Hill: Reconstructing the Congressional Women's Caucus *by Irwin N. Gertzog. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. 197 pp. $49.95.*

This book makes an important contribution to the literature on gender and substantive representation by shining a light on the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues (CCWI), an institution that has gone largely unrecognized by students of congressional and gender politics. Although its priorities have shifted from time to time, the CCWI operates as a bipartisan group composed of women House members working to address issues of particular importance to women.

Irwin Gertzog brings the CCWI to life, chronicling its development and highlighting the changes it has undergone since its origin in 1977. The difficulty of navigating abortion politics, the growing partisanship in the House, and the complexity of defining and unifying behind a "women's agenda" serve as some of the most notable challenges the CCWI has faced. Most prominently, however, Gertzog demonstrates that the Republican takeover in 1995 served as a major blow to the CCWI's effectiveness. House rules changes that stripped the resources from legislative service organizations made the work of caucuses much more difficult. As a result, the CCWI has been limited in the extent to which it can advocate for women's substantive interests.

In focusing on the history of the CCWI, the bulk of the analysis focuses on the 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses. This allows for a fresh examination of the manner in which women in Congress affect the content of public policy. Whereas most of the research that explores the impact of women in Congress relies upon empirical analyses of floor votes, bill sponsorship rates, and patterns of cosponsorship, Gertzog relies on nearly eighty interviews with women House members and staffers. The words and experiences of the women who lived and breathed the struggles of the CCWI add richness and nuance to the analysis. In fact, the greatest strength of the work is its reliance on these interviews. They combine to expose fascinating gender dynamics within the evolution of the CCWI.

Although there is quite a bit to admire about this volume—the historical record of the CCWI alone makes it a worthwhile read—the book offers little

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in the way of broad, encompassing conclusions. Gertzog appears content to end the work with prognostication for the future of the CCWI. This narrow focus is consistent with the fact that the author discusses the CCWI's origin and development almost entirely outside of the context of any broader trends occurring in social and political life in the United States. He misses an opportunity to assess broader gender dynamics within Congress and the changes that occurred over the twenty-five year period covered in the book. Further, he chooses not to discuss the CCWI within the context of the fairly dramatic attitudinal shifts regarding women's entrance into political life and prospects for women's election to public office.

In the end, though, these shortcomings do not overly detract from what is an important historical account of a pioneering institution in U.S. politics.

RICHARD FOX
Union College

Southern Women at the Millenium: A Historical Perspective *edited by Melissa Walker, Jeanette R. Dunn, and Joe P. Dunn. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 2003. 256 pp. $44.95.*

This collection of seven essays grew out of a symposium at South Carolina's Converse College intended for women to celebrate the new millennium by examining the changing roles of southern women. Change there has certainly been, especially in recent decades, as the South has become more integrated into the national economy. But even as they celebrate, these essays reveal that conditions rooted in southern history continue to limit women's opportunities in powerful ways.

Jacqueline Jones blames the South's "persistent rurality" and "racist ideology" for holding women back. "These forces," she argues "have tended to estrange groups of women from each other and to limit the potential of women to contribute fully to the southern economy as family members, as workers, and as citizens" (p. 13). The intervention of the federal government has helped some women, but the government's long-term policy of deferring to local communities, Jones charges, has made it "complicit in maintaining long-standing social and economic inequalities" (p. 39).

Melissa Walker confirms Jones's assessment. Through oral histories of white, black, Native American, and immigrant women farmers, she argues that the hard life of the family farm has mostly disappeared, but so too have its satisfactions, while the opportunities that have replaced them have been either in low-skilled jobs (many of them now disappearing to Mexico or Asia) or in high-skilled positions in the South's new urban centers that have tended to go to better-educated outsiders.

Sarah Wilkerson-Freeman's essay on women in the southern Democratic party and Barbara A. Woods's on women in the Civil Rights Movement tell

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a more positive story by focusing on the ways in which black and white women have worked to transform southern politics—if not always together, then in parallel and cumulative ways. Woods portrays women as the backbone of the Civil Rights Movement, while Wilkerson-Freeman traces the emergence of a gender gap in the South significant enough to have had a decisive impact by the 1970s. It was Arkansas women, Wilkerson-Freeman reminds readers, who "put the young, progressive politician Bill Clinton and his activist, feminist wife, Hillary, in the governor's mansion" (p. 78). The Clintons now live in New York, however, and the Democratic party of the South has lost much of its former power.

In her study of law and education, Amy Thompson McCandless looks at how the overturning of "separate but equal" as a justification of racial segregation provided a strategy for breaking down gender stereotypes as well. She also notes, however, that this approach, which opened nursing schools to men and military schools to women, has threatened women's colleges like Converse and the female aspirations they foster.

Ann Goodwyn Jones provides the most positive portrait of change in the entire collection by examining the transformation of the southern literary canon not only in including texts by and about women but also in moving beyond a "bi-racial focus" on the region's past through the exploration of sexual differences, diverse ethnicities, subcultures, and complex psychological conditions. And yet, powerful cultural resistance to this emphasis on diversity remains. "The boundary between man and woman," Jones admits, "is nowhere clearer than in the South, where cross-dressing can be more deadly than racial passing" (p. 178).

In an essay on religion in the South, Nancy Hardesty suggests that such intolerance will abate as women and men "become more comfortable sharing leadership and working together in their religious communities" (p. 224). Perhaps, but resistance to equitable gender relations remains pronounced in the South, as all of the essays in this collection make clear; and there seems to be little reason to believe that the region's churches are likely to become vanguards of change any time soon.

ROSALIND ROSENBERG
Barnard College

Consent to Sexual Relations *by Alan Wertheimer. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 310 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $26.00.*

The notion of consent, although it is fundamental to establishing the legitimacy of the modern liberal-democratic state and is fairly well articulated at this level, is far less clearly understood at the level of interpersonal relations, especially as regards decision making concerning sexual relations. Here, the liberal ideal of freely given consent may or may not obtain, and so, too, its indication of the

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relative autonomy of one person with respect to a decision to engage in sexual relations. Given the typical inequality in physical strength between men and women, the generally higher level of motivation to seek sexual gratification among males, and the greater consequences to women, such as risk of pregnancy, misunderstanding consent here may lead to ill-considered judgments regarding morally or legally permissible sexual relations between men and women. Alan Wertheimer's in-depth analysis of the concept, value, and application of consent in this important arena has set a new standard for clarity and for the integration of empirical research (chiefly, from evolutionary psychology) with the theoretical. This work will help legal professionals and gender theorists to better understand where it would be a mistake to rely on commonsensical wisdom.

The driving concern of this book is to provide the principles of valid consent, when consent is morally transformative, so as to make sexual relations permissible, including for legal purposes or judgments of social morality, neither of which necessarily implicates or neatly maps out onto the other. Indeed, "we can view a woman's experience with critical suspicion and still regard her consent as morally transformative" (p. 229). The Appendix provides approximately one hundred hypothetical cases in which consent and autonomy are at issue, challenging the reader to negotiate an astonishingly difficult and varied terrain. Although we are used to justifying on the basis of consent, Wertheimer presses the issue of when consent is justified, shifting it into "an *output* of moral theorizing" (p. 124).

Wertheimer argues that even rape is about sex, too, and that his particular interest is nonconsensual sex that does not involve force, and so may be indistinguishable from the circumstances of consensual sex. He argues that "we may inadvertently teach men that so long as their behavior is not violent, it is relatively unproblematic" (p. 88), a perspective that fails to take seriously a woman's experience of unwanted, nonconsensual sex. Wertheimer looks to evolutionary psychology to explain why, for women, this experience is decidedly negative. Regardless of whether the harm is socially mediated or the distress belief-mediated, it is real and may be morally and legally cognizable. Our standard way of basing normative claims arguably assumes not only that biology is not destiny, but that it is not at all involved, fearful of what an empirical claim might entail. While Wertheimer recognizes that the leap from "is" to "ought" remains just that, he advances the argument that we may better understand the psychology of sex and what counts as a morally transformative token of consent, and so, too, its absence, if we use the empirical sciences as a basis.

Wertheimer believes that his argument is empowering of women because it takes seriously their experience of nonconsensual sex, although it grounds this experience in evolutionary psychology, an arguably surer ground than, say, social construction accounts that purport to explain sexual violence by men against women. While some feminist theorists may find this basis iffy,

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Wertheimer makes a strong case for psychological, motivational differences between men and women, and dispositonal differences as regards sex. Wertheimer refutes communitarian theorists by arguing that considerations of justice in interpersonal relations enhance, rather than corrupt, improving the quality of personal interactions, rather than separating persons.

GORDON A. BABST
Chapman University

Gay Rights and American Law *by Daniel R. Pinello. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 366 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $23.00.*

Daniel R. Pinello provides a highly provocative empirical analysis of how American appellate courts over the last twenty years have addressed lesbian and gay rights claims. The project is striking, not only in its scope, but also with respect to some of the conclusions Pinello draws. In addition to investigating the particular subject matter of gay and lesbian rights, however, Pinello promotes his analysis as an example of how to bridge the professional and intellectual gap between political science and law scholarship, a gap he suggests exists because "law professors and political scientists generally have neglected each other's contributions" (p. 3). To that end, Pinello strives to explain his empirical study in a manner that is both accessible and relevant to lawyers without skimping on the standard quantitative data analysis essential to political scientists.

At the outset of the book, Pinello dedicates a lengthy chapter to case narratives that offer an anecdotal glimpse into the biases and roadblocks gay and lesbian litigants face when attempting to advance their rights claims (pp. 17–71). These extended excerpts provide an eye-opening introduction for those unfamiliar with instances of discrimination against gay people; and, for those who teach and write about gay rights issues, the narratives (along with the exhaustive compilation of gay rights cases in the appendices) serve as a wonderfully valuable data source. While the narratives certainly help set the stage for Pinello's empirical analysis, the excerpts are left largely unadorned, without much commentary from Pinello. Of course, this approach arguably lets the cases speak for themselves. But Pinello surely selects certain cases to illustrate a particular trend regarding the treatment of gay people, and greater elaboration of exactly what Pinello believes the excerpts demonstrate would help those unfamiliar with the nuances of gay and lesbian rights understand what is at stake.

With respect to the empirical study itself, Pinello examines thirty-nine attitudinal, environmental, legal, and other factors that might help explain the outcomes of the 468 appellate court cases addressing gay civil rights claims during the last two decades. Pinello argues that the models he develops predict case outcomes "with reasonable degrees of accuracy" (p. 104), although he acknowledges the models do not work quite as well for predicting Supreme Court outcomes (p. 97).

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On the basis of his findings, Pinello draws a number of interesting conclusions. He argues that judges in southern states and those appointed by Republican presidents are not particularly accommodating of gay rights claims (pp. 145, 151), a finding probably not surprising to some readers. In contrast, Pinello concludes that diversity in the judiciary with respect to age, gender, race, and religion substantially increases the likelihood of success for gay rights claimants (p. 146). Perhaps most provocative, however, is Pinello's conclusion that a new judicial federalism is developing, with state courts far more likely to embrace gay rights under state constitutions than either federal or state courts seem willing to recognize under the U.S. Constitution. As a result, Pinello states, there is "virtually no empirically based reason to anticipate success for lesbian and gay litigants in federal fora as they are constituted currently or in the foreseeable future" (p. 146).

This last conclusion seems a bit overstated for at least two reasons. First, without a comparison of the success rates of gay rights claims between state courts and federal courts located within the same federal circuit (which Pinello does not provide), it is not clear that an actual litigant living in any state would be better advised to pursue a claim in that state's court system rather than in the federal courts of the particular circuit in which the state is situated. Second, Pinello published the book just before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in *Lawrence v. Texas*, the landmark case overruling *Bowers v. Hardwick* and recognizing under the Due Process Clause a right to engage in same-gender sexual activity. Although the ramifications of *Lawrence* remain uncertain, it seems likely that the decision will give rise to a spate of gay rights litigation under the federal Constitution. Thus, the *Lawrence* case may work substantially against the evolution of the "new federalism" Pinello describes.

Finally, in an apparent effort to demonstrate the contrast in attitudes between political scientists and law professors, Pinello closes the book with a section detailing excerpts from Internet postings authored by "legal academics" who raised "normative objections" when requested by Pinello to assist in collecting data on the otherwise unpublished religious affiliations of certain judges. Pinello explains that the excerpts were included to "highlight[ ] the diversity of opinion over the place of quantitative empirical legal study in academe and beyond" (p. 155). Despite Pinello's goal, the limited anecdotal excerpts do not really capture the full diversity of opinions regarding the place of empirical legal study, and the sour tone distracts from Pinello's primary analysis. That ending seems especially unfortunate, considering Pinello's earlier pledge to bridge the gap between political scientists and legal scholars.

In the end, Pinello's work represents a thought-provoking analysis that invites further commentary and empirical study from lawyers and political scientists alike.

MICHAEL R. SIEBECKER
Hofstra University School of Law

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Officially Gay *by Gary L. Lehring. Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 2003. 248 pp. Cloth, $59.50; paper, $19.95.*

At the time of this writing, the reality of legally recognized same-sex marriages in the state of Massachusetts is imminent. While the ongoing policy debate on a proposed constitutional amendment to prohibit state recognition of same-sex marriage (and the ancillary debates at the state level nationwide) will ultimately determine the scope and viability of this startling legal development, it seems fair to say that the prospect of gay marriage in the United States would have been hard to imagine even a decade ago. Consider that just over a decade has passed since the bitterly polarized debate around Clinton's proposal to lift the ban on gays in the military roiled the first six months of his presidency. As Gary Lehring argues, the terms of this debate underscored the precarious position that sexual minorities occupied in making claims for political equality in the face of the military's framings, which were inextricably linked to a set of truth claims that had as their origin not only the state itself, but epistemologies rooted in institutions as diverse as the church, medicine, psychiatry, and law.

Lehring analyzes the ways in which political institutions, public policies, and the power of the state have shaped the choices about and understanding of sexual identity. Beginning with a review of the "essentialist-constructivist" debate around homosexual identity, Lehring lays the groundwork for a critique of an ethnic-group model of identity politics (which Lehring contends is rooted in essentialism) that privileges assimilationism and access to dominant institutions and rights. Lehring next analyzes how different discursive systems of truth production (that is, those of the church, medicine, and psychiatry) have interacted with one another and with agencies of the state to create the modern homosexual subject. Lehring goes beyond the familiar new historicist argument by offering a cogent analysis of the role that U.S. military policy has played in constructing an official gay identity. Through a policy that requires the identification, investigation, and ultimate discharge of homosexual servicepersons, the military has played a critical role in the constitution of homosexual identity. Lehring further analyzes the important role that medical/psychiatric experts have played in the formulation and administration of national public policy in this area. The close interaction between science and the state is a striking example of how epistemologies and institutions that construct homosexual identity have routinely worked together to inform, supplement, reinforce, and legitimate one another. After highlighting the contradictions and incoherences in military policy regarding homosexual acts and identity (which have historically been conflated in practice), Lehring examines the policy debate and resulting policy effects of the 1993 "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" compromise. Lehring concludes by thinking more broadly on the current state of gay and lesbian politics.

By adopting an approach that recognizes the role of military policy (and state power more generally) in affecting the choices about and understanding

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of homosexual identity, Lehring has broadened our understanding of the constitution of gay identity. By investigating the relationships among prevailing discourses rooted in religion, medicine, psychiatry, and the state, Lehring offers a nuanced and explicitly *political* analysis of the processes that have formed an *official* gay identity. While Lehring does not completely ignore the role of agency on the part of homosexuals themselves in the creation of an intelligible minority group identity *as* homosexuals, it is clearly not a central concern. In any case, other scholarly work that more directly addresses the role of gay and lesbian collective actors in both contesting and transforming dominant constructions of gayness (which includes gay identity itself) certainly exists. This book represents an important contribution to the disciplinary study of gay and lesbian politics. While the author seems most at home on the terrain of social and political theory, Lehring's compelling treatment of the military policy chapters (which form the core of the book) make this recommended reading for students of minority politics, public policy, and gender and sexuality studies.

ALAN S. YANG
Columbia University

Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization? *by Kimberly Ann Elliott and Richard B. Freeman. Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, 2003. 175 pp. Paper, $25.00.*

One of the most contentious issues surrounding globalization is its effects on labor standards around the world, particularly in developing countries. Defenders of globalization tend to argue that trade liberalization promotes economic growth, which, in turn, leads to a demand for higher labor standards. Their view is that efforts by rich countries to impose higher standards on poorer countries are, therefore, not only unnecessary but also misguided; and, further, that such standards are really a form of protectionism in disguise and are thus costly both to workers in poor countries and consumers in rich ones.

Critics of globalization have an alternative view of this issue. They believe that greater openness promotes a "race to the bottom," as low-income countries with a comparative advantage in unskilled labor suppress wages and benefits in a desperate effort to attract foreign direct investment. As a consequence, the only way to avoid this downward spiral and prevent a repetition of nineteenth-century working conditions is to explicitly tie trade agreements to acceptance of some set of international labor standards, such as the core standards promulgated by the International Labor Organization (ILO).

In their new book, *Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization?*, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Richard B. Freeman seek to advance and even resolve this debate by suggesting that globalization and higher labor standards are not the opponents they are commonly portrayed to be, but are, instead,

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"complementary ways to raise living standards in LDCs (less developed countries)" (p. 9). Their argument is straightforward: improvements in labor standards in developing countries can increase the market for their goods in industrial ones. "The key to this virtuous circle," they write, "is consumers' willingness to pay higher prices for goods made under demonstrably better working conditions" (p. 10). The authors then try to demonstrate that this willingness actually exists.

This book has many strengths, chief among them that it provides the most comprehensive account of the labor standards issue that one can find. The authors portray the debate over higher labor standards in a remarkably even-handed fashion, and they consider the effects of that debate on both governments and firms. Further, the authors illustrate their points nicely by making useful references to a number of prominent case studies in which labor rights were at the heart of bilateral and firm-level disputes.

Unfortunately, the empirical sections of the book do not fully support the weight of their central argument. The authors provide evidence of various kinds—survey data, changes in corporate share prices in response to consumer movements, and some behavioral anecdotes—in support of their contention that consumers will pay more for goods produced under "better working conditions" (a term that they define in terms of core ILO labor standards such as the right to association and a prohibition on child labor), but the evidence is not wholly convincing. Even more disturbing, in some cases the authors' use of evidence is highly selective.

For example, in their discussion of consumer boycotts aimed at promoting higher labor standards, one of the cases they highlight is the ultimately successful campaign to stop soccer ball manufacturers in Pakistan from using child labor. They note how an activist group, the International Labor Rights Fund, brought global attention to this issue and how it generated enough controversy to motivate firms to modify their production techniques, including investments in modern plants and equipment. But the authors overlook evidence produced by a trio of University of Michigan economists—reported in the October 2000 issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's *Regional Review*—suggesting that these changes did not help the children or their families, who lost work but without any gain in education or other opportunities. Activists in the industrial world may have felt good about stopping child labor, but the consequences of their actions were paid by the people of Pakistan. Such selective use of evidence, of course, calls into question the authors' other case studies as well.

In addition, the authors completely overlook the possible costs to poor consumers in the North of higher labor standards in developing countries. Their argument is based on consumer willingness to pay more for their textiles and sneakers, but which consumers indicate such a desire? Much of their evidence, for example, is drawn from the alleged preferences of American university students or Starbuck's devotees. This is hardly a representative sample. Do the poor in the United States and Western Europe wish to pay more to support higher labor standards in the developing world? That question is never addressed.

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The authors also present a naive view of the relationship between activists who lobby for higher standards and the firms that, in response to "consumer" campaigns, adopt codes of conduct in which they pledge to enforce them. Yet, activists and firms may be forming a symbiotic relationship, in which activists take rents from firms in the process of certifying their good behavior, while firms pass the costs to their workers, on the one hand, and to consumers, on the other. Indeed, in many cases, multinational firms willingly adopt higher standards because they provide a barrier to entry against potential competitors. Nowhere do the authors mention the high costs associated with monitoring plants and factories for higher labor standards, but these costs may be greater than small and medium-sized enterprises can support. Again, the consequences for product markets of higher labor standards and the associated corporate codes of conduct are nowhere mentioned.

Overall, then, *Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization?* represents a bold and useful effort to put a new and positive spin on a debate that has brought people into the streets at any number of recent multilateral gatherings. The authors have tried to suggest a middle way, in which higher labor standards translate into greater market access. Students of these issues will undoubtedly use this book as a basis for further discussions concerning how to ensure that the benefits of globalization are distributed to workers throughout the developing world. I heartily recommend it for classroom use at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.

ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN
INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France, and
Center for Global Development, Washington, DC

Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule *by Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas. Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Brookings Institution, 2003. 218 pp. Paper, $18.95.*

The e-Connected World: Risks and Opportunities *edited by Stephen Coleman. Quebec, Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003. 180 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $29.95.*

In what has been written so far about the political significance of the Internet, three assumptions exert a pervasive influence: a technological determinist view of the Internet as an intrinsically democratic force; a conception of democracy primarily in terms of liberal individualism, which the Internet is seen to naturally facilitate; and the idea that the economic significance of the Internet represents an indirect force for political liberalism. In their different ways, these two books significantly depart from these influences to emphasize the highly contingent nature of the Internet's democratic political impact and the collective organizational and deliberative dimensions of democracy itself.

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Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas are specifically concerned about the significance of the Internet for authoritarian regimes. They systematically examine the manner in which the Internet affects relationships within and between the state, civil society, and the economy. Importantly, the cases studied include authoritarian regimes that vary in size and nature as well as extent of engagement with the global market system: China, Singapore, Vietnam, Burma, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Theirs is a sophisticated analysis that locates the Internet within the context of complex and dynamic social and political processes, highlighting opportunities and challenges alike for authoritarian regimes.

Indeed, one of the great strengths of their approach is its capacity to explain how the Internet is being harnessed to improved surveillance under many of these regimes and why self-censorship often consolidates rather than diminishes with the technology's diffusion. The authors demonstrate that the Internet can be deployed to shore up the legitimacy and effectiveness of authoritarian regimes. This extends beyond e-commerce, e-government, and blatant propaganda initiatives to the selective sanctioning of Internet access and usage by proregime organizations. In Saudi Arabia, for example, authorities have exploited widespread social conservatism by inviting the public to identify sites that should be blocked. The study cautions, moreover, against the idea that loss of control over the Internet by authorities in authoritarian regimes necessarily opens the door to liberal and democratic politics. Where there are cracks in the system of controls in China, for instance, it is nationalist rather than democratic sentiment that threatens. In the Middle East, radical political Islam could conceivably be given fuller expression in any breakdown of state controls.

The book also further exposes the myth about markets as a natural ally of democracy. In China, in particular, it was the desire to keep on the good side of the authorities in order to secure market access that led in 2002 to more than one hundred foreign Internet industry entrepreneurs signing a pledge to promote self-discipline and encourage the elimination of "deleterious information" (p. 36) on the Internet. Multinationals from the West have also been at the fore of designing and providing technical means for filtering, blocking, and monitoring the Web, all of which are being adopted to differing extents by authoritarian regimes.

The fact that all of the states in the study, with the exception of Egypt, control much of the physical network infrastructure, such as national backbones and gateways, is not incidental to the propensity for self-censorship by Internet providers and users in these states. However, the authors do not place faith in privatization per se to foster freer expression and information flow. Instead, they argue that the World Trade Organization needs to specifically foster more liberal access and content policies. Even then, a realistic objective, they argue, would be for policy makers to abandon the idea that the Internet can of itself stimulate grassroots political opposition and instead explore ways in which the Internet can support existing liberal trends, which might involve developments at the elite level.

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This book represents a powerful corrective against technological determinism and naïve liberal optimism about the Internet. It steers attention to such factors as the nature of the state and its political and economic relationships, the complexity of political institutions and party systems, and the extent and nature of the determination by domestic and international civil societies of the Internet's impact on authoritarian regimes. It is not the final word on the precise analysis of these relationships, but it is an outstanding contribution to a better understanding of what the Internet means for authoritarian rule. Hopefully, it will stimulate a research agenda to carry that analysis further.

Stephen Coleman's edited collection brings together an interesting group of Internet policymakers, academics, and practitioners, largely from Canada and the United Kingdom. The topics examined range from protecting anonymity and privacy, policing financial crime, and enhancing social access and learning on the Internet to more overt political questions, such as how to enrich or even revive civil society and democracy through the technology. Collectively, the contributions are intended to provide a "non-utopian account of digital technology" (p. 7).

Stephanie Perrin argues that the pace and nature of Internet development has meant that governments, businesses, and citizens are all experiencing a sense of loss of control over intellectual property and private transactions. Protection of privacy, contends Perrin, is one of the cornerstones of democracy. The freedom to read, associate, and express are, however, now subject to various forms of commercial and governmental surveillance. Yet, as Ronald Deibert explains in another chapter, legislative measures aimed at balancing privacy and security have so far been overwhelmingly directed toward protecting the interests of governments and business, often at the expense of citizens' rights. Thus, the containment of file sharing/file trading is leading to what Diebert describes as draconian intellectual property laws aimed at protecting the interests of powerful corporations. Meanwhile, the "war on terror" has been accompanied by the radical extension of state powers of electronic surveillance. These powers pose a potential threat to citizen networks and might jeopardize altogether the work of nongovernment organizations such as those in the human rights field that rely on information security to operate under authoritarian regimes.

A number of the book's contributors emphasize the political importance of the design of the Internet and the way in which global communications infrastructure is developed. Coleman dedicates the concluding chapter to a discussion of these concepts, starting by underlining serious limitations to the existing concept and practices of political representation in advanced liberal democracies. He advocates fuller development of the Internet's potential for interactive, public deliberation and more effective means of ensuring responsiveness on the part of business and government to these expressions. Involvement of participants in online deliberations "need[s to] be less preoccupied with representation and more focussed on recruiting a broad range of experience,

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expertise, and interests," according to Coleman (p. 30). Yet, he adds that the e-democracy debate is "about the reinvention of representative democracy" (p. 37). How to reinvent without subverting democratic representation, though, is the question that Coleman's idea will have to address. Questions are emerging about the relationship between functional and democratic representation and about who determines the recruitment of political participants.

GARRY RODAN
Murdoch University

The Politics of Internet Communication *by Robert J. Klotz. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. 304 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $26.95.*

Robert J. Klotz stakes out a continent of territory in this introductory volume. He surveys what is known about Internet users, online campaigning, e-government, online journalism, the legal and regulatory framework of the Net, and how the new medium has emerged differently in democratic and repressive regimes. As might be expected in a first edition about a sprawling and fast-changing field, the contents vary in quality. Klotz does a fine job of summarizing landmark court decisions, legislation, and governing bodies vis-a-vis the Internet. He provides adequate accounts of early patterns and achievements in online campaigns for office and policy outcomes in the United States and delivers fresh perspective on that history by noting that thanks largely to an absence of regulation, online politics in the United States has been more similar in style to that in other advanced democracies than is the case with broadcast campaigning. He sensibly interprets survey data about Net use through the lens of technological diffusion theory and makes a good start at carrying that chronological framework into the other sections of his book. There are more payoffs to come in contrasting Internet politics and policy during the pioneer years (1983–1994), the years of rapid early adoption (1995–1999), and the years of mainstreaming (2000–present).

Many of the examples and citations in the book come from the second era. That is understandable, but the book could have been of greater use had it supplied a few enduring questions and Web sites at the end of each section, so that students, teachers, and other researchers could update material on their own. The book also relies on a flawed definition of the Internet. Klotz sees it as a computer-enhanced medium for personal and mass communication. That definition illuminates a lot of the "more, faster" effects associated with online politics, but slights the significance of the Internet as an instrument of and inspiration for group communication.

In its unique capacity to put people in sustained yet affordable contact with others whom they know *and* may not know, the Internet dramatizes how crucial the activity of networking is to the success of democratic politics. Just

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as ambitious individuals gain when they reach out and meet people, polities gain when tens, hundreds, thousands, even millions of people do this simultaneously with similar purposes in mind. The Internet may usher in the reinvention of the interest group and political party, as innovators apply lessons from the business and social worlds (Napster, E-Bay, Friendster, and similar matchmaking sites, software beta-testing, viral e-mail) to challenge, or at least mitigate, the logic of collective action. Inchoate but highly suggestive examples of a new kind of group politics made possible by the Internet include the 2000 vote-trading Web sites, the growing power of Moveon.org, ecstatic moments from the Howard Dean campaign, the launches of the Gray Davis recall and the Wesley Clark campaigns, and, perhaps, al Qaeda.

The last example compels us to be wary of how the Internet amplifies paradoxically the powers of both collusion and surveillance. Klotz is alert to the paradox and to other dark aspects of his subject matter. Yet, as Net politickers improve in assembling support networks and bringing their collective resources—including intelligence as well as money and volunteer hours—to bear on civic institutions and processes, they may redeem Klotz's optimism about the Internet as a "Net Gain for Democracy."

MICHAEL CORNFIELD
The George Washington University

Citizenship and the Environment *by Andrew Dobson. New York, Oxford University Press, 2004. 240 pp. Cloth, $80.00; paper, $29.95.*

Andrew Dobson's study of the relationship between citizenship and the environment is dense and is aimed more at philosophers than at the general reader. He urges a transformation of our traditional notions of liberal and/or civic republican citizenship into a new conception of "post-cosmopolitan" rights and obligations (pp. 33–40). The logic of his argument leads to the concept of the ecological citizen and to the centrality of the ideal of justice.

Another key concept is that of the "ecological footprint," which replaces the municipality and the nation-state (outmoded by accelerating globalization) as the means to evaluate the impact of human activity. The ecological citizen is one who ensures that future generations will be able to pursue options of their own choosing (pp. 99–100, 118–119). The obligation extends not only to future generations but also to those who take less than their share of ecological space—that is, those who tread lightly on the earth.

There are many distinctions to be made—between public and private spheres of action, between contractual and noncontractual obligations, between territorial and global citizenship, between reciprocal and asymmetrical rights and duties. The question of asymmetrical obligation is especially interesting: it recognizes the capacity of some actors "to affect the life chances of distant strangers" (Judith Lichtenberg, quoted in Andrew Dobson, p. 49). For example, Dobson stresses the asymmetry of the relationship (and the size of the ecological footprint) between the heavily industrial North and the less-developed South.

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Dobson is generally meticulous about his contested definitions, but the book's title is misleading. "Environmental citizenship," a liberal concept, is concerned with the claiming of rights. "Ecological citizenship," in contrast, is noncontractual, it can be private or public, and it is nonterritorial. Their common focus is on a sustainable society (p. 89). After stressing this point, he adds that "the key thing now is to see that the question has normative dimensions" (p. 119). I flag this because it is clear that Dobson is not entirely comfortable with his departure from a traditional liberal view that seeks value neutrality.

The author concludes with an engaging discussion of the new, compulsory citizenship curriculum for high school students in Great Britain—enacted in 1996, but not implemented until 2002. Teachers vary in their willingness to take the concept of "citizenship" seriously. But the potential exists (under this law) for a "lived" experience that goes beyond the classroom to emphasize the complexities of real campaigns—especially those involving environmental justice. Dobson argues that "ethics, justice and fairness should take precedence over learning to write letters to one's Member of Parliament" (p. 206). In short, he advocates going beyond the classroom—and the traditional field trip—to confront real problems from the perspective of the participants.

Now, a few criticisms. The author takes great care with definitions and the ideological context. In so doing, he uses an excessive number of quotations—indeed, occasionally he repeats the text of a quotation for purposes of emphasis. Dobson is also highly selective in his choice of sources. The result is a fair treatment of the classics (Aristotle, Machiavelli, etc.), a good treatment of his British contemporaries, but very little attention to American sources. It is also regrettable that he neglects innovative curricula in the United States. One example is Portland, Oregon, where middle school and high school students spend a few winter weeks learning about ecology from Native American storytellers, the Audubon Society, and others. I suspect similar programs exist elsewhere in the United States as well.

My criticisms thus fall into two categories: use of lengthy quotations and the lack of trans-Atlantic citations and examples. Some may also find a third problem: the discomfort some traditional liberals will feel about the flexible value stance of postcosmopolitanism. Dobson has done a real service, I believe, in opening the debate. As is always the case with contestable concepts, some dissent is inevitable.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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